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Between Politics and Reason
Chapter 9. Drugs and Crime
Erich Goode — State University of New York, Stony Brook
Drugs and crime are intimately related in the public mind. When
a gangland execution is reported in the media, most of us immediately
begin thinking about a possible drug connection. Drugs are behind
the extraordinarily high murder rate in the nation's largest cities,
we feel. Innocent bystanders are gunned down on the street—and
behind every such slaying, drugs are seen as being responsible.
Decent, honest, law-abiding citizens are held hostage to drug
dealers, afraid to leave their apartments at night. Robbery, burglary,
auto theft, simple larceny—these and other property crimes are
committed on a massive scale to pay for millions of drug habits.
Assault, rape, reckless endangerment, child abuse, automobile
fatalities: Much of it is committed when the offender is under
the influence.
The connection between drugs and crime is real, of course, although
somewhat exaggerated in the public's mind, and in the media as
well. All researchers recognize that determining the causal link
between drug use and criminal acts is not an easy matter. If the
police discover a body in a known crack house, was the killing
drug-related? Not necessarily. The deceased may have died of natural
causes, or as a result of actions completely unrelated to drugs.
To some degree, the designation "drug related" is a
construct, not an objective reality (Brownstein, 1993). Even the
fact that drugs and crime are frequently found together or correlated
does not demonstrate their causal connection. Still,
all observers agree that the drugs-crime connection is strong.
Drug users do have a significantly higher than average crime rate.
In fact, the recreational users of all drugs—alcohol
and tobacco included—have a substantially higher crime rate
than do drug abstainers. (Let's return to this theme momentarily.)
What's behind this connection? What causes it? And what can we
do about it? Quite obviously, the criminalizers and the legalizers
have precisely the opposite solution. The criminalizers think
that severe penalties will take the criminals off the street,
discourage potential offenders from breaking the law, and lower
the crime rate. The legalizers think that removing criminal penalties
from the currently illegal drugs would sever the drugs-crime connection
by removing the motives for property crime (because drugs would
be cheap) and violent crime as well (because there would be no
illegal empire to protect). How would it work? And would it be
successful?
One building block of the legalization position is that it is
law enforcement itself that is largely responsible for the high
rate of crime in our society. If the currently illegal drugs were
to be legalized, they say, the crime rate would decline sharply
and drastically. Legalization would "take the crime out of
drugs," its advocates argue. This will take place in at least
four distinctly different ways.
First, since, under legalization, drug possession would no longer
be a crime, not arresting addicts and users—and, in all likelihood,
petty, street-level user-dealers as well—would free up the criminal
justice system to the tune of hundreds of thousands of arrests
per year, and keep hundreds of thousands out of the nation's prisons,
and put them into treatment programs.
Second, since drugs would be sold legally and at low cost, addicts
and drug abusers would no longer be forced to commit crimes in
order to obtain their substances of choice. Their current crime
rate is a function of the illegality of cocaine and heroin; transform
that legal status, and the crime rate of hard-drug users will
plummet, again, freeing up our criminal justice system so that
it can focus largely on the violent criminal.
Third, legalization would result in the deflation of the profits
earned by dealers which, in turn, would result in the virtual
elimination of gang "turf" wars and other violent disputes
that erupt around the drug trade. As much as half the urban street
violence can be traced to the drug trade; eliminate drug profits,
violence will decline, and many lives will be saved.
And fourth, legalization would virtually wipe out organized crime,
at least that sector of it that earns its livelihood by selling
the currently illegal drugs. A major source of the underworld's
profits will be eliminated overnight; organized crime will shrink
correspondingly.
Do these arguments in favor of legalization make sense? Will legalization
reduce or "take a bite out" of crime? Are these points
empirically sound? What evidence do we have to address these points?
Conceptually, at least, we have to make a distinction between
crimes committed by users in the course of their everyday lives
and those committed by dealers in the course of their illicit
business. In addition, we have to keep the distinction between
crimes of violence and property crimes fresh in our mind. These
two distinctions will become relevant as our discussion unfolds.
DRUG CRIMES
If drug possession and sale are legalized, by definition all the
current drug crimes would no longer be against the law. In this
sense, legalization would produce a direct and immediate drop
in the crime rate as a result of taking the drug laws off the
books. Or would it? This depends entirely on the specific legalization
program under consideration. The details of the plan under consideration
are far from a trivial matter. Details represent a series of conditions
which determine or influence what the targeted population is likely
to do, and that is different for different conditions.
Many legalization plans propose controls for the currently illegal
drugs similar to those now in place for alcohol. Alcohol is a
legal substance; anyone above a certain age may purchase it. Let's
be clear about this: In the United States, there are far more
arrests related directly to the use, possession, and sale of alcohol,
a legal substance, than is true for all the illegal drugs.
In 1994, according to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, arrests
for drug abuse violations numbered 1.3 million. But there were
just under 1.4 million arrests for driving under the influence,
over half a million for violations of the liquor laws, and nearly
three-quarters of a million for drunkenness. (This does not count
the arrests for violations that are code words for alcohol-related
offenses, such as disorderly conduct and vagrancy.) Of course,
this statement must be met with a strong qualifier: Though there
are many alcohol-related arrests, and consequently, a sizable
segment of jail or temporary holding facilities is devoted to
them, there are very few arrests that result in prison incarceration.
In contrast, over 60 percent of federal and 26 percent of
state prisoners (and a third of newly incarcerated state offenders)
are incarcerated for drug offenses (Butterfield, 1995). Alcohol
offenses tie up a huge proportion of police and jail resources,
but practically none in prisons. In any case, if the laws and
their enforcement against the now-illicit drugs were similar to
those now operating for alcohol, it is clear that this would not
eliminate drug crimes or arrests on drug charges. It is not
inconceivable that, under legalization, the current drug arrest
figures may actually rise as a result of two developments:
One, as I argued, under legalization, more people will use drugs;
and two, the police will use charges like public intoxication
and driving while under the influence as a new means of controlling
drug abuse. In any case, an alcohol-type legal control system
will not eliminate drug arrests—and it may actually increase
them.
The marijuana decriminalization or "harm reduction"
program that now prevails in the Netherlands is often cited by
legalizers as a model drug plan the United States might adopt.
Yet, it has not resulted in the disappearance of drug crimes.
Recall that in the Netherlands, the possession and sale of small
quantities of marijuana, while technically against the law, are
tolerated in practice; the possession and sale of large quantities
of marijuana remain a crime—both in the law and in its enforcement.
Moreover, the possession and sale of the hard drugs by users,
addicts, and petty street dealers, again, while illegal, results
in very few arrests. Yet, as we've seen, in the Netherlands, roughly
a third of the prison population is made up of drug offenders;
most were arrested for the sale of substantial quantities of the
hard drugs. This is comparable to the United States, where, again,
just over a quarter of the state prison population is made up
of drug violators (Butterfield, 1995). Clearly, then, certain
legalization or decriminalization programs will not eliminate
drug crimes.
Picture a far more modest legalization scheme: some form of drug
maintenance or a prescription plan. In the United States at present,
as we've seen, roughly 100,000 narcotic addicts are enrolled in
methadone maintenance programs. Under these programs, narcotic
addicts are not granted complete, free, or unrestricted access
to any psychoactive substance they wish to take. Instead, they
are administered maintenance doses of methadone, a slow-acting
narcotic. These doses are administered orally rather than injected,
so that they do not produce a high or intoxication. However, only
a minority of the nation's narcotic addicts are enrolled in these
programs (100,000 out of between half a million to a million),
partly because funding for them is limited and partly because
most narcotic addicts do not want to be maintained—they want
to get high. Most enrollees violate the terms of the program
by taking illegal drugs; most drop out of the program against
the advice of the staff, presumably to return to a life of addiction;
most continue to commit criminal behavior, even when they are
enrolled in the program. However, roughly a third to 40 percent,
as I pointed out earlier, are helped in some major way, as a result
of a significant decline in their use of heroin and other drugs,
as well as a reduction in their crime rate. If drug legalization
is to look anything like the current methadone maintenance program
for narcotic addicts, then what we should expect is a significant
drop in the overall rate of illegal drug use for enrollees as
a whole (to perhaps one-half or one-third of their previous level).
However, roughly a third of all enrollees will continue to take
illegal drugs frequently, and will drop out of the program; a
third will take them less frequently, and will bounce in and out
of the program; and a third will remain semi-abstemious as a result
of the program (Hubbard et al., 1989). Again, while this is an
improvement, it does not result in an elimination of drug
crimes among addicts. If legalization is to look like our present
methadone maintenance program, we should expect similar results.
In fact, perhaps we should expect poorer results, since,
now, methadone programs only enroll the addicts who are most
committed to giving up illegal drug use. If these programs
were to be expanded, they will inevitably enroll a far higher
percentage of less-committed addicts and, hence, a higher volume
of drug violations.
Considering methadone maintenance programs forces us to face an
obvious dilemma in "fine tuning" the dispensing of drugs
in any legalization system.
On the one hand, if the restrictions are as strict as they are
for our current methadone maintenance program, many users, abusers,
and addicts will not be willing to enroll because it does not
give them the drug they want, or the drug in sufficient doses,
or administered the way they want. Most users want to get high,
they do not wish simply to be maintained and, hence, refuse to
enroll in a maintenance program. As a consequence, a restrictive
program, such as the methadone programs we now have, will result
in many drug violations among users, including enrollees.
On the other hand, under a viable legalization program, what are
our criteria for eligibility to be? Should anyone above a certain
age be allowed to obtain any quantity of any drug, no matter how
large, at any level of potency? What would the price of newly
legal drugs be pegged at? The price of the currently illegal drugs
is hugely inflated above what they cost to manufacture under free-market
conditions—by a factor of 20 to 50 times. Should drugs be priced
at what the market will bear? If this means selling crack at 50
cents a dose, within the budget of any sixth-grader—so be it?
If not, will an illicit market step in and supply what the market
wants, but cannot obtain legally?
The fact is, under almost any conceivable form of legalization,
that is one with some restrictions, an illicit market will "continue
to thrive alongside the legal one" (Kraar, 1990, p.71). The
lower legal prices are (and the more accessible drugs are), the
smaller this illicit market will be; the higher legal prices are
(and the less accessible drugs are), the larger it will grow.
If there is an "iron law of prohibition" it is this:
An illicit market in a hugely desired product will shrink only
to the extent that the demand for that product is satisfied; to
the extent that it is not, the illicit market will grow correspondingly.
The claim that legalization will dry up an illicit drug market
seems extraordinarily naive, given that it fails to stipulate
the single most crucial factor: the price and availability of
the newly legalized substances. Is it really possible that any
informed observer imagines that free and ready availability of
drugs will not significantly increase their use and abuse and,
hence, multiply the damage they cause?
Hence, the dilemma can be stated quite simply: The more restrictive
the program, the larger the volume of illicit use, and therefore
the more frequent the drug crimes; the less restrictive the program,
the smaller the volume of illicit use—but, almost certainly,
the greater the legal use (Moore, l990a, p.l6). Programs with
many restrictions will have little licit but much illicit
use, whereas programs with few restrictions will have much
licit but little illicit use. Programs which claim to wipe out
drug distribution crimes will do so only at the expense of distributing
psychoactive substances to anyone who wants them, and will encourage
use; to the extent that there are restrictions, an illicit market
will arise to meet that demand. The same economic market principle
operates for less-than-full legalization programs as for our current
punitive policy. The only legalization plan that would result
in eliminating drug-related crimes or arrests for sale and possession
is a complete free-market or laissez-faire program (Szasz, 1992),
which calls for virtually no restrictions on drugs whatsoever.
This plan has no likelihood whatsoever of implementation in the
foreseeable future. As I said earlier, it is difficult to imagine
any legislator or serious policy analyst urging a program that
calls for controls on powerful and dangerous psychoactive drugs
that are no more stringent than those that apply to the possession
and sale of tomatoes.
THE DRUG USE—PROPERTY CRIME CONNECTION: THREE MODELS
Currently, drugs and crime are connected in very specific ways;
their connection bears directly on the issue of whether or not
property crime would decline under legalization. At least three
"models" spell out the different ways they could
be connected: the "enslavement" or "medical"
model, the "criminal" model, and the "intensification"
model.
The enslavement (or "medical") model is the one
that has been adopted by the legalizers. It goes as follows. Addicts
and abusers become "enslaved," unable to control their
use of they drug; they spend so much money on it that they are
unable to support their habit by working at a regular, legitimate
job. Consequently, they must engage in crime; they have
no choice in the matter. The enslavement model argues that addiction
came first and crime followed as a consequence; addicts turn to
crime because of their addiction. In the absence of addiction,
those persons who are now enslaved to a drug would not commit
moneymaking crimes, at least not to the same degree. Under legalization,
in contrast heroin and cocaine would cost just a dollar or so
per dose, and a huge slice of crime would be wiped out virtually
overnight (Inciardi, 1992, pp.l50,153,159,248,263). The enslavement
model makes two assumptions: first, that addicts and abusers are
motivated to use their drugs of choice primarily because they
want to avoid painful, body-wracking withdrawal symptoms and,
second, that they will be satisfied with maintenance and will
not seek intoxication or a high.
The criminal model argues that it is not addicts who
turn to crime but criminals who turn to drugs. Long
before they become dependent on heroin and cocaine, those who
eventually do so were already engaging in a variety of
criminal activities. Persons who eventually become drug addicts
and abusers were delinquents and criminals first; only
later do they turn to drug use. The type of person who
engages in criminal behavior—moneymaking crimes included—is
the same type of person who experiments with and becomes dependent
on drugs. Addiction has nothing to do with their criminal behavior;
they are not enslaved to a drug so much as participants on
a criminal lifestyle. Their drug use is a reflection or
an indicator of that lifestyle; it is a later phase of
a deviant tendency or career. Take away the drugs
and they would still commit a great deal of crime; make drugs
inexpensive, and they would still commit a great deal of crime;
make drugs legal, again, and they would still commit a great deal
of crime. Such persons belong in prison, this argument holds;
legalization isn't going to reform their criminal tendencies (Inciardi,
1992, pp.l51,160-163).
The intensification model represents something of a blend
or compromise between the enslavement and the criminal models
(Inciardi, 1992, pp.l58,163,248). It argues that, yes, criminal
careers are already well established long before someone
abuses, becomes dependent on, or even uses illegal drugs. Take
away the drugs and, indeed, these same persons would still
commit crimes vastly in excess of the rate of the general
population. Legalization will not eliminate their criminal
activities; indeed, most drug-dependent persons are deeply entrenched
in a criminal lifestyle—dependency or no dependency, drugs or
no drugs. Drug abuse and criminal activity are simply part
and parcel of the way some people live. Drugs and crime are
not causally connected so much as manifestations of the same deviant
tendencies. On the other hand, the heavy use of cocaine
and heroin certainly intensifies the likelihood that addicts
and abusers will commit crimes, especially moneymaking crimes.
Researchers have followed samples of heroin addicts over a period
of years. The number of days on which these addicts committed
crimes was extremely high during periods of nonaddiction
(that is, during abstention or when enrolled in a methadone maintenance
program)—but strikingly lower than the number of days
during which they remained addicted (Anglin and Speckart, 1988;
Nurco et al., 1988). The conclusions are inescapable: Drug abuse
does not create or cause criminal behavior, but
it does intensify or drive it. Legalization would
not wipe out moneymaking crime among addicts and abusers,
but it may very well reduce it (Inciardi, 1992, pp.l58,
163, 248).
Would some form of drug legalization reduce the incidence of moneymaking
crimes among drug addicts and abusers to practically zero? Almost
certainly not. Most are involved in crime as a way of life; very
few have a legitimate job; very few have enough education to make
them marketable. Most commit crimes just to stay alive. In the
world of chronic street-drug abuse, criminal activity is routine,
deeply entrenched. It is simply how a certain segment of the abuser
population earns money to obtain what it wants. Legalization is
not going to change this very much. On the other hand, would legalization
reduce the likelihood that heroin addicts and cocaine abusers
would commit moneymaking crimes? In all likelihood, yes. Now,
as we've seen, the total amount of crime committed by addicts
who are enrolled in treatment programs declines to between one-half
and one-third of its former level (Hubbard et al., 1989). Remember,
however, that methadone maintenance clients represent a fairly
small, self-selected sample of addicts who are motivated to succeed;
if all addicts were able to walk into such a program whenever
they felt the impulse to rehabilitate themselves, would their
crime rate be as affected as is the case now, with a more restrictive
program? If legalization were to increase the number of addicts
and abusers significantly and strikingly, the total crime rate
may very well increase along with it. And under legalization,
would users, who would then spend less money on drugs, begin spending
the same amount on other goods and services and, as a consequence,
commit the same amount of crime? This is a distinct possibility.
DRUGS AND VIOLENCE: THREE MODELS
As we saw, crimes of violence must be at least conceptually separated
from property crime. Their dynamics are not necessarily the same;
in fact, their motives are quite different. (At the same time,
most of the same persons who commit crimes of violence also commit
property crime.) The legalization model, at any rate, rests on
a sharp distinction between them. As with the connection between
drug use and moneymaking crimes, we encounter three models of
the drugs-violence nexus, or why violence is more common among
drug abusers than the rest of our citizenry: the psychopharmacological
model, the economic-compulsive model, and the systemic
model (Goldstein, 1985; Goldstein et al., 1989). They do not
correspond exactly to the three models for moneymaking crimes
I just spelled out, although the economic-compulsive model is
similar to the enslavement model above, and the systemic model
corresponds more or less to the criminal model. It is important
to note that these three models are not mutually exclusive;
that is, one is not right, while the other two are wrong. In fact,
one could be right in explaining the dynamics of a particular
criminal event, while, for another specific crime, another model
best explains its unfolding. All may be right in explaining the
drug use-violence link for different specific crimes; on the other
hand, it is possible that one of them best explains a great deal
more drug-caused acts of violence than the other two.
The psychopharmacological model says that drugs cause violence
because of their direct effects. As a result of taking
a specific drug, this model argues, users become irritable, excitable,
impatient, and irrational and, hence, are much more likely to
engage in criminal behavior. Judging by their direct or pharmacological
effects, it might seem reasonable that narcotics would depress
or reduce violent behavior because of their soothing, calming,
soporific effect; marijuana as well is more likely to lower the
user's violent tendencies and hence, reduce the incidence of violent
behavior as well. In contrast, again, simply going on their direct
pharmacological effects, cocaine and amphetamine would seem to
increase the criminal behavior of users as a result of these drugs'
tendency to stimulate overall activity, alertness, edginess, suspicion,
paranoia, and behavioral fixations. It should also be said that
heroin and the narcotics could generate an excitable, impatient,
irritable state during withdrawal (Inciardi, 1992, p.l61).
The economic-compulsive model argues that what causes the
higher rate of violence among addicts and abusers is not so much
the direct or pharmacological effects of drugs but the fact that
users are dependent on drugs and, thus, engage in a great deal
of violent crime that is a by-product of that dependency.
In supporting a costly drug habit, addicts and abusers have to
commit such crimes as theft, prostitution, and robbery; in committing
them, they come into abrasive and sometimes violent confrontation
with victims, bystanders, and the police. Moneymaking crimes become
violent crimes inadvertently, by accident, without design,
simply because victims and others fight back or because drug abusers
often lack good judgment about using the most effective means
of carrying out the deed. They are not "really" violent
criminals, this reasoning goes, they're just involved in moneymaking
activities that unwittingly force them to become violent
upon occasion. Their violence is an extension of their "enslavement"
to drugs.
The systemic model argues that drug abusers are more likely
to be violent than the rest of us because drug abuse is densely
woven into a lifestyle that is, by its very nature, violent. This
is especially the case when we consider drug selling in addition
to the use and abuse of illegal drugs. One cannot be a drug dealer,
especially in the inner city, without facing the possibility of
violence; it is a world that is saturated with violence.
In a study of over 400 homicides in New York City, Goldstein et
al. (1989) found that over half were "drug related."
Four out of 10 of all these homicides, and eight out of
10 the drug-related homicides, specifically involved cocaine.
The connection in nine out of 10 of the cases of cocaine-related
homicides was systemic in nature. It was the social
context of the drug trade that generated the vast majority
of these killings; these homicides were results of territorial
disputes, robbery of a drug dealer, assaults to collect a debt,
punishment of a drug worker, disputes over a drug theft, and disputes
involving a dealer's selling bad drugs.
In other words, the world of selling cocaine, especially in certain
contexts, is an ugly, brutal, violent, inherently disputatious
world. Arguments are frequent. Predators roam the street looking
for opportunities to rip dealers off or muscle in on their territory.
Dealers dilute the merchandise for a fatter profit. Users attempt
to acquire merchandise without paying for it. Huge sums of cash
are exchanged; valuable merchandise—illegal drugs—is moving
from one location to another, from hand to hand, apartment to
apartment, vehicle to vehicle. The temptation to cheat, steal,
and shortchange is always great. Violence is a means of social
control in such a world; it is an ever-present reality.
But we can take this a step further: It is not only the world
of drug dealing in which violence is common (although this is
especially the case); so is the street world of drug abuse generally.
A later study by the same research team (Goldstein et al., 1991)
obtained detailed, day-by-day accounts of the criminal activities
and drug use of nearly 300 street cocaine users for eight weeks,
or 56 days. The sample was divided into nonusers (former cocaine
users—that is, they were nonusers for the period of this study),
"small" users (who spent less than $34 per day on cocaine
during the study), and "big" users (who spent more than
$34 per day on cocaine). The researchers sampled men and women
equally. This study provides a somewhat different slant on the
reality of the connection between drug, especially cocaine, abuse
and violence than the study cited earlier.
About half the sample were involved with at least one seriously
violent episode during the eight weeks of the study (55 percent
for the men, 59 percent for the women). However, the violence
in which men were involved was mainly as a perpetrator, while
the violence most of the women were involved in was as a victim.
Moreover, as volume of cocaine use increased, the men were
increasingly likely to be involved in violence as a perpetrator,
while for the women, as cocaine use increased, the likelihood
of being a victim of violence increased (pp.356, 357). For men,
violence as perpetrator was related to involvement in robbery;
for women, violence as victim was related to domestic disputes
with lovers, boyfriends, and husbands, as well as to disputes
with friends and acquaintances. In this study, alcohol played
a prominent role in violent episodes, and an extraordinarily high
proportion of the violent events reported by the sample stemmed
from the psychopharmacological dimension, and far less from the
systemic or economic-compulsive dimensions (p.361). And in most
of these events, alcohol—not cocaine—was the drug most intimately
connected to violence. Interestingly, of all the categories in
the sample, the "big" male cocaine users were the most
likely to be involved in violence, but their violence was
least likely to be related to cocaine use or distribution
(p.364).
The conclusions we can draw from this study seem clear. Heavy,
chronic street abusers of illegal drugs are involved in a great
deal of violence. Heavy (or "big") male cocaine users
are often victimizers; they frequently engage in a variety of
crimes, both economic and violent. The specific motive of paying
for and supporting a drug habit is almost beside the point. Rather,
most engage in crime more or less as a way of life. Even crimes
with an economic motive, such as robbery, often turn violent.
Many of their acts of violence are alcohol-related. Women, too,
are frequently implicated in acts of violence, but more often
as a victim than as a perpetrator. It is almost inevitable that
women who are involved in the illegal street drug scene will be
victimized; in fact, the more they use cocaine, the greater that
likelihood is. Drug use either places them in vulnerable situations
or is a measure or indicator of their involvement in the violence-saturated
street drug scene. It is extremely unlikely that legalization
will transform the violent nature of the world of heavy, chronic
drug abuse very much. That violence is a part of the way that
frequent, heavy drug users live their lives; it is systemic
to their subculture. In assuming that the ordinary, routine,
day-to-day, garden-variety violence will decline substantially
if the currently illegal drugs were to be legalized, the legalizers
do not make a terribly compelling argument.
THE DRUGS-CRIME CONNECTION GENERALLY
The connection between drug use and criminal behavior is strong,
intimate, and, in all probability, ineradicable. But is it causal
in nature? If so, what is the nature of the causal relationship
between them? As we've seen, the causal connection is extremely
complex. Certainly illegality and, hence, the cost of illegal
drugs influence the crime rate, that is the exact magnitude
of crime. But illegality and cost do not determine criminality.
Recall that, among cocaine abusers, the drug that was most
intimately connected with violence was alcohol, not cocaine, and
that the more that they used cocaine, the less that cocaine played
a role in their violence (Goldstein et al., 1991).
The role of the unexpected is made stunningly clear when we examine
the correlation between legal drug use and criminal behavior.
The relationship between alcohol and tobacco use and the commission
of crime is strong and significant. Practically every study that
has ever been conducted on this relationship has found that drinkers
and smokers are more likely to engage in criminal behavior
of all kinds—both property crime and crimes of violence—than
is true of substance abstainers. Moreover, the more that one drinks,
at any rate, the greater this likelihood is (Akers, 1984; O'Donnell
et al.,1976, pp.82,83). Again, what's the causal connection? And
if this is true of crime's connection with legal—and
fairly inexpensive—drugs, what does this say about the impact
that legalization will have on the criminality of users of the
currently illegal drugs? Then, too, if systemic violence
is characteristic of heavy users of illegal drugs (cocaine and
heroin, at any rate), what accounts for the higher crime rate
of drinkers and smokers? After all, most consumers of alcohol
and tobacco are presumably not members of a criminal subculture;
where does their higher rate of criminality come from?
Let's be clear about this: Most drinkers and smokers are
law-abiding; most do not engage in crime—serious crime at any
rate—and most are not "criminals." When criminologists
assert a connection between drug use and crime, they are talking
about a correlation, a statistical, not an absolute, relationship.
In comparison with alcohol and tobacco abstainers, drinkers
and smokers have a higher rate of criminal offenses. Of course,
there are many drinkers and smokers in the population, so this
does add up to a lot of crimes, but very few of them commit
the crimes that are likely to lead to arrest and incarceration.
Still, when we're talking about differences, they are significant.
And they do shed light on what is likely to happen if the currently
illegal drugs were to become legalized. So, what accounts for
the relationship? What's the explanation?
The explanation, according to some criminologists, is quite simple.
Crime does not cause drug use, and drug use does not cause crime;
attempting to determine a causal relationship between them is
"a waste of time and money" (Gottfredson and Hirschi,
1990, p.234). It is not even necessary to refer to a criminal
subculture, they say. (Although it may be a factor in the equation.)
What's important is that "crime and drug use are the same
thing—that is, manifestations of low self-control"
(pp.233-234; the italics are mine). Essentially, this argument
goes, the type of person who uses psychoactive substances
(alcohol and tobacco included) is also the type of person who
commits criminal offenses. Both drugs and crime "provide
immediate, easy, and certain short-term pleasure" (p.41).
Both entail engaging in an activity that satisfies a hedonistic
desire for something that involves a measure of danger, risk,
or harm, either to oneself or to another. And who is willing to
take such risk, to expose oneself to such danger, to harm oneself
or another? An actor who lacks self-control. After all, the pleasure
is immediate, but the pain takes place over the long run. Hence,
it is an inability to control one's desire for risky pleasures
that is the key here, and that may be found both in substance
abuse and in criminal activity.
Again, this is not to say that all or most substance users engage
in (nondrug) crime. Or that all or most criminals are substance
users or abusers. (Although the second statement probably is true.)
What it is to say is that drug users and criminals are essentially
the same people, at least those who use drugs and commit crime
at a certain level of frequency and seriousness; these two denizens
are cut from the same cloth. The kind of person who engages in
one activity is likely to engage in the other; they are, in fact,
motivated by the same impulse.
This fundamental fact has important implications for what is likely
to happen if the currently illegal drugs were to be legalized.
The fact is, the routine, garden-variety criminal behavior of
the vast majority of heavy substance abusers is likely to be fundamentally
unchanged under a program of drug legalization. Currently,
the day-to-day lives of drug abusers is saturated with crime and
violence; under legalization, by what magical formula is this
going to be transformed overnight? If drugs were distributed inexpensively,
would our current abusers commit the same level of crime to obtain
more nondrug commodities? Hard-core drug abusers are typically
uneducated (most are not even high school graduates), unskilled,
and essentially unemployable. How will legalization change this?
How will abusers obtain the basics, such as food and shelter,
to live after drugs are legalized? It is not clear that legalization
can transform a way of life very much. Sure, among current abusers,
moneymaking crimes may decline, but this is likely to be purchased
at the cost of drawing a greater number of users into the drug
scene, and increasing their involvement in the drug subculture.
Being able to obtain drugs legally will not change the fact that
most drug abusers, now and in the future, are low impulse control,
high-crime perpetrators. It is difficult to imagine what will
turn them into law-abiding citizens, although some feasible programs
could, conceivably, lower their crime rate a bit.
VIOLENCE, DEALING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME
Would legalization eliminate or substantially reduce the volume
of violence that stems from drug dealing? It depends on the exact
program in question. Extremely liberal programs relying on the
ready availability of drugs on demand may very well eliminate
the need for an illicit drug market, and thus have the projected
impact. But as with users generally, without a source of income
and essentially unemployable in legitimate jobs, how will the
dealers of today earn their livelihood? Will crime including violence,
become their only source of income? What will replace what they
now have? And will legalization wipe out or weaken organized crime?
(Keep in mind that "organized crime" is a good deal
less organized—that is, far more decentralized—than
most people think.) The repeal of Prohibition didn't wipe out
organized crime in the 1930s; in fact, Prohibition capitalized
the later enterprises, some of them legal, that organized crime
turned its attention and talents to. What would these ambitious,
daring entrepreneurs have in store for us if a major source of
their income were to be eliminated overnight? Would they become
more ruthless in taking over legal enterprises? Would they turn
their attention to more or less legal financial speculation? Would
their new enterprises entail more, or less, danger to the public
than the sale of drugs does now? Or, would the old organized criminals
now be selling legal drugs? Would they then be in much the same
position that purveyors of alcohol and tobacco are now? After
having "gotten rich from illegal drugs," would dealers
then "launder their images and play key roles in the now-legal
distribution system" (Jacobs, 1990, p.29)? Would their new,
legal source of income magnify their power and influence? It's
anyone's guess. But one thing is certain: A legal change is not
going to force them out of business. They'll do something,
but whether this will involve more—or less—mischief for
the rest of us has to remain in the realm of speculation.
Of course, the other side of the equation is that, to the extent
that legalization programs are more restrictive, an illicit market
will be correspondingly larger. As we've seen, illicit drug dealing
can be shrunk down only to the extent that the current
demand for these drugs can be met. To the extent that restrictions
block access to them, an illicit market will flourish correspondingly.
And, of course, as I've argued, increases in use are an extremely
likely consequence of less-restricted access. An illicit market
can be diminished, and whatever benefits there are in a reduction
in the crime rate along with it, only at the expense of an increase
in availability and therefore use. As with use specifically, this
represents one of the central dilemmas in the issue of legalization.
SUMMARY
If a knowledgeable observer were to summarize the probable impact
of legalization on criminal behavior, it would go something like
this.
Legalization is likely to reduce economic crimes among current
heroin and cocaine abusers to a certain extent, although probably
not dramatically. But drug abusers commit a great deal of crime
in their day-to-day lives, and most of that volume is not going
to be affected very much. Moreover, we do not know what the impact
of increased use is likely to have on the crime rate of current
nonusers. And what are current dealers, high and low, going to
do once their livelihood is taken away? To imagine that they will
turn into law-abiding citizens overnight is fanciful. An experienced
gambler is not likely to wager much money on the bet that legalization
will have a dramatic impact on the crime rate.
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