Own your ow legal marijuana business | Your guide to making money in the multi-billion dollar marijuana industry |
Special Collections of Documents | ||||
The Rufus King Collection | ||||
The Drug Hang Up, America's Fifty-Year Folly |
|
The Drug Hang Up, America's Fifty-Year Folly by Rufus King Chapter 11 Smearing Mary Jane IN THIS ENFORCED vacuum marijuana continued to be portrayed as a national menace calling for heroic responses from the drug-police camp. And that brings us to a brief look at Commissioner Anslinger's famous annual reports. From the early 1920's the Narcotics Division and its successor, the Narcotics Bureau, prepared a single document each year to serve as its report to the U.S. Congress and at the same time to fulfill the reporting obligations of the United States as a party to the International Opium Convention and subsequent treaties. This lent itself to the bootstrap operations we have already observed-whatever the Bureau said to Congress could subsequently be cited in Geneva and New York as the official U.S. position vis a vis the international community, and vice versa; that is, whatever the U.S. Commissioner might say as an international delegate was thus fed right back to Congress as gospel from the high contracting powers. These double-barreled reports are titled "Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs" and there is nothing else like them in all the annals of U.S. bureaucratic publishing. Year after year they scolded, grumbled, and exhorted, leaning heavily on bold-face capitalization, torrents of italics, and turgid hyperbole. They innovated such shabby reporting tricks as measuring the T-men's prowess by adding all prison sentences imposed on persons they had arrested (already mentioned-the 1933 total was 3,248 years, 10 months, 18 days), and reckoning the value of contraband seizures in exaggerated estimates of what they might have brought at top-dollar retail prices on the illicit market. Although the Government Printing Office does not encourage embellishing illustrations in official reports, these documents were always laced with photographs: criminal types posed where they were caught, mug shots of unattractive Bureau targets, and revolting portraits of alleged victims of the traffic. Instead of statistical analysis, the reports leaned heavily on anecdotal items like the following:
It is noteworthy in connection with this otherwise insignificant -and typical-account that Treasury tax collectors were never intended to be armed, and that Narcotics Bureau agents only received special authority to carry guns from Congress in the Narcotic Control Act of 1956. The following year, the Bureau solemnly chronicled this as a marijuana case:
To give the full flavor of these singular documents-remembering t they are official publications of an agency of the United States government and at the same time formal communications addressed by the government to other nations, is a task which, though tempting for what it reveals about Anslinger and his Bureau, would require more than the compass of this volume. When anyone, no matter how clumsy or obscure, published something that supported the Bureau's official line, the report would note it and sometimes devote pages to commendation of the author and quotations of favorite passages. When one Pablo 0. Wolff, for example, who later became the World Health Organization's resident expert on marijuana thanks to vigorous U.S. sponsorship, published an alarmed monograph on marijuana in Latin America (where the drug has always been regarded with sanguine calm), the Bureau hailed it as "a painstaking review of information on the abuse of cannabis," and "a much-needed compilation of current knowledge in one volume":
Even federal judges were patronized. In the 1949 report, this second-rate Treasury agency set forth the following, captioned "The Sound Policy of a United States District Judge":
The same report then details, for the information of Congress and the U.N., some "Crimes Associated with Marijuana":
The total of seizures of bulk marijuana reported by the Bureau for the nation for the year 1949 was, incidentally, less than a thousand pounds, and total seizures of marijuana cigarettes were approximately twenty pounds. Members of Congress have always seemed to relish Mr. Anslinger's themes, and pronouncements emanating from the Bureau were sometimes topped by echoes from Capitol Hill. As public anxiety about drug addiction peaked again in the early fifties, the Bureau found a champion in Congressman Hale Boggs, who took up the witless refrain that the courts were really responsible for drug trafficking because they were meting out sentences of insufficient severity. The remedy for this, according to An-slinger and Boggs, was greatly increased penalties with mandatory minimums (provisions requiring sentencing judges to impose punishment of at least a specified number of years of imprisonment), and the Congressman introduced a bill for is purpose, quickly emulated by other law-makers in both houses, in the 81st Congress in 1950. This so-called Boggs Act failed to pass on the first round, but it was reintroduced in the 82nd Congress and acquired so much momentum that it was reluctantly embraced by the Kefauver Committee, becoming law in 1951 as one of the latter's legislative proposals. Drum-beating for tougher sentences for all dope-connected convictions somewhat eclipsed the marijuana issue in the Kefauver proceedings, but the new penalties were attached to marijuana offenses as a matter of course, without any question or opposition. Kefauver noted that marijuana was coming into the country from Mexico in "a tremendous flow," observed that more and more young people were using it, and accepted the Bureau claim that there was a causal or sequential relationship between marijuana use and addiction to the more damaging drugs:
Again in 1955-56, when the Daniel Committee conducted its hearings and sponsored even more severe penalties and higher mandatory minimums in the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, marijuana was carried along into the new pattern with only glancing attention. The Senate investigators noted that Mexico was still the source of a great volume of marijuana, that not only civilian users but also U.S. servicemen stationed at military installations near the border went across frequently to get drugs, and that "juveniles also cross with ease." Even Commissioner Anslinger was momentarily outdone by the zeal of some of the questioning:
The Commissioner explained that cannabis had been withdrawn from medical use after 1937 because it had no therapeutic advantages and was dangerous, "with the likelihood that it might cause insanity." Then followed this exchange:
In 1948 the United States government and the Narcotics Bureau-run synonyms in this context-had launched a campaign in the U.N. Commission to consolidate all existing international drug agreements into a new Single Convention. Year after year the Bureau reports scolded and exhorted to move this project along, and commencing in the middle fifties they began to bear down on cannabis:
Heading a new parade of episodes in 1958 under the caption "Narcotics and Crime" came the story of one Joe Padilla Franco, an amiable alcoholic by his own description, who bought three marijuana cigarettes from the Green Ladder Bar in Roswell, New Mexico, drank some beer, smoked two of the joints, and some time later woke up to recall that he had stabbed a three-year-old girl to death, whereupon he fled to Mexico. When apprehended, Joe told the authorities that the whole thing had been like a dream, and that he "believed he would not have killed the child if he had not smoked the marijuana." In the following year, the Bureau's official gallery of horrors featured this:
How surprised and proud this Mexican Joe must have been if he ever learned that his horn-blowing and seed-carrying had been thus officially reported in such vivid detail by the U.S. Treasury department to Congress and by the U.S. Government to the United Nations.
|