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U.S. Attorneys: More Accountability for Implementing Priority Programs Is
Desirable
(Letter Report, 06/23/95, GAO/GGD-95-150).
U.S. Attorneys litigate for the government in criminal and civil
proceedings. They prosecute persons charged with violating federal
criminal law, represent the government in civil cases, and collect money
and property owed to the government. In view of the independence and
the discretion exercised by U.S. Attorneys in determining which cases to
prosecute and recent growth in the size and the cost of their
operations, this report determines (1) how the Justice Department
communicates national priorities to the U.S. Attorneys; (2) how selected
U.S. Attorneys establish their priorities and coordinate them with law
enforcement agencies in their districts; and (3) what, if any, measures
Justice uses to assess U.S. Attorneys' effectiveness in meeting national
priorities.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GGD-95-150
TITLE: U.S. Attorneys: More Accountability for Implementing
Priority Programs Is Desirable
DATE: 06/23/95
SUBJECT: Law enforcement
Law enforcement agencies
Crimes or offenses
Interagency relations
Lawyers
Prioritizing
Agency missions
Judicial review
Litigation
Policy evaluation
IDENTIFIER: DOJ Operation Weed and Seed Program
California
Florida
Michigan
New York
Texas
Maine
Maryland
DOJ Operation Garbage Out
Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
June 1995
U.S. ATTORNEYS - MORE
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR IMPLEMENTING
PRIORITY PROGRAMS IS DESIRABLE
GAO/GGD-95-150
Implementing Priority Programs
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
ATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
DEA - Drug Enforcement Administration
EOUSA - Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys
FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
GPRA - Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service
IRS - Internal Revenue Service
LECC - Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee
OMB - Office of Management and Budget
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-259728
June 23, 1995
The Honorable Karen L. Thurman
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs and
Criminal Justice
Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight
House of Representatives
The Honorable Gary A. Condit
House of Representatives
U.S. Attorneys litigate for the government in criminal and civil
proceedings. They prosecute individuals charged with violations of
federal criminal law. They also represent the government in civil
cases and collect money and property owed to the government. By
statute, U.S. Attorneys are under substantial supervisory control of
the Attorney General. For example, the Attorney General is
authorized to supervise all litigation involving the United States
and to direct all U.S. Attorneys and their assistant U.S. Attorneys
in the discharge of their duties.\1
The Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), located in the
Department of Justice, provides assistance and coordination services
for 93 U.S. Attorneys. In practice, the U.S. Attorneys exercise a
large degree of independence and discretion in the handling of their
cases. This independence and discretion stem from several factors,
including historic precedent, the appointment process for U.S.
Attorneys, and their ties to the districts they serve.
In view of the independence and discretion exercised by U.S.
Attorneys in determining which cases to prosecute and recent growth
in the size and cost of their operations, the Chairman of the former
Subcommittee on Information, Justice, Transportation and Agriculture,
House Committee on Government Operations, asked us to review several
issues relating to U.S. Attorney priorities. Specifically, he asked
(1) how the Justice Department communicates national priorities to
the U.S. Attorneys, (2) how selected U.S. Attorneys establish their
priorities and coordinate them with law enforcement agencies in their
districts, and (3) what, if any, measures Justice uses to assess U.S.
Attorneys' effectiveness in meeting national priorities.
During the course of this review, Congress enacted the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).\2 The law requires that
Justice and all federal agencies will set goals, measure performance,
and report results. We considered Justice's processes for setting
priorities and measuring results in the context of the GPRA's
requirements, which are to be phased in over the period of 1997 to
2000.
--------------------
\1 28 U.S.C. 519.
\2 Public Law 103-62.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Justice did not have a specific process for communicating national
law enforcement priorities over the past 10 years. National
priorities were communicated to U.S. Attorneys through a variety of
formal and informal channels, such as Attorney General speeches,
press conferences, testimony before Congress, budget memorandums, and
in discussions at seminars and conferences. Often, priorities were
broadly stated, covering a wide range of crime types. An EOUSA
official said that national priorities had been so broad and wide
ranging that almost every major crime type could be classified as a
priority.
Although Justice continued to communicate priorities to U.S.
Attorneys through a variety of channels in 1994, it moved toward
setting more focused law enforcement priorities. The Attorney
General expressed commitment to principles of strategic management
and clear articulation of priorities, goals, and missions for U.S.
Attorneys. She ranked violent crime and health-care fraud as the
nation's number one and two law enforcement priorities, respectively,
and took specific steps to implement these priorities.
Justice did not require U.S. Attorneys to have processes in place to
establish and communicate their local priorities. Seven of the eight
U.S. Attorneys we visited did not have formal processes to establish
priorities and communicate them to law enforcement components in
their districts. Their priorities were set informally on the basis
of the Attorney General's priorities, as well as on the crime
problems and socioeconomic characteristics of their districts. For
example, government program and procurement fraud was a priority for
one U.S. Attorney in part because his district was the home of many
defense contractors.
The U.S. Attorneys we interviewed were generally satisfied with
their input into the development of national priorities.
Investigative agency personnel we visited generally said that they
understood the priorities of the U.S. Attorneys. These personnel
felt that the priorities of the U.S. Attorneys were closely or
adequately coordinated with the priorities of their own offices.
Caseloads and workloads for U.S. Attorneys' Offices nationwide, and
for the eight districts we visited, indicated that most cases filed
and attorney time spent in fiscal year 1993 were in three broad
priority program areas--drugs, economic/white-collar crimes, and
violent crimes. Within these broad program areas, criminal caseload
and workload statistics varied for the U.S. Attorneys we visited.
See appendix II for an analysis of EOUSA statistics on criminal
caseloads and workloads.
Justice had no requirements for U.S. Attorneys to measure their own
effectiveness, and none of the U.S. Attorneys we visited had
developed set processes for doing so, although they noted various
sources of information that they thought provided indicators of the
effectiveness of their operations. Justice's evaluation program,
which officials said was the primary means of assessing the
activities of individual U.S. Attorneys' Offices, covered the issue
of priority-setting broadly, if at all, in the evaluation reports
that were available at the time of our review. According to EOUSA,
changes were made to the evaluation program beginning in 1994 that
incorporated new methods of determining whether U.S. Attorneys were
addressing national priorities.
Due to the unreliability of some data and the lack of other data,
EOUSA could not fully use its information systems to determine how
U.S. Attorneys were addressing national and local prosecutorial
priorities. Some existing measures of U.S. Attorneys' caseloads and
workloads appeared to be inaccurate. The information systems did not
collect some other information that may be useful in determining how
U.S. Attorneys address national and local priorities and for other
resource management purposes.
At the end of 1994, Justice was developing plans to implement the
GPRA's requirements to measure performance. Justice determined that
performance goals and performance indicators would be required for
U.S. Attorneys collectively, rather than for individual U.S.
Attorneys. The Attorney General asked Justice components to review
existing data to see what elements would be useful as indicators of
performance required to implement the GPRA. EOUSA had initiated
steps to improve the quality of its information management systems,
though additional efforts were needed. For example, though we did
not make a reliability assessment of the automated information
systems used by EOUSA to produce annual statistical reports, it
appeared, on the basis of discussions with EOUSA and U.S. Attorneys'
Offices personnel and review of evaluation reports on the U.S.
Attorneys' Offices we visited, that data did not accurately reflect
the caseloads and workloads of all of the offices. Quality control
measures to ensure the accuracy of performance indicators were
lacking, and Justice did not measure the complexity of cases handled
by U.S. Attorneys.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The 93 U.S. Attorneys, serving 94 federal judicial districts,\3
operated out of 195 staffed offices in fiscal year 1993. They had an
operating budget of nearly $800 million, and more than 4,000
attorneys and nearly 5,000 support personnel to assist them. The
budget and staff for U.S. Attorneys grew substantially in the past
decade. Between fiscal years 1984 and l993, the overall U.S.
Attorney budget, adjusted for inflation, more than doubled from $340
million to $796 million. The average number of personnel in U.S.
Attorney offices also more than doubled in that period from 4,429 to
9,006.
--------------------
\3 The same U.S. Attorney serves the District of Guam and the
District of the Northern Mariana Islands.
HISTORIC AND POLITICAL
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO
INDEPENDENCE OF U.S.
ATTORNEYS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :2.1
Since the earliest days of the nation's history, almost a century
before the Justice Department was established, U.S. Attorneys have
prosecuted cases in the federal judicial districts. The Judiciary
Act of 1789 directed the president to appoint an attorney for each
federal judicial district to prosecute all crimes and offenses
against the United States and all civil actions in which the United
States was concerned.\4 At that time, U.S. Attorneys prosecuted only
crimes specifically mentioned in the Constitution, such as piracy,
treason, and counterfeiting.
U.S. Attorneys functioned without supervision by any executive
agency for about 40 years. In 1820, Congress paved the way for some
central oversight of U.S. Attorneys. Congress gave the president
power to designate an officer within the Department of the Treasury
to oversee U.S. Attorneys' activities. About 10 years later,
Congress created the position of Solicitor of the Treasury to oversee
U.S. Attorneys. Authority over U.S. Attorneys shifted to the
Attorney General after the Civil War. The Attorney General received
statutory authority to supervise U.S. Attorneys in 1870 when the
Department of Justice was established.
In 1953, EOUSA was established in the office of the Deputy Attorney
General. Among other things, EOUSA was to (1) maintain a check on
the overall performance of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices through
inspections, (2) serve as liaison between U.S. Attorneys' Offices
and other parts of Justice, and (3) facilitate the exchange of
information and ideas among U.S. Attorneys' Offices and between
those offices and other parts of Justice. Including personnel on
detail from U.S. Attorney Offices and professional and support
personnel, EOUSA consisted of about 277 staff as of February 1995.
The Attorney General is responsible for setting national law
enforcement priorities and accounting to Congress for how Justice
resources are used to address them. The Attorney General is the
chief legal officer of the federal government and exercises authority
and responsibility over enforcement of the federal criminal law. As
head of Justice, the Attorney General is responsible for the
performance of the Department's components and functions. This
includes both its investigative components, such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), and its litigating components, such as the U.S. Attorneys'
Offices. With reference to the U.S. Attorneys, the law provides
that the Attorney General shall supervise all litigation to which the
United States is a party and shall direct all U.S. Attorneys and
assistant U.S. Attorneys in the discharge of their duties. The
Attorney General's responsibility for resource allocation within
Justice includes determining staffing and funding levels for U.S.
Attorneys' Offices.
As a practical matter, however, the Attorney General's authority over
U.S. Attorneys is mitigated by the fact that it is the president who
has the authority to appoint U.S. Attorneys, subject to Senate
confirmation, and to remove them. Justice participates in the
appointment process by providing the president with the names of
qualified nominees. The local standing of U.S. Attorneys also
contributed to their unusual degree of independence. As one
commentator observed:\5
"The [Justice] Department relies upon [U.S. Attorneys] to
implement national legal policy as it is shaped by the political
process in Washington, D.C. Yet, unlike most other field
personnel implementing centrally determined policies, they
belong to and identify with the community in which they serve.
Because their appointment depends upon their political standing
in the community, U.S. Attorneys frequently feel they owe their
position to local political personalities and interests. They
perform their legal duties in their home territories and plan to
remain in the community and pursue a legal or political career
there when they leave office. Thus, local claims on their
attention, time, and policies come to rival the demands of
national policy and headquarters directives."
--------------------
\4 1 Stat. 73, 92-93. The Judiciary Act also provided for the
appointment of the Attorney General to represent the United States in
litigation before the Supreme Court and to furnish legal advice to
the president and department heads.
\5 Eisenstein, Counsel for the United States: U.S. Attorneys in the
Political and Legal Systems (1978).
IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT
ON FEDERAL AGENCIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :2.2
The enactment of the GPRA will require Justice and all federal
agencies to set goals, measure performance, and report results.
Goals must be stated in a way that will allow assessments of whether
they have been met. Programs may be consolidated or disaggregated,
as long as any consolidation of programs does not omit or minimize
the significance of a major program.
By September 1997, each agency is to have submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress a 5-year strategic plan for
its program activities. The strategic plan should articulate the
organization's fundamental mission and lay out its long-term goals
and objectives for accomplishing that mission. This plan is to be
updated every 3 years and should serve as the starting point and
basic underpinning of the agency's goal-setting and performance
measurement process.
GPRA does not require that the goals and objectives be stated as
department priorities. The goals and objectives could focus on any
of a number of issues affecting a department's direction, services,
or values. For example, a departmental goal could be to improve
efficiency, measured by a specific decrease in the average time to
perform a certain task or a specific increase in the number of forms
processed or letters written.
Beginning with fiscal year 1999, agencies are to have developed
annual program performance plans for submission to OMB and Congress.
Program performance plans are to link agencies' daily operations to
the broad goals and objectives established in the strategic plans.
The performance plans are to define target levels in objective,
measurable terms so that actual achievement can be compared against
the targets. When a target has not been met, an explanation of why
not, and what actions would be needed to achieve the unmet goals, is
required.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Our objectives were to determine
how Justice communicates national prosecutorial priorities to U.S.
Attorneys;
how selected U.S. Attorneys establish their priorities, including
whether they consider national prosecutorial priorities and
coordinate their priorities with those of federal law
enforcement agencies and state prosecutors; and
what, if any, measures Justice uses to assess U.S. Attorneys'
effectiveness in meeting national priorities.
We conducted our review at Justice headquarters and in eight U.S.
Attorney districts. The eight districts we visited were the Central
District of California, the Southern District of Florida, the Western
District of Michigan, the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York,
the Northern District of Texas, and the Districts of Maine and
Maryland. These districts were judgmentally selected to obtain a
geographic representation and a combination of large and small
offices. The 8 districts did not constitute a statistically
representative sample of all 94 districts.
We interviewed officials at Justice headquarters. In each district,
we did structured interviews with the U.S. Attorney and other
representatives of the U.S. Attorney's Office, representatives of
federal law enforcement agencies and other federal agencies that deal
with U.S. Attorneys, and state prosecutors. At Justice headquarters
and in the districts, we reviewed records and documents containing
data on priorities, organization, staffing, and operations of U.S.
Attorney Offices. We also reviewed prosecution guidelines and 10
evaluation reports done between 1990 and 1993 at the 8 offices we
visited, and we analyzed caseload and workload data for each office.
Our discussions on effectiveness measures focused on the status of
efforts by Justice to comply with the GPRA.
We provided a draft of this report for comment to the Attorney
General and received written comments from the Director of EOUSA.
The comments are summarized on pages 26 through 28 and reprinted in
appendix III.
We did our work between January 1993 and December 1994 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. A detailed
description of our objectives, scope, and methodology is contained in
appendix I.
PAST ATTORNEYS GENERAL
COMMUNICATED BROAD NATIONAL
PRIORITIES THROUGH A VARIETY OF
FORUMS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
Over the last 10 years, Attorneys General did not issue prosecutorial
priorities through any specific process. According to EOUSA, Justice
did not issue any "definitive lists" of prosecutorial priorities or
maintain historical records documenting priorities over time.
Rather, Attorneys General communicated priorities through a variety
of forums, such as in budget requests to Congress, congressional
testimony, speeches, and press conferences. In addition, information
on priorities was included in memorandums to U.S. Attorneys and
other Justice components as a part of the process of developing
budget requests each fiscal year. An EOUSA official said that this
often resulted in a wide range of crimes being named as priorities
and provided little specific guidance to U.S. Attorneys on how to
best direct their resources.
According to the eight U.S. Attorneys we visited, the Attorney
General communicated national priorities to them through channels
such as Attorney General and Justice directives, policies, and
memorandums. Priorities were also communicated through means such as
discussions at meetings, training sessions, seminars, and
conferences.
Some priorities cited over this period were stated as specific crime
types. Examples of specifically stated priorities included narcotics
trafficking, public corruption, counterintelligence, and
environmental crimes.
Other priorities were broadly stated, encompassing a wide range of
crime types. For example, in most of the fiscal years from 1980 to
1994, white-collar crime was designated as a priority in Justice's
budget guidance. White-collar crime encompasses many offenses
including: securities and commodities fraud, financial institution
fraud, antitrust violations, health-care fraud, computer fraud,
public corruption, insurance fraud, bank embezzlement, federal
procurement fraud, and bankruptcy fraud. Given its breadth, such a
priority provided little guidance as to the relative importance of
the individual crimes or offenses of which it was constituted.
An EOUSA official told us that a criticism of national priorities in
the past was that everything was a priority. We noted, for example,
that for fiscal year 1994, a total of 17 priorities were enunciated
in various Attorney General speeches, testimony, and budget
memorandums.
JUSTICE MOVED TOWARD
COMMUNICATING MORE SPECIFIC
NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
PRIORITIES IN 1994
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
EOUSA officials told us that they thought Justice would articulate
priorities with more specificity in the future than it had in the
past. Actions by the Attorney General in 1994 offered specific
guidance about how top-ranked priorities should be implemented. Even
so, the guidance left U.S. Attorneys considerable discretion on how
best to approach priority crime categories in their districts.
First, the Attorney General ranked her two top priorities--violent
crime and health-care fraud, respectively. Second, she issued
written guidance to U.S. Attorneys explaining what she wanted done
to implement the violent crime priority. A national antiviolent
crime initiative was undertaken in early 1994. Each U.S. Attorney
was to designate a senior attorney to be a violent crime coordinator.
Each U.S. Attorney was also to meet with federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies in their districts to form a new, or
strengthen an existing, violent crime working group. Each U.S.
Attorney was to do a survey to identify and prioritize the violent
crime problems that were susceptible to a coordinated federal, state,
and local attack. Then, each U.S. Attorney was to develop a plan to
implement the national initiative.
Justice also is considering how best to develop indicators of the
effectiveness of U.S. Attorneys' implementation of antiviolent crime
initiatives. The Acting Chief of Justice's Criminal Division Section
on Terrorism and Violent Crime said that Justice will probably
require some type of reporting from U.S. Attorneys on the results of
their antiviolent crime efforts, but officials had not determined
what the reporting measures would be as of February 1995.
U.S. Attorneys were not asked to develop plans for implementing the
Attorney General's health-care fraud priority program. However, the
Attorney General did take some steps to indicate the importance of
this priority program. She designated a Special Counsel for
Health-Care Fraud within Justice to coordinate all of Justice's
health-care fraud activities. The Special Counsel has formed an
Executive Level Health-Care Fraud Policy Group composed of
representatives from Justice and other agencies to provide a forum
for discussing and addressing interagency issues. Working through
the Attorney General's Advisory Committee of U.S. Attorneys, the
Special Counsel also has requested that each U.S. Attorney (1)
designate an Assistant U.S. Attorney to be the health-care fraud
coordinator for their district and (2) participate in local
health-care fraud working groups, many of which are made up of
representatives from federal, state, and local investigative and
prosecutive agencies, as well as private insurance company
investigators.
U.S. ATTORNEYS HAD INPUT INTO
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL
PRIORITIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
U.S. Attorneys we visited were satisfied with their input into
setting national prosecutive priorities. They told us that they
expressed their views about which crime types should be considered
priorities primarily through the Attorney General's Advisory
Committee of U.S. Attorneys and its subcommittees.
The Advisory Committee was formed in 1973 to address topics of
concern to the Attorney General or U.S. Attorneys. A mix of
geographic regions and office sizes are represented on the Advisory
Committee, which is composed of the Attorney General and a rotating
group of 15 U.S. Attorneys who are appointed for staggered 3-year
terms. U.S. Attorneys who do not serve on the full committee may
participate on subcommittees. Seven of the eight U.S. Attorneys we
interviewed said that they had input on what national prosecutorial
priorities should be primarily through their involvement with the
Advisory Committee.
An EOUSA official noted that the Advisory Committee was helpful not
only as a forum for the Attorney General and U.S. Attorneys to
discuss national priorities, but also as a mechanism to encourage
consistency in how U.S. Attorneys respond to the priorities. He
believed that when U.S. Attorneys meet and discuss appropriate
responses to priorities, this could lead to similar responses in
offices around the country. If an approach is working well in one
U.S. Attorney's Office, other U.S. Attorneys may try the same
approach.
U.S. ATTORNEYS STRESSED THE
NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN
ESTABLISHING NATIONAL
PRIORITIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
The U.S. Attorneys we visited cited flexibility, discretion, and the
latitude to focus on local concerns as key components of a national
priority-setting process. Six of the eight U.S. Attorneys we
interviewed said that the priorities communicated to them reflected
an appropriate balance between generalities and specifics and
provided a useful national framework for deciding which prosecutions
to emphasize. Summaries of comments made by these interviewees
follow:
The national priorities have generally been good ones, and we have
had the flexibility to react appropriately to them at the
district level. Very few national priorities apply to every
district, and I think the Attorney General recognizes that we
cannot gratuitously respond to every priority that comes down.
For example, if health-care fraud is not a problem in a
particular district, the U.S. Attorney should not be compelled
to turn the district upside down looking for those cases to
address a national priority. In our district, we have no
problem with organized crime, so we do not devote resources
there.
The priorities Justice articulates are the right ones. Where the
Department falls short is in translating priorities into action.
It is bothersome that more work is not going on in some areas.
For example, we know that the problems are there in the student
loan program, with securities fraud and government contract
fraud, but agents do not have the expertise to work these cases
and attorneys have limited knowledge of them. White-collar
crime is a priority, but the FBI here has only one out of four
of its squads working white- collar cases. That one squad
covers financial institution fraud, health-care fraud, and every
other kind of white-collar crime.
One interviewee said that he does not pay much attention to national
priorities, preferring to trust his staff's judgment, focus on local
interests, and prosecute anything that is big enough to warrant his
office's attention. Another said that he had no problem with
guidance from Justice, but would disapprove of Justice's exercising
specific approval or control over the types of cases U.S. Attorneys
prosecute.
Supervisors in several U.S. Attorneys' Offices stressed that "big
cases" were prosecuted whether or not they were designated as
priority crime types. One U.S. Attorney noted that what a case
needs is what a case gets, priority crime type or not. How much of a
priority the case is depends, in part, on the common sense of the
attorney and supervisor assigned to the case.
MOST U.S. ATTORNEYS SET LOCAL
PRIORITIES AND COORDINATED WITH
OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
INFORMALLY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
With one exception, the U.S. Attorneys we visited did not use
formal, structured processes to establish their priorities. They
usually arrived at priorities informally, after considering the
Attorney General's priorities, their own experience and knowledge of
the district, and input from their staff and representatives of other
law enforcement agencies that investigated the federal matters
brought to them for prosecution.
The U.S. Attorneys we interviewed told us that they exercised broad
discretion in establishing the priorities for their offices.
However, almost all of those we interviewed said that the Attorney
General's priorities as a whole were considered when setting local
prosecutive priorities. Most of the U.S. Attorneys we visited cited
health-care fraud, violent crime, and narcotics trafficking as
national priorities that were adopted locally. However, the degree
to which they adopted national priorities varied depending on the
existence and significance of a particular crime type within their
districts.
A district's geographic, social, and economic characteristics were
cited as important determinants of the U.S. Attorney's priorities,
as were the impact, severity, and pervasiveness of particular crimes.
The U.S. Attorneys we visited provided the following examples of why
certain crimes were local priorities.
In the Northern District of Texas, white-collar crime was a high
priority because the Dallas/Fort Worth metropolitan area is a
major corporate service center for the southwest. Narcotics
trafficking was a significant priority because of the district's
proximity to the Mexican border. Government program and
procurement fraud was a priority because many defense
contractors were located in the area.
In the Eastern District of New York, organized crime was a priority
because the area is the residence of or venue for activities of
major organized crime figures.
Although they each tended to place more importance on certain
priorities than others, seven of the eight U.S. Attorneys' Offices
we visited did not rank their priorities. One U.S. Attorney, for
example, said that there was no formal ranking of priorities, but
that some issues were more important than others. He said that the
level of importance depended, in part, on the strength of his
relationship with the particular investigative agency responsible for
that priority crime. Another U.S. Attorney said that the relative
amount of resources devoted to particular priorities depended on the
level and types of crime occurring in the district at any given point
in time. Accordingly, the relative importance of priorities to one
another may change often. A supervisory attorney in one office said
that the top nine priority crimes were ranked, but he also noted that
there was no problem deviating from priorities if there were
legitimate reasons for doing so, such as significant nonpriority
cases to prosecute.
Most of the U.S. Attorneys we visited told us that designating a
particular crime type as a priority generally meant that it received
more resources than nonpriority crime types. For example, assigning
assistant U.S. Attorneys to enforcement task forces or special
prosecutive units were ways to emphasize priority crime areas.
ONE U.S. ATTORNEY USED A MORE
FORMAL PROCESS TO SET
PRIORITIES THAN THE OTHER
DISTRICTS WE VISITED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
One district we visited, Maryland, used a new, more formal process
than the other seven districts we visited for setting prosecutive
priorities in 1994. According to Maryland's U.S. Attorney, in the
first step of the process, her office determined the crime concerns
in the district and the appropriate federal responses through
meetings with business and community leaders and state and local law
enforcement officials throughout the state. She said that she and
her staff also met with officials of the federal law enforcement
agencies working in the district. The FBI and DEA, for example,
provided information on significant areas affecting community safety
and security under their jurisdictions. Representatives of the U.S.
Postal Inspection Service and the U.S. Secret Service provided
information on postal theft and counterfeiting issues.
In a March 1994 memorandum, the U.S. Attorney announced a
reorganization of her office according to priority program areas,
which were based on input from within her office and their client law
enforcement agencies. Prosecutors were assigned to work in specific
priority areas. Under each of the priority areas, the U.S. Attorney
identified the types of cases that the investigative agencies should
develop and/or strategies to use in investigating those cases. She
also revised prosecutive guidelines to emphasize the priority crime
areas.
At the time of our review, it was too soon to determine whether the
new process was judged by law enforcement officials in the district
to be an improvement in the U.S. Attorneys' Office operating
procedures.
U.S. ATTORNEYS COORDINATED
WITH INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES ON
PRIORITIES
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10
All of the eight U.S. Attorneys we visited said that they
coordinated their priorities with federal and local law enforcement
agencies. Representatives of federal investigative agencies we
visited generally indicated that they had a good understanding of the
types of cases the U.S. Attorneys would accept for prosecution and
that their priorities were closely or adequately coordinated with
those of the U.S. Attorneys.
Interaction with federal investigative agencies influenced the
priorities developed by the U.S. Attorneys we visited in a variety
of ways. One U.S. Attorney, for example, told us that in developing
priorities, she routinely considered information provided by federal
and state investigative agencies. In this district, telemarketing
fraud was designated a priority on the basis of consultations with
the federal investigative agencies. Another U.S. Attorney said he
emphasized specific violent crimes, such as carjackings, in part on
the basis of the results of meetings with officials of the FBI, DEA,
the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF), and other law enforcement agencies in his district.
To gain an understanding of how well they felt they understood the
priorities of the U.S. Attorneys with whom they worked, we
interviewed 63 federal investigative agency supervisors in the 8
districts. We asked the supervisors whether they felt that they had
a good understanding of the types of cases the U.S. Attorneys in
their jurisdictions would accept for prosecution. Fifty-nine of the
interviewees said that they had a good understanding of the
priorities, while four said that they did not.
The interviewees said that the U.S. Attorney's priorities were
communicated to them via written prosecutive guidelines and through
ongoing informal communication among agents and assistant U.S.
Attorneys. The lines of communication included discussions of
ongoing cases and conversations at law enforcement meetings. Several
interviewees also noted that U.S. Attorneys' priorities were
communicated by the allocation of resources, with more attorneys
assigned to work on priority cases.
We asked these investigative agency supervisors to describe the
interrelationship between their investigative agencies' priorities
and the U.S. Attorney's priorities by choosing a response from among
the following categories:
Our priorities and those of the U.S. Attorney are closely
coordinated.
Our priorities and those of the U.S. Attorney are adequately
coordinated.
Our priorities and those of the U.S. Attorney are not adequately
coordinated.
None of these responses describes the interrelationship.
The vast majority of investigative agency supervisors we interviewed
thought that priorities were at least adequately coordinated.
Thirty-five interviewees said that their priorities and those of the
U.S. Attorney for the district were closely coordinated. Nineteen
interviewees said that the priorities were adequately coordinated.
Two interviewees said that priorities were not adequately
coordinated, and seven interviewees did not select any of these
responses to the structured interview question. In the two instances
in two different districts that interviewees said priorities were not
adequately coordinated, the reason given was that the priorities of
their agencies did not match those of the U.S. Attorney.
U.S. Attorneys we visited also received informal input from state
prosecutors, especially in the area of violent crime. U.S.
Attorneys said that they usually became aware of the state
prosecutors' priorities by meeting informally with them on cases with
state and federal implications or through participation in task
forces.
State prosecutors' priorities indirectly affected some U.S.
Attorneys' priorities. For example, one U.S. Attorney said that her
office worked closely with the state on violent crime cases and that
historically this relationship had worked well. However, recent
state legislation increasing state penalties has caused both sides to
re-examine their roles in violent crime prosecutions.
EFFORTS TO MEASURE PROSECUTIVE
PERFORMANCE DIFFER
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11
U.S. Attorneys we visited had no discrete processes for measuring
the effectiveness of their prosecutive activities, but they said that
information from a variety of sources provided indicators of the
effectiveness of their operations in fighting crime in their
districts. EOUSA's primary evaluation mechanism was its evaluation
program, under which a broad review of the overall operations of each
U.S. Attorney's Office was conducted every several years. According
to program instructions, the evaluation was to include an assessment
of how U.S. Attorneys were implementing the Attorney General's
priorities. The subject of priorities was generally covered broadly,
if at all, in the evaluation reports we reviewed; and Justice did not
require that U.S. Attorneys implement recommendations made by
evaluation teams.
U.S. ATTORNEYS WE VISITED
CITED A VARIETY OF
SUBJECTIVE MEASURES OF
EFFECTIVENESS
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11.1
In discussions on how they determined their effectiveness in
addressing crime in their districts, U.S. Attorneys we visited did
not cite any single objective measure, but they noted several
subjective forms of feedback and information from a variety of
sources that could provide indicators of effectiveness. For example,
several U.S. Attorneys said that they gauged the general
effectiveness of their offices through discussions with and/or
feedback from their staffs and the investigative agencies. Other
U.S. Attorneys mentioned, as indicators of effectiveness, the number
of cases they prosecuted and decreases in certain types of criminal
activity in the district. Also mentioned by U.S. Attorneys as
effectiveness measures were economic indicators, such as the price of
drugs, and success in coordinating the efforts of various law
enforcement agencies in the district. A supervisor in one U.S.
Attorney's Office believed that effectiveness could be measured by
the impact that cases had on the community. For example, he said
that dismantling the leadership of an organized crime group or
foiling a major plot to distribute drugs could have significant
impact. However, the U.S. Attorney had no formal performance
measures to assess the impact such prosecutions had on illegal
activities in the district.
JUSTICE'S EVALUATION REPORTS
FOR MOST OFFICES WE VISITED
GAVE LITTLE ATTENTION TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIORITIES
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11.2
According to EOUSA officials, Justice's primary mechanism for
assessing the activities of U.S. Attorney Offices, including how
U.S. Attorneys were implementing the Attorney General's priorities,
was its evaluation program. The subject of priorities was generally
covered broadly, if at all, in the evaluation reports we reviewed;
and Justice did not require U.S. Attorneys to implement the
evaluation teams' recommendations.
According to an evaluation program manager, evaluation teams composed
of Assistant U.S. Attorneys visited each U.S. Attorney's Office
every 3 to 4 years to perform a broad review of its overall
operations. About 115 to 120 Assistant U.S. Attorneys served as
evaluators, doing three or fewer evaluations each year. Evaluation
program guidance required that teams be led by a legal management
evaluator, who was responsible for coordinating and managing all
pre-evaluation activities, the on- site evaluation, and the
submission of written evaluation reports. Administrative and
financial litigation evaluations were conducted simultaneously with
legal management evaluations, resulting in reviews of U.S.
Attorneys' entire operations.
As required by EOUSA's Evaluation Manual, at the end of each on- site
visit, the evaluation team was to provide a briefing on preliminary
findings to the U.S. Attorney and any key staff the U.S. Attorney
invited to attend. The team was then to prepare a draft written
report for submission to EOUSA. According to EOUSA officials, the
EOUSA director was to forward the draft report to the U.S. Attorney,
who was responsible for reviewing it and responding to, but not
necessarily implementing, any recommendations. If the evaluation
team was satisfied with the U.S. Attorney's action or proposed
action to address a recommendation or was convinced by the U.S.
Attorney that the recommendation was not appropriate, the
recommendation was to be dropped from the final report.
One of the purposes of the evaluation program was to determine
whether the Attorney General's priorities were being carried out by
the U.S. Attorneys. The evaluation team was to make this
determination primarily on the basis of interviews of personnel.
Other methodologies available to them included examination of case
management data and reviews of cases. According to an EOUSA
representative, however, evaluators did not look at actual case files
unless some problem was identified. Evaluators, in conducting their
evaluations, generally looked at printouts from the case tracking
systems and relied heavily on the results of interviews with
personnel in the U.S. Attorneys' Offices.
Our review of 10 legal management evaluation reports prepared during
the period from 1990 through 1993 for the 8 districts we visited
showed variance in the extent to which compliance with national
priorities was specifically reported. In seven of the evaluation
reports, evaluators made no written assessment of whether or not
national priorities were addressed. In another two evaluation
reports, evaluators made general assessments about whether national
priorities were addressed. In one evaluation report, evaluators
treated the issue of national priorities in some detail, relating
resources and case reviews to priorities.
The general statements made about work in national priority areas in
two reports were:
Overall cases here are quality cases. Many are very complex and
high profile. The cases brought are consistent with the
priorities of the Attorney General.
The office is doing a very good job of conducting the government's
litigation. Justice priorities and policies are followed and
applied appropriately.
A summary of the evaluation comments relating priorities to resources
and case reviews in more detail follows:
The office seems posed and prepared to address any of the law
enforcement priorities set nationally by the Attorney General,
as well as those that have emerged from district-level criminal
problems. This commitment to well-defined law enforcement goals
is reflected in the prosecution teams set in place by the U.S.
Attorney. He is well aware, for example, that there is a large
number of toxic dump sites in his district and has tasked . .
. a unit to step up enforcement efforts in all environmental
matters. The same high priority and follow-through is evident
in the area of defense procurement fraud. Hard-hitting
enforcement efforts against drug traffickers is a clear
priority, and the dedication of five full-time Assistant U.S.
Attorneys for the task demonstrates that priority.
The Evaluation Manual, as updated in July 1993, contained a section
on recommendations, but it did not state whether in any instances
such recommendations were binding on U.S. Attorneys. An EOUSA
official said that U.S. Attorneys were in the best position to know
how to direct the resources of their districts to crime categories.
He said that draft evaluation team recommendations were reviewed by
the EOUSA director and deputy director. Before issuing the final
evaluation reports, evaluators were to follow up to see if any
changes were made on the basis of the evaluation results, but U.S.
Attorneys were not required to make any of the recommended changes to
their operations. The official said that EOUSA planned to consider
having a team available to help U.S. Attorneys implement
recommendations.
In commenting on a draft of this report, EOUSA said that the vast
majority of the recommendations made by evaluators have been
implemented by U.S. Attorneys. It said that the EOUSA director or
deputy director or the Deputy Attorney General would have required
implementation of a significant or important recommendation if the
reasons for not doing so were flawed, and it noted that fact would
not necessarily be known by individual members of EOUSA's evaluation
and review staff.
EOUSA also noted in its comments that changes were made to the
evaluation program in l994 including updated training of evaluators
and additional methods to determine whether the Department's
priorities were being addressed appropriately. These methods
included review of dedicated attorney and support resources to
certain types of crimes and interviews with federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies.
CASELOAD AND WORKLOAD DATA
APPEARED TO BE INACCURATE
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :12
Due to the apparent unreliability of some data and the lack of other
data, EOUSA could not fully use its existing information systems to
determine how U.S. Attorneys were addressing national and local
prosecutorial priorities. Assessments of what information will be
required and how to ensure its accuracy are indispensable if EOUSA is
to rely on its information system to help measure performance, as
envisioned by the GPRA.
The Attorney General, in seeking input from Justice components to the
Department's fiscal year 1996 budget request, asked for a review of
existing data to identify which elements would be useful as
indicators of performance and which elements would not be helpful.
The Attorney General's instructions stated the following:
"In selecting performance indicators, components should
completely review all existing workload data and adapt those
items that are useful and results-oriented. Component program,
planning/evaluation, and budget offices are urged to work
together to develop new performance indicators that focus on
program outputs and outcomes, and less on program input and
process indicators.
[Text omitted.]
"It is recognized and expected that in a number of instances,
new indicators will be identified for which no baseline data are
available."
Some existing measures of U.S. Attorneys' Offices workloads and
caseloads were inaccurate, limiting their usefulness in measuring
performance and responsiveness of U.S. Attorneys to addressing
national priorities. Officials at Justice headquarters and U.S.
Attorneys' Offices told us that some statistical data in the case
management system and in the system used to track attorney time were
inaccurate and incomplete. Evaluation reports on several of the U.S.
Attorneys' Offices we reviewed also documented inaccuracies in these
systems. EOUSA has not studied the reliability of its case
management information system by checking data against case files in
U.S. Attorneys' Offices. However, EOUSA had a project underway
aimed at improving the quality of the automated data.
The caseload and workload data systems did not collect some
information that could have been useful in determining how U.S.
Attorneys were addressing national and local priorities, as well as
serving other resource management purposes and measuring performance
as required by the GPRA. For example, Justice did not measure the
complexity of the cases prosecuted. It would be difficult to measure
performance without knowing whether cases reported in the information
system were complex, time-consuming cases, or comparatively simple
cases involving little prosecutor time. Nor did Justice account for
time spent by prosecutors on other than case-specific activities,
such as coordinating task forces, conducting crime surveys, and
developing prosecutive strategies with state and local officials, as
finite categories of resource use. Knowledge of the time spent on
such nonprosecutive activities would have been helpful to the
Attorney General since she has asked prosecutors to do work involving
planning, coordinating, and managing law enforcement resources.
In commenting on a draft of this report, EOUSA stated that it had
begun to account for time spent by prosecutors on other than
case-specific activities. It cited as an example that, as of October
1994, it included time spent in areas related to community coalition
building, Weed and Seed, and/or Law Enforcement Coordinating
Committee (LECC) programs in the time category of "Crime
Prevention/LECC."
SOME CASE MANAGEMENT DATA
APPEARED UNRELIABLE
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :12.1
We did not make a reliability assessment of the automated information
systems used by EOUSA to produce annual statistical reports on U.S.
Attorneys' caseloads. However, on the basis of discussions with
representatives of EOUSA and U.S. Attorneys' Offices and review of
evaluation reports on the U.S. Attorneys' Offices we visited, it
appeared that the data did not accurately reflect the caseloads and
workloads of all of the offices. EOUSA and U.S. Attorneys' Office
officials told us that some caseload statistics were more reliable
than others. The number of cases filed by U.S. Attorneys in federal
district court was one data element that information management
officials said was particularly reliable because it could be checked
against statistics maintained by the courts.
Because offices we visited used different criteria to count cases and
declinations (criminal matters that were not prosecuted), comparisons
of caseloads among districts could be misleading. For example, EOUSA
officials said that there was some variation in the way different
U.S. Attorneys counted criminal matters and some declinations.
Several offices we visited did not include misdemeanors in their
caseload statistics. But one office did include such data, thereby
giving its criminal caseload the appearance of being larger than it
actually was relative to other offices. A data analyst in a large
office said that double-counting of defendants was routine. She said
that defendants were sometimes listed under their names and again
listed under the names of their criminal operations. She also noted
that if two Assistant U.S. Attorneys were involved in a trial, the
trial may be counted twice in the data management system because both
attorneys would have noted it in their personal statistics.
EOUSA evaluations of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices we reviewed,
conducted from 1991 through 1993, documented problems with the
reliability and usefulness of the case management systems. Only 1
evaluation of the 10 evaluations we reviewed reported that the case
information system was generally accurate and used by the U.S.
Attorney as a management tool. Eight evaluations reported problems
of varying degrees of seriousness, while the reliability and
usefulness of the case management system was not reported in one
evaluation. Examples of some of the problems noted follow:
One evaluation team found that nearly 300 cases in 1 office were
assigned to "mystery" Assistant U.S. Attorneys who did not
appear on any office rosters. This evaluation team found over
1,000 cases that they thought could be eliminated from the civil
case docket of about 5,000 cases.
At another location, an evaluation team found case lists from the
information system to be "chronically incorrect" and noted that
improvements were needed to keep track of workload and to avoid
spending extraordinary amounts of time trying to correct the
information.
A third evaluation team noted that it appeared that cases were
being carried when there was no activity, thereby artificially
inflating the caseload.
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CASE
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :12.2
According to the EOUSA Information Systems Manager, EOUSA tried to
improve the accuracy of the case management data, but had not
attempted to verify its accuracy by matching data on the information
management system to records in U.S. Attorneys' Offices. EOUSA
consolidated data tapes from U.S. Attorneys' Offices and produced
listings identifying some errors, such as nonexistent crime codes.
EOUSA also worked on improving the quality of its case-tracking
systems in an effort called "Operation Garbage Out." The goals of
this effort were to update the databases in each U.S. Attorney's
Office to reflect correct and current information, provide training
in using the data system, recommend steps to improve the quality of
the data system, and increase management accountability for and line
attorney involvement in the quality of the local database.
In phase one of the effort, U.S. Attorneys were asked to review all
pending cases that were older than 5 years and close those cases that
needed to be closed. As a result of this effort, more than 10
percent of the U.S. Attorneys' pending caseloads were dropped. In
phase two, U.S. Attorneys were asked to certify that all cases, not
just the old cases, had been reviewed to ensure that they were
classified accurately. Phase three involved EOUSA looking at case
management data in greater detail, four districts at a time, focusing
on errors that were common across districts. The results of the
later phases of the Operation Garbage Out effort were not available
at the time of our review.
An EOUSA official said that there had been some discussion about
possibly checking the validity of data reported on the case
management system against records in U.S. Attorneys' Offices, but no
decision had been made on whether to do such a validity check. As of
December 1994, the EOUSA Information Systems Manager said that
discussions about a new formal program for information quality
management were underway, but no timeframe had been set on when the
program would be implemented.
The official said that plans were also being made for developing a
new case management system and introducing it nationally for all U.S.
Attorneys' Offices in mid-1996. One improvement she anticipated with
the new system was that it would allow for inclusion of specialized
information on priority programs.
SOME WORKLOAD DATA APPEARED
INACCURATE
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :12.3
Discussions with personnel in U.S. Attorneys' Offices and review of
evaluation reports on the U.S. Attorney Offices we visited indicated
that data on the amount of time prosecutors spend on various
prosecutive activities were inaccurate. According to EOUSA
officials, prosecutors completed resource summary reports (USA Form
5) at least monthly, estimating the percentage of time they spent
working during the month in 24 criminal division crime categories and
25 civil division categories. No guidance existed on how prosecutors
were to determine which categories to use for various types of work.
In commenting on a draft of our report, EOUSA provided guidance dated
December 27, 1994, on how to charge time to various categories of
criminal and civil cases.
Administrative staff were to compile the information on all of the
USA Form 5s completed in their offices and send it to EOUSA each
month. EOUSA was to consolidate the information into a single
database. During our review, EOUSA was working toward automated
transmission of USA Form 5 data from U.S. Attorneys' Offices to
Justice headquarters.
Representatives of some of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices we visited
indicated that the time-tracking data were inaccurate and unreliable.
One concern expressed was that some attorneys were not diligent in
reporting their time; therefore, work was underreported or did not
accurately reflect the types of prosecutions the office handled.
Another concern was that there was uncertainty about which time
categories to charge for some work, particularly on economic crime
cases. One Assistant U.S. Attorney said, for example, that
distinctions between credit card fraud and bank fraud or credit card
fraud and telemarketing fraud were not always clear. Thus, data on
hours worked on each of these crime types could be inconsistent from
one office to another and one attorney to another.
Evaluation reports we reviewed also documented inaccuracies in
reporting time spent on various types of cases. For example, one
evaluation report noted that civil section attorneys in the office
completed USA Form 5s monthly from memory or by estimation. Another
evaluation report found that some prosecutors were reluctant to keep
and report necessary USA Form 5 information, although the
administrative officer indicated that continued efforts were being
made to get all staff to cooperate.
EOUSA officials said that no efforts had been made to verify the
accuracy of the data showing attorney time spent on various types of
cases.
ADDITIONAL MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION COULD BE USEFUL
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :12.4
In the course of our review, we noted two measures that Justice did
not include in its information systems that could have helped to
assess how U.S. Attorneys addressed priority programs. These
measures may have also served other management purposes, such as
resource allocation and performance measurement, as required by the
GPRA. These measures were (1) attorney time spent on coordination,
outreach, and other nonprosecutive functions and (2) case complexity.
Knowledge of the time spent on nonprosecutive activities would have
been helpful to the Attorney General since she asked prosecutors to
do work involving planning, coordinating, and managing law
enforcement resources and community outreach. The resource summary
information system that was in place at the time of our review did
not measure time spent by attorneys on these functions.
A key challenge that the Attorney General gave U.S. Attorneys at
their January 1994 conference was to increase their efforts to
coordinate the work of law enforcement agencies to avoid overlap and
direct investigative resources in the best manner possible. Also, a
key component of Justice's antiviolent crime initiative is to
cooperate with other law enforcement authorities. The work that the
U.S. Attorneys put into the initiative by organizing and attending
task force meetings and surveying the law enforcement community was
not reflected in raw numbers of cases.
We asked supervisory attorneys in several U.S. Attorneys' Offices
how they accounted for time spent on such tasks as planning,
coordinating task forces, and surveying the community about crime
concerns. The attorneys said the time would probably come under a
particular crime type such as "violent crime," or under the general
category of "management and administration." They said that
distinctions between time spent on prosecutive functions versus
planning, community outreach, and coordinating and managing resources
was not reflected.
One supervisory Assistant U.S. Attorney noted that some of the work
in his office was not really measured by any time-charge activity.
He said attorneys spent a fair amount of time talking to high schools
and community groups; helping police departments apply for grants;
bringing federal, state, and local investigative resources together
to address crime problems; and doing other types of nonprosecutive
tasks. The attorney said that such time would have been charged in
his office either to the subject matter of the meetings or to a
general category of management and administration.
It is difficult to measure performance without knowing whether cases
reported in the information system are complex, time- consuming cases
or comparatively simple cases that involve little prosecutor time.
Justice does not assess the complexity, quality, or impact of cases
prosecuted, although two U.S. Attorneys' Offices we visited made
assessments of case complexity on their own. Supervisors assigned
complexity ratings to cases on scales from one to three.
A case filed is statistically one case whether it was a
plea-bargained, relatively low-level drug prosecution requiring a few
hours of one prosecutor's time or a complex drug trafficking
conspiracy case that took several years and a large amount of
attorney resources to prosecute. The amount of time spent by
attorneys prosecuting various cases could serve as one indicator of
complexity.
The EOUSA Information Systems Manager said that the new information
management system, scheduled to be piloted during 1995, would have a
data field for offices to assign complexity weightings to cases.
However, no data on that field would be collected nationally. U.S.
Attorneys' Offices would have the option to use or not use the field
as a local management tool. The manager noted that without specific
case weighting criteria, offices might tend to skew weights to the
high side if they were being compared to case weights in other
offices.
CONCLUSIONS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :13
As the nation's chief law enforcement officer and head of the Justice
Department, the Attorney General is responsible and accountable to
Congress for ensuring that the federal law enforcement components
within Justice are effectively coordinated, that Justice resources
are effectively applied, and that national law enforcement priorities
are addressed appropriately. Enactment of the GPRA reinforces the
importance of these responsibilities. To accomplish them, the
Attorney General needs clear information on how U.S. Attorney
resources are directed nationwide to various law enforcement
priorities.
At the same time, U.S. Attorneys need to retain flexibility to
address the specific crime problems that exist in their districts and
to adapt national priorities to best meet local conditions. Close
consultation between Justice and the U.S. Attorneys is essential to
strike an appropriate balance.
The Attorney General's recent identification and ranking of two top
national priorities moved Justice in the direction of setting more
focused national law enforcement priorities, as did her requirement
that U.S. Attorneys take actions to implement the two priorities.
While these steps focused national priorities, they also afforded
U.S. Attorneys considerable discretion in deciding which specific
steps to take in their districts to implement the two priorities.
More accurate and complete data would help Justice to better
determine how U.S. Attorneys are implementing national and local
priority programs and to comply with the GPRA. Although EOUSA was
continuing to take steps to improve the accuracy of its information
systems, the caseload and workload data contained inaccuracies that
could hinder Justice's efforts to measure performance and track how
well U.S. Attorneys are implementing national priorities and
otherwise applying their resources. As Justice moves into the GPRA
environment and considers whether data elements that it collected in
the past are needed to measure performance and results and whether
additional data elements would be useful as performance indicators,
it will be important to ensure that the data it collects are complete
and accurate.
RECOMMENDATION
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :14
We recommend that, as the Department of Justice evaluates what data
will be selected as indicators of U.S. Attorney performance to meet
the GPRA requirements, the Attorney General direct EOUSA to develop
quality control measures to ensure the accuracy of the data to be
collected. EOUSA should give specific consideration to developing
measures of case complexity to be used by all U.S. Attorneys.
AGENCY COMMENTS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :15
We provided a draft of this report for comment to the Attorney
General and received comments from the Director of EOUSA. The
comments and our responses are summarized below. EOUSA's comments
are reprinted in appendix III.
EOUSA reiterated that in our review of eight different U.S.
Attorneys' Offices of varying sizes, serving communities with diverse
demographic characteristics, none was unaware or neglectful of the
Attorney General's priorities.
In the draft of this report, we suggested that EOUSA consider
establishing workload categories to measure time spent on
nonprosecutive attorney activities, such as organizing and attending
task force meetings. EOUSA said that as of October 1994, it began to
account for time spent by attorneys on other than case-specific
activities, and because of this, we did not include the suggestion in
our final report. EOUSA also said that our statement that it did not
have guidance for attorneys on how to charge time to various types of
cases was inaccurate. The guidance EOUSA provided to illustrate this
point was dated December 27, 1994, which was after our audit work was
completed. We added this information to the report.
EOUSA noted difficulties that would arise in developing measures of
case complexity to be used by all U.S. Attorneys and said that it
may not be feasible to develop such measures. However, experiences
of individual U.S. Attorneys may be of value in exploring ways to
measure complexity. Two of the eight U.S. Attorneys we visited had
developed systems of rating complexity on scales of one to three. In
addition, we were advised that the Deputy Attorney General's Office
was exploring the use of full- time attorney equivalents charged to
cases as a measure of case complexity to help make decisions on
staffing allocations for U.S. Attorneys' Offices. If more work time
goes into prosecuting a smaller number of fraud cases compared to a
larger number of drug cases, that would be an indicator of
complexity. If standards for measuring complexity were developed for
use by all U.S. Attorneys, the EOUSA evaluation program could serve
as a means to assess the consistency in which various U.S. Attorneys
apply the standards for their caseloads.
We agree that development of a system to measure case complexity is a
difficult challenge. However, unless EOUSA attempts to do so, it
will not have definitive data on feasibility. Without knowing
whether cases reported in the information system are complex and
time-consuming or comparatively simple cases involving little
prosecutor time, performance measurement will have little objective
value.
EOUSA did not mention our recommendation that it develop quality
control measures to ensure the accuracy of data to be collected as
performance indicators. However, the senior counsel to EOUSA's
director told us, in a follow-up discussion, that EOUSA generally
agrees with the recommendation and is continuing to work to improve
the accuracy of its data.
EOUSA stated that its evaluation program remains the primary
mechanism for monitoring U.S. Attorneys' implementation of priority
programs, but noted that, as we relied on evaluation reports done
between 1990 and 1993, we did not take into account changes in the
process that began in 1994. For example, EOUSA said that evaluation
reports are being modified to report priority programs in a more
organized and recognizable format. We agree that we did not assess
any improvements to the program that occurred in 1994 because our
methodology for reviewing evaluation reports was to obtain the most
recent reports available for each of the eight U.S. Attorneys'
Offices we visited. For the Districts of Maine and Eastern New York,
we reviewed evaluations done in 1990 and the final reports for
evaluations done in 1993 when they became available. As noted in our
report, evaluation teams visit U.S. Attorneys Office about every 3
to 4 years. In addition, there was a lag time of several months
between the date of the evaluation and the date the final report was
available for our review. Thus, we assessed all of the evaluation
reports available during the course of our audit work.
EOUSA disagreed with a statement in our report that, according to an
EOUSA official, U.S. Attorneys were not required to make changes to
their operations recommended by evaluation teams. EOUSA stated that
members of its evaluation and review staff may not be aware that top
EOUSA management or the Deputy Attorney General could require a U.S.
Attorney to implement a specific recommendation. EOUSA did not
provide any specifics on processes through which such a requirement
would be made, nor examples of when or how often such requirements
are made of U.S. Attorneys. The handbook followed for legal
management evaluations, as updated in July 1993, contained a section
on recommendations, but it did not state whether in any instances
such recommendations were binding on U.S. Attorneys. Because this
information was not specified in the written guidance, we followed up
with EOUSA's director for evaluation and review and included in our
report his statement that recommendations were not binding.
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :15.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, the
Office of Management and Budget, and the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees. It will also be made available to others upon request.
Major contributors are listed in appendix IV. If you have any
questions, please contact me on (202) 512-8777.
Norman J. Rabkin
Director, Administration
of Justice Issues
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I
The Chairman of the former House Government Operations Subcommittee
on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture\1
asked us to review several issues relating to U.S. Attorneys'
prosecutorial priorities.
Specifically, we agreed to determine the following:
how the Department of Justice communicates national prosecutorial
priorities to U.S. Attorneys;
how selected U.S. Attorneys establish their priorities, including
whether they consider national prosecutorial priorities and
coordinate their priorities with those of federal law
enforcement agencies and state prosecutors; and
what, if any, measures Justice uses to assess U.S. Attorneys'
effectiveness in meeting national priorities.
To address the first objective, we interviewed Justice officials and
obtained documentation on how national prosecutorial priorities are
developed and communicated. We reviewed budget memorandums
addressing priorities, as well as Attorney General speeches,
testimonies, and communications. We also asked U.S. Attorneys how
national priorities were communicated to them.
To address the second objective, we did structured interviews in
eight U.S. Attorneys' Offices. We interviewed U.S. Attorneys\2
and key staff in each U.S. Attorneys' Office. We also did
structured interviews with officials of eight federal investigative
agencies and a state prosecutor in each U.S. Attorney district to
address how U.S. Attorneys' priorities were communicated and whether
they were coordinated with other law enforcement officials.
In addressing the second objective, we also reviewed case management
data on the number of cases and matters filed and declined by type of
crime for fiscal years 1980 through 1993. We reviewed data on U.S.
Attorney work years for fiscal years 1980 through 1993, and we
reviewed data on hours attorneys spent working on various types of
cases nationally and for the eight selected districts for fiscal year
1993. We reviewed guidelines established by the eight U.S.
Attorneys for determining whether to accept cases for federal
prosecution.
To address the third objective, we interviewed Justice officials and
U.S. Attorneys and reviewed evaluation reports to determine what
qualitative and quantitative measures were in place to evaluate the
effectiveness of the operations of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. The
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires
federal agencies to implement a system to set goals, measure
performance, and report results. We focused our discussions for this
objective on the status of efforts by Justice to comply with the law.
--------------------
\1 In the 104th Congress, jurisdiction changed to the newly
established Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs
and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight.
\2 In the Southern District of New York we interviewed a first
assistant U.S. Attorney who was an Acting U.S. Attorney at the time
of our visit.
SELECTION OF U.S. ATTORNEYS'
OFFICES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
Table I.1 lists the U.S. Attorneys' Offices we visited and provides
information on the criminal and civil cases filed in each office
during fiscal year 1993. The districts were the Central District of
California, the Southern District of Florida, the Western District of
Michigan, the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, the
Northern District of Texas, and the Districts of Maine and Maryland.
We judgmentally selected these districts to include various
geographical regions of the country and small, medium, and large
offices.
Table I.1 also shows that the eight U.S. Attorneys' Offices combined
filed about 18 percent of both the criminal and civil cases that were
filed in district courts in fiscal year 1993.
Table I.1
Criminal and Civil Cases Filed in
District Court in the Districts We
Visited and Nationally (Fiscal Year
1993)
Criminal
Criminal Civil
cases defendants cases
filed filed in filed in
District in court court court
------------------------ ---------- ---------- ----------
California, Central 1,271 1,921 3,633
Florida, South 1,100 2,045 2,641
Maine 112 149 426
Maryland 458 625 603
Michigan, West 241 392 685
New York, East 1,380 2,052 3,657
New York, South 1,263 1,881 2,039
Texas, North 867 1,484 3,356
============================================================
Total for districts we 6,692 10,549 17,040
visited
============================================================
Total for all districts 36,995 56,814 94,092
Districts we visited as 18.1% 18.6% 18.1%
a percent of all U.S.
attorney districts
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: United States Attorneys' Offices Fiscal Year 1993
Statistical Report.
The eight districts also filed about 21 percent of all asset
forfeiture cases (criminal and civil) filed nationally in fiscal year
1993 and collected about 18 percent of the estimated cash and
property recoveries. They collected about 14 percent of the total
debts collected by U.S. Attorneys nationwide in bankruptcies,
foreclosures, and other civil debt and property collections.
As shown in table I.2, the number of attorney positions in the eight
districts we visited ranged from 19 full-time equivalent attorney
positions in the district of Maine to 206 full-time equivalent
attorney positions in the Southern District of Florida. Combined,
the eight districts had about 22 percent of the total attorney
positions nationwide.
Table I.2
Full-Time Equivalent Attorney Positions
in the Districts We Visited and
Nationally (Fiscal Year 1993)
District Positions
------------------------------------------------ ----------
California, Central 202
Florida, South 206
Maine 19
Maryland 61
Michigan, West 29
New York, East 140
New York, South 187
Texas, North 78
============================================================
Total for districts we visited 922
============================================================
Total for all districts 4,161
Districts we visited as a percent of all U.S. 22.2%
attorney districts
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: United States Attorneys' Offices Workload Statistics, fiscal
year 1993.
SELECTION OF INTERVIEWEES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
We did structured interviews with U.S. Attorneys or acting U.S.
Attorneys and their first assistants and the chiefs of their criminal
and civil divisions in the eight districts. We asked them how they
established priorities for their offices, how national priorities
were communicated to them, how they coordinated priorities with
federal, state, and local investigative agencies and with state
prosecutors, and how they measured their effectiveness in the mission
of fighting crime in their districts. We pretested the structured
interview instruments with U.S. Attorneys' Office representatives in
Southern New York and Maryland, and we made clarifications and
refinements on the basis of the comments we received.
We also talked with other division and section chiefs in these
offices about prosecutions of specific types of cases, and we talked
with personnel responsible for the data management systems about how
information on caseload and workload was compiled.
In addition, we did structured interviews with representatives of
investigative agency field offices and with one state prosecutor in
each of the eight court districts. We asked investigative agency
personnel for general information about their caseloads, workloads,
and priorities, as well as how they coordinated their priorities with
the U.S. Attorney. We asked the state prosecutors how the U.S.
Attorney coordinated priorities with them and how the priorities of
the U.S. Attorney affected the operations of their offices.
Investigative agency interviewees included field personnel for the
Justice investigative agencies. These were the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). We interviewed
representatives of the Treasury Department investigative agencies.
These agencies were the Secret Service, Customs Service, Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) Criminal Division, and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). We also interviewed representatives from
two other judgmentally selected agencies in each district. We
pretested these interview instruments with selected law enforcement
personnel in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York and the
District of Maryland before we used them in the other locations.
Table I.3 lists the judgmentally selected agencies we selected to
interview in each field location. We met with special
agents-in-charge and/or agents closely involved in dealings with the
U.S. Attorneys' Offices we reviewed.
Table I.3
Law Enforcement Agencies Selected for
Supplemental Interview by U.S. Attorney
District
Investigative agencies selected
District for supplemental interviews
-------------------------- --------------------------------
California, Central Postal Inspection Service,
Postal Service
Defense Criminal Investigative
Service, DOD
Florida, South Office of the Inspector General,
HHS
Criminal Investigations
Division, EPA
Maine Fish and Wildlife Service,
Department of the Interior
Criminal Investigations
Division, EPA
Maryland Office of the Inspector General,
HHS
Criminal Investigations
Division, EPA
Michigan, West Office of the Inspector General,
HHS
Postal Inspection Service,
Postal Service
New York, East and South Office of the Inspector General,
HHS
Criminal Investigations
Division, EPA
Texas, North Office of the Inspector General,
HHS
Criminal Investigations
Division, EPA
------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
DOD - Department of Defense
HHS - Department of Health and Human Services
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
Source: GAO.
The field work provided information on how priorities were addressed
in various U.S. Attorneys' Offices and officials' views on a variety
of issues and concerns about priority setting and how best to use
limited law enforcement resources, but they did not constitute a
representative or statistically valid sample of opinions.
ANALYSIS OF EOUSA STATISTICS ON
CRIMINAL CASELOADS AND WORKLOADS
NATIONWIDE AND FOR EIGHT U.S.
ATTORNEYS' OFFICES
========================================================== Appendix II
U.S. ATTORNEYS' CRIMINAL
CASELOADS AND WORKLOADS VARIED
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
Analysis of the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys' (EOUSA)
statistics on criminal caseloads and workloads for each of the eight
U.S. Attorneys' Offices we visited showed that most cases filed and
time spent corresponded to the stated priorities of the U.S.
Attorneys. Criminal caseload and workload were concentrated in 3
broad program areas in these offices and for the 93 U.S. Attorneys'
Offices nationwide. These areas were drug,\1
economic/white-collar,\2 and violent crimes.\3 The eight offices we
visited also had organizational units dedicated to at least two of
these three program areas.
Caseloads and attorney time spent within the three broad program
areas of drug, economic/white-collar, and violent crimes varied in
the offices we visited. For example, drug cases filed ranged from 13
percent to 49 percent of the total criminal caseload in these
offices. Attorney time spent on economic/white-collar crime
prosecutions ranged from 25 percent to 48 percent of total attorney
time spent on criminal prosecutions.
Our caseload analysis was based on statistics on criminal cases filed
by U.S. Attorneys in federal district courts during fiscal year
1993. Based on discussions with headquarters and district
information management system personnel, cases filed appeared to be
the most reliable statistic in the EOUSA case management system. Our
workload analysis used EOUSA resource summary reports through which
U.S. Attorneys reported on the number of full-time equivalent
attorney positions and the amount of time spent in various crime
categories. Because we had concerns about the accuracy of this
information, both data sets should be viewed as general indicators of
caseload and workload. (See pp. 18 through 24.)
--------------------
\1 Drug offenses include drug dealing, drug possession, and crimes
prosecuted through the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
program.
\2 Economic/White-collar crimes include official corruption;
health-care fraud; environmental, health, and safety crimes;
financial institution fraud; and other frauds, such as telemarketing,
computer, securities, and bankruptcy.
\3 Violent crimes include firearms violations, bank robbery, and
other violent crimes.
ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES
FOCUS ON THREE BROAD CRIME
AREAS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
The predominance of drug, economic/white-collar, and violent crime
prosecutions in U.S. Attorneys' caseloads and workloads is
consistent with the organizational structure and concentration of
resources in the eight U.S. Attorneys' Offices we visited. All
eight of the offices had units dedicated to at least two of the three
major crime areas. The eight offices all had specialized units for
drug prosecutions. They all also had units dedicated to specific
types of economic/white-collar crime, such as financial institution
fraud, business/securities fraud, or public corruption. Within the
violent crime program area, one of the offices had a specialized
violent criminal enterprises unit. Two other offices conducted
violent crime prosecutions under a narcotics and violent crime unit.
The other five districts prosecuted violent crimes through
nonspecialized units, such as a general crimes unit.
Similarly, the resources attached to these units accounted for a
substantial portion, and in some cases, a majority of the resources
of the offices' criminal divisions. In seven districts for which
data were available, 51 percent of the criminal division prosecutors
were assigned to units dedicated to drug, economic/white-collar, and
violent crimes. In four of those seven districts, more than half of
the prosecutors were assigned to those three crime areas.
MOST CASES FILED IN COURT BY
U.S. ATTORNEYS INVOLVED DRUG,
ECONOMIC/WHITE-COLLAR, AND
VIOLENT CRIMES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3
As shown in Figure II.1, nationwide about 28.5 percent of all cases
filed involved drug crimes, about 28.8 percent involved
economic/white-collar crimes, and about 15.6 percent involved violent
crimes. The remaining 27.1 percent of cases filed involved other
types of prosecutions, including organized crime, immigration, and a
wide range of other federal criminal violations.
Figure II.1: Type and Percent
of Total Criminal Cases Filed
Nationwide (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note 1: Total criminal cases filed equaled 36,995.
Note 2: Numbers do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
In each of the eight districts we visited, the combined total of
drug, economic/white-collar, and violent crime cases filed accounted
for the vast majority of cases filed by the district--from 65.8
percent in the Southern District of New York to 81.3 percent in the
District of Maine. However, the percentage of case filings for each
of the three crime areas varied widely among the eight districts.
Figures II.2 through II.9 show the respective percentages of drug,
economic/white-collar, violent crime cases, and other crimes filed in
federal district court for each of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices we
visited.
Figure II.2: Type and Percent
of Total Criminal Cases Filed
in the Central District of
California (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal cases filed equaled 1,271.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.3: Type and Percent
of Total Criminal Cases Filed
in the Southern District of
Florida (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal cases filed equaled 1,100.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.4: Type and Percent
of Total Criminal Cases Filed
in the District of Maine
(Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal cases filed equaled 112.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.5: Type and Percent
of Total Criminal Cases Filed
in the District of Maryland
(Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal cases filed equaled 458.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.6: Type and Percent
of Total Criminal Cases Filed
in the Western District of
Michigan (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal cases filed equaled 241.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II. 7: Type and
Percent of Total Criminal Cases
Filed in the Eastern District
of New York (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note 1: Total criminal cases filed equaled 1,380.
Note 2: Numbers do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.8: Type and Percent
of Total Criminal Cases Filed
in the Southern District of New
York (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal cases filed equaled 1,263.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.9: Type and Percent
of Total Criminal Cases Filed
in the Northern District of
Texas (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note 1: Total criminal cases filed equaled 867.
Note 2: Numbers do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
The percentage of drug cases filed ranged from 49.2 percent in the
Eastern District of New York to 13.1 percent in the Central District
of California. The percentage of economic/white-collar cases filed
ranged from 39.4 percent in the Western District of Michigan and the
Southern District of New York to 22.2 percent in the Eastern District
of New York. Violent crime cases filed ranged from 25.3 percent of
all cases filed in the Central District of California to 5.2 percent
of the cases filed in the Eastern District of New York.
Figures II.10 through II.13 compare the percentages of cases filed in
the three largest program areas and in all other program areas
combined for each of the districts we visited to the percentages of
these cases filed nationally. The figures provide another
illustration of the differences in the types of criminal cases filed
by the U.S. Attorneys' Offices we visited.
Figure II.10: Percent of Drug
Cases Filed Nationally and in
U.S. Attorneys' Offices We
Visited (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.11: Percent of
Economic/White-Collar Cases
Filed Nationally and in U.S.
Attorneys' Offices We Visited
(Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.12: Percent of
Violent Crime Cases Filed
Nationally and in U.S.
Attorneys' Offices We Visited
(Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.13: Percent of All
Other Crime Cases Filed
Nationally and in the U.S.
Attorneys' Offices We Visited
(Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
MOST ATTORNEY TIME WAS SPENT ON
DRUG, ECONOMIC/WHITE-COLLAR,
AND VIOLENT CRIME CASES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4
As shown in Figure II.14, in fiscal year 1993, nationwide about 32
percent of criminal prosecutors' time was spent on drug cases, about
32 percent was spent on economic/white-collar cases, and about 11
percent was spent on violent crime cases. The remaining 25 percent
of the criminal prosecutors' time was spent on other types of cases,
including organized crime, immigration, criminal forfeitures and
appeals, and other criminal violations.
Figure II.14: Percent and Type
of Full-Time Equivalent
Criminal Attorney Positions
Nationwide (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal attorney positions equaled 2,832.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Criminal prosecutors in the eight U.S. Attorneys' Offices we visited
spent most of their time working in the three large program
areas--drug, economic/white-collar, and violent crimes. In each of
these offices, the combined total time devoted by prosecutors to
these three program areas accounted for a substantial majority of the
office's total prosecutive time--from 61 percent in the Eastern
District of New York to 82 percent in the District of Maryland.
Figures II.15 through II.22 show the number of attorney positions
devoted to the three broad priority program areas and to all other
criminal cases, nationwide and for each of the eight districts we
visited.
Figure II.15: Percent and Type
of Full-Time Equivalent
Criminal Attorney Positions in
the Central District of
California (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note 1: Total criminal attorney positions equaled 138.
Note 2: Numbers do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.16: Percent and Type
of Full-Time Equivalent
Criminal Attorney Positions in
the Southern District of
Florida (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal attorney positions equaled 147.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.17: Percent and Type
of Full-Time Equivalent
Criminal Attorney Positions in
the District of Maine (Fiscal
Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal attorney positions equaled 14.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.18: Percent and Type
of Full-Time Equivalent
Criminal Attorney Positions in
the District of Maryland
(Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal attorney positions equaled 45.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.19: Percent and Type
of Full-Time Equivalent
Criminal Attorney Positions in
the Western District of
Michigan (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal attorney positions equaled 19.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.20: Percent and Type
of Full-Time Equivalent
Criminal Attorney Positions in
the Eastern District of New
York (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal attorney positions equaled 96.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.21: Percent and Type
of Full-Time Equivalent
Criminal Attorney Positions in
the Southern District of New
York (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal attorney positions equaled 123.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.22: Percent and Type
of Full-Time Equivalent
Criminal Attorney Positions in
the Northern District of Texas
(Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Total criminal attorney positions equaled 51.
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
While the largest amount of attorney time in all of the districts was
spent in the three large program areas combined, time devoted to each
area varied among districts, particularly for drug and
economic/white-collar crime prosecutions. For example, the amount of
attorney time spent on drug cases ranged from the equivalent of 26
percent of attorney positions in the Central District of California
and the Northern District of Texas to 37 percent in the Southern
District of Florida and the District of Maryland. Attorney time
spent on economic/white-collar crimes ranged from the equivalent of
25 percent of attorney positions in the Eastern District of New York
to 48 percent in the Northern District of Texas. The amount of
attorney time spent on violent crime ranged from the equivalent of 4
percent of attorney positions in the Southern District of Florida and
the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York to 12 percent of
attorney positions in the Central District of California.
Figures II.23 through II.26 compare the percent of attorney time
spent in the three largest program areas in each of the districts to
the percent of attorney time spent nationally. The figures show the
differences in how criminal attorney time was spent by the U.S.
Attorneys' Offices we visited.
Figure II.23: Percent of
Full-Time Equivalent Criminal
Attorney Positions Spent on
Drug Cases (Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.24: Percent of
Full-Time Equivalent Criminal
Attorney Positions Spent on
Economic/White-Collar Cases
(Fiscal Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.25: Percent of
Full-Time Equivalent Criminal
Attorney Positions Spent on
Violent Crime Cases (Fiscal
Year 1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
Figure II.26: Percent of
Full-Time Equivalent Criminal
Attorney Positions Spent on
Other Crime Cases (Fiscal Year
1993)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of EOUSA data.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
========================================================== Appendix II
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Justice's
letter dated April 13, 1995.
GAO COMMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:5
1. While we discussed the role of the Attorney General's Advisory
Committee of U.S. Attorneys as a forum for U.S. Attorneys to have
input into setting national prosecutive priorities, we did not
explore the involvement of this group in coordinating priorities
among Justice components because we focused on coordination among law
enforcement agencies at the level of individual U.S. Attorney
districts.
2. We noted that priorities were communicated to U.S. Attorneys
through a variety of forums, including most of those EOUSA cited.
Among the forums we cited as examples were Attorney General and
Justice directives, training sessions, seminars, and conferences.
(See p. 8.)
3. We recognized that Law Enforcement Coordination Committees (LECC)
were important forums of inter-district communication in several of
the U.S. Attorney districts we visited. We referred to LECCs
broadly as law enforcement meetings when citing them as forums for
U.S. Attorneys to communicate priorities to federal, state, and
local investigative agency personnel. (See p. 14.)
4. We agree that we had no means of assessing whether evaluators
reviewed how U.S. Attorneys addressed national priorities but then
did not mention their findings in their written reports. We reviewed
final evaluation reports, but we were not provided with evaluators'
working papers and notes.
5. While we devoted some attention to efforts by EOUSA to improve
the accuracy of its case management data, including discussion of
actions taken in various phases of its "Operation Garbage Out"
program, we did not note specifically that EOUSA sent U.S. Attorneys
error listings on a periodic basis.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Deborah A. Knorr, Senior Evaluator
Wendy C. Graves, Evaluator
Janice Turner, Evaluator
Barry J. Seltser, Assistant Director
David P. Alexander, Senior Social Science Analyst
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Henry R. Wray, Senior Associate General Counsel
Ann H. Finley, Senior Attorney
BOSTON/NEW YORK FIELD OFFICE
Michael Savino, Senior Evaluator
Brenda R. James-Towe, Senior Evaluator
ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE
Clarence Tull, Senior Evaluator
CHICAGO/DETROIT FIELD OFFICE
Jerry Aiello, Senior Evaluator
DALLAS FIELD OFFICE
Phillip Caramia, Senior Evaluator
LOS ANGELES FIELD OFFICE
Richard R. Griswold, Senior Evaluator
_
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