|
|
Continental Air Defense: A Dedicated Force Is No Longer Needed
(Letter Report, 05/03/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-76).
The continental air defense evolved during the Cold War to detect and
intercept Soviet bombers attacking North America via the North Pole.
GAO concludes that such an air defense is no longer needed and could be
disbanded at an annual savings of as much as $370 million. Other
reserve and active units are well equipped to handle what has become the
defense force's current focus--intercepting drug smugglers. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that (1) the
continental air defense be performed by dual tasking active and reserve
general-purpose fighter and training squadrons in the Air Force, the
Navy, and the Marine Corps and (2) the number of Air National Guard
units assigned to this mission be sharply reduced or eliminated. The
Secretary of Defense's guidance and the Air Force's plan, however,
accomplish only part of what was envisioned by the Chairman, allowing
the Air National Guard to retain an excessive force structure and incur
the associated operating and support costs.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-94-76
TITLE: Continental Air Defense: A Dedicated Force Is No Longer
Needed
DATE: 05/03/94
SUBJECT: Defense operations
International relations
Defense economic analysis
Reductions in force
Combat readiness
Defense contingency planning
Military aircraft
Defense budgets
Defense cost control
Defense capabilities
IDENTIFIER: F-15A/B Aircraft
Soviet Union
DOD Bottom-Up Review
F-16A/B Aircraft
**************************************************************************
* This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a GAO *
* report. Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles, *
* headings, and bullets are preserved. Major divisions and subdivisions *
* of the text, such as Chapters, Sections, and Appendixes, are *
* identified by double and single lines. The numbers on the right end *
* of these lines indicate the position of each of the subsections in the *
* document outline. These numbers do NOT correspond with the page *
* numbers of the printed product. *
* *
* No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although figure *
* captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but may not resemble *
* those in the printed version. *
* *
* A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO Document *
* Distribution Facility by calling (202) 512-6000, by faxing your *
* request to (301) 258-4066, or by writing to P.O. Box 6015, *
* Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015. We are unable to accept electronic orders *
* for printed documents at this time. *
**************************************************************************
Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Committees
May 1994
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE - A
DEDICATED FORCE IS NO LONGER
NEEDED
GAO/NSIAD-94-76
Continental Air Defense
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
NORAD - North American Aerospace Defense Command
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-255846
May 3, 1994
The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
In February 1993, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended that (1) the continental air defense mission be performed
by dual tasking existing active and reserve general-purpose fighter
and training squadrons in the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine
Corps and (2) the number of Air National Guard units dedicated to
this mission be sharply reduced or eliminated. As part of our
legislative responsibility, we assessed the viability of the
Chairman's recommendations and the Secretary of Defense's and the Air
Force's responses to those recommendations. We are reporting to you
because of your committees' jurisdiction over these issues.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The continental air defense mission evolved during the Cold War to
detect and intercept Soviet bombers attacking North America via the
North Pole. The continental air defense force that carries out that
mission is within the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD), which is a joint U.S. and Canadian command. The U.S.
portion of that force is currently comprised of 180 Air National
Guard F-15A/B and F-16A/B aircraft located in 10 units and 14 alert
sites in the United States. In addition to the 10 dedicated units, 2
F-15 dual-tasked general- purpose units stand alert for NORAD--an
active unit at Elmendorf, Alaska, and an Air National Guard unit at
New Orleans, Louisiana--part of which is on 24-hour alert. Because
it does not have a wartime mission outside North America, the
continental air defense force is not counted as part of the Air
Force's 26-1/2 fighter wing equivalent base force or the 20 fighter
wing equivalent force recently proposed by the Secretary of Defense
as a result of the Bottom-Up Review.\1 The Air Force currently
budgets about $370 million annually to operate and support the
continental air defense force.
As required by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommended in early 1993 those role and mission changes necessary to
achieve maximum effectiveness of the military services. The Chairman
determined that the United States no longer needed a large, dedicated
air defense force because of the near disappearance of the Soviet
threat. Consequently, the Chairman concluded that the dedicated
force could be significantly reduced or eliminated and that existing
active and reserve general-purpose combat and training forces could
be tasked to perform the continental air defense mission.\2 The
Chairman expected that his recommendations would result in
significant savings in personnel and operating costs. The analysis
leading to the Chairman's conclusion and recommendations focused on
the forces the United States dedicates to the air defense mission.
Likewise, this report discusses the roles and missions of the U.S.
forces and does not include any analysis of Canadian forces.
The Secretary of Defense viewed the Chairman's recommendations as a
top priority. The Secretary considered the Chairman's
recommendations and subsequently directed the Air Force to reduce the
force but retain the mission primarily as an Air Force reserve
responsibility. In response, the Air Force devised a plan to retain
the mission within the Air National Guard as a dedicated force and
reduce that force from 180 aircraft to slightly more than 2 fighter
wing equivalents, thus accomplishing only a portion of what was
envisioned by the Chairman. The plan, while not formally endorsed by
the Secretary of Defense, is reflected in the Department's fiscal
year 1995 budget submission.
--------------------
\1 These levels were established as the number of fighter wings
needed to support two simultaneous regional conflicts. Each fighter
wing has 72 combat aircraft.
\2 Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United
States, February 1993.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
A dedicated continental air defense force is no longer needed. Since
the threat of a Soviet-style air attack against the United States has
largely disappeared, the air defense force has been focusing its
activities on air sovereignty missions. Active and reserve
general-purpose and training forces could perform these missions
because they have comparable or more capable aircraft, are located at
or near most existing continental air defense bases and alert sites,
and have pilots capable of performing air sovereignty missions or
being trained to perform such missions.
The Chairman's recommendations recognize the need to reassign air
sovereignty missions and eliminate or sharply reduce the force now
dedicated to performing those missions to other forces. The
Secretary's guidance and the Air Force's plan accomplish only a
portion of what was envisioned by the Chairman, as summarized in
table 1.
Table 1
Summary of the Chairman's
Recommendations, the Secretary's
Guidance, and the Air Force's Plan
Chairman, Joint Chiefs Secretary of
of Staff Defense Air Force
------------------------ ------------------ --------------
Eliminate/sharply Reduce dedicated Reduce the
reduce dedicated forces number of
forces dedicated
aircraft to
about two
fighter wing
equivalents
Dual task other active Retain forces Retain forces
and reserve general- largely in the Air
purpose as a reserve National Guard
and training forces function
------------------------------------------------------------
Full implementation of the Chairman's recommendations would make more
operating and support funds available to sustain general-purpose
forces during this period of declining budget resources. The
Secretary's guidance and the Air Force's plan, however, would allow
the Air National Guard to retain an excessive force structure and
incur the associated operating and support costs.
A DEDICATED CONTINENTAL AIR
DEFENSE FORCE IS NO LONGER
NEEDED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
The former Soviet Union no longer poses a significant threat of a
bomber attack on the continental United States. Further, internal
problems within Russia and other former Soviet Union countries have
extended the time it would take them to return to previous levels of
military readiness and capabilities. As a result, dedicated forces
the United States once maintained exclusively to counter a Soviet
attack now concentrate on air sovereignty missions, such as anti-drug
smuggling efforts. The air sovereignty missions could be reassigned
to other existing reserve or active general-purpose combat or
training units because they (1) have comparable or better aircraft,
(2) are located at or near most existing air defense units or alert
sites, and (3) have pilots that possess similar skills to those used
by air defense and air sovereignty pilots.
ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN FOCUSED
ON AIR SOVEREIGNTY MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
According to the Chairman, the air defense force was structured to
intercept the former Soviet Union's long-range bomber force if it
attacked over the North Pole. Since that threat has largely
disappeared, the United States no longer needs a dedicated
continental air defense force, and the force has refocused its
activity on the air sovereignty mission, concentrating on
intercepting drug smugglers. However, anti-drug smuggling activities
at some units and alert sites have been minimal and at others almost
nonexistent. Overall, during the past 4 years, NORAD's alert
fighters took off to intercept aircraft (referred to as scrambled)
1,518 times, or an average of 15 times per site per year. Of these
incidents, the number of suspected drug smuggling aircraft averaged
one per site, or less than 7 percent of all of the alert sites' total
activity.\3 The remaining activity generally involved visually
inspecting unidentified aircraft and assisting aircraft in distress.
Appendix I contains additional information on the scramble activity
at each air defense unit and alert site and on the continental air
defense and air sovereignty missions.
In September 1993, we reported on the justification for the amount of
flying hours and steaming days the Department of Defense (DOD) uses
in carrying out its drug detection and monitoring role.\4 The report
stated that DOD's efforts were part of a multiagency effort and
concluded that the government's investment does not appear to be
paying off because estimated cocaine flow has not appreciably
declined and most drug smugglers are not interdicted.
--------------------
\3 These figures relate to all air defense units active during the
4-year period. Over that time, some sites were closed or operations
were transferred to other locations.
\4 Drug Control: Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance Is Not
Paying Off (GAO/NSIAD-93-220,
Sept. 1, 1993).
OTHER RESERVE AND ACTIVE
UNITS HAVE COMPARABLE OR
BETTER AIRCRAFT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
General-purpose combat and training forces' aircraft, such as the
F-15C, F-16C, F-14A/A+, and F/A-18A/B/C, are capable of performing
the air defense and air sovereignty missions. These aircraft are
generally newer and equipped with more advanced avionics than the
dedicated air defense force's F-16As and F-15As, which are the oldest
F-16 and F-15 models in the Air Force's inventory. For example, the
more modern F-16Cs and F-15Cs have advanced radars that provide
greater range and sharper resolution than those on the F-16A or
F-15A. Moreover, the F-15C has undergone a multistage improvement
program to enhance other avionics, such as the electronic
countermeasure system and the central computer system, which resulted
in greater data storage capabilities and enhanced processing speed.
In addition, over 500 fighter aircraft have been designated for
training purposes.
LOCATION OF RESERVE AND
ACTIVE UNITS WOULD ALLOW
THEM TO CARRY OUT MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
Current air defense and alert sites are located along U.S. borders
to provide geographic coverage. General-purpose and training units
in the active and reserve forces, which are located at about 50 bases
throughout the United States, could support NORAD's coverage
requirements. In addition, several air defense force alert sites are
collocated with or close to general-purpose and training units.
Therefore, dual-tasked existing general-purpose and training forces
would also be able to fulfill the air defense and air sovereignty
missions. Figure 1 and appendix II identify the locations of air
defense units, alert sites, and general-purpose and training units.
Figure 1: Locations of Air
Defense Units, Alert Sites, and
Active and Reserve F-14, F-15,
F-16, and F/A-18 Units
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Some general-purpose and training forces might have to deploy to
other locations to perform their missions. NORAD currently deploys
some air defense force aircraft to other sites to perform their
duties instead of dual-tasking collocated or nearby general-purpose
units. For example:
The Air Force deploys F-16s from the 158th Fighter Interceptor
Group at Burlington, Vermont, to Langley Air Force Base,
Virginia. Langley is the home of the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing,
an active unit of 72 F-15Cs--the most technologically advanced
fighter in the Air Force--and its pilots are trained in the
air-to-air mission, which closely resembles the air defense
pilots' training.
The 148th Fighter Interceptor Group, Duluth, Minnesota, deploys to
Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, home of the 325th Fighter Wing.
This wing trains F-15 pilots and has 72 F-15C aircraft.
The Air Force deploys air defense force F-16As from the 120th
Fighter Interceptor Group, Great Falls, Montana, to
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona. Davis-Monthan is
the home of the 162nd Tactical Fighter Group, which has 46 F-16
aircraft and pilots trained in the air-to-air mission.
SKILLS FOR AIR DEFENSE AND
ACTIVE AND RESERVE PILOTS
ARE COMPARABLE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.4
The skills required by pilots in the air defense force are, in
several ways, comparable or similar enough to those required by
pilots in general-purpose squadrons. For example, both
general-purpose and air defense pilots are required to be proficient
in skills such as day or night target intercepts, defense of an area,
aerial gunnery, and quick takeoffs or intercepts. However, some
skills are unique to either general-purpose or air defense pilots.
For example, skills needed for composite force training and joint
maritime operations are needed by general-purpose units but are not
necessary for all air defense force pilots. Likewise, skills such as
slow shadow day or night visual identification are needed by air
defense and air sovereignty pilots so that they can identify and
track unknown aircraft, but these skills are not needed by
general-purpose pilots. However, despite the missions' unique pilot
requirements, enough training similarities would allow dual-tasked
general-purpose squadrons to accomplish the air defense and air
sovereignty missions.
THE CHAIRMAN'S RECOMMENDATIONS
COULD SAVE COSTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's recommendations could
result in significant cost savings. If existing general-purpose and
training forces were tasked to accomplish the air defense and air
sovereignty missions, force structure and associated costs could be
reduced. The amount of savings would depend on whether the dedicated
air defense units were disbanded or assigned another mission. If all
the air defense units were disbanded, the Air Force could save as
much as $370 million in annual operation, maintenance, and personnel
costs.
To accomplish the added responsibility, existing active and reserve
units may need additional resources, such as aircraft for alert
duties. The cost associated with these aircraft could be offset if a
corresponding dedicated air defense unit were disbanded. For
example, the dual-tasked F-15 general-purpose unit at the Naval Air
Station, New Orleans, Louisiana, has 24 combat aircraft instead of
the usual 18 aircraft assigned to F-15 units that are not dual
tasked. These aircraft cost about $46 million annually, or about $6
million more than those in units with 18 aircraft. However, if dual
tasking a 24-combat aircraft Air National Guard unit would eliminate
a dedicated air defense F-15 unit costing over $42 million, then over
$36 million would be saved.
THE AIR FORCE'S PLAN WOULD NOT
ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT COST
SAVINGS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
Since the Secretary of Defense's guidance and the Air Force's plan
would retain the air defense mission as a largely dedicated Air
National Guard responsibility and only reduce the dedicated force
structure, significant cost savings would not be achieved. The Air
Force estimates that its plan to slightly reduce the dedicated force
by retiring some aircraft at each of the 10 Air National Guard units
would save about $36.5 million annually in operations and support
costs. Thus, the Air Force would still incur significant personnel,
operating, and support costs, since the Air Force would continue to
operate and maintain all 10 dedicated NORAD air defense units. The
plan, while not formally endorsed by the Secretary of Defense, is
reflected in DOD's fiscal year 1995 budget submission.
RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense not approve the Air
Force's plan unless it is modified (1) to eliminate or sharply reduce
the dedicated air defense force and (2) to reassign the air defense
mission to active and reserve general-purpose and training units.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
DOD provided comments on a draft of this report, which appear in
appendix III. Although it mostly concurred with the facts discussed
in the draft report, DOD took issue with some of the analysis and
conclusions drawn from those facts and did not concur with the
recommendation. In commenting on the draft report, DOD noted that
(1) the Chairman's recommendation was based on an Air Force
consisting of 26-1/2 fighter wings, (2) air sovereignty and a
capacity to regenerate a continental air defense force remain a
critical function of the Air Force, and (3) it has taken steps to
appropriately size the available force.
According to DOD, the Bottom-Up Review required the Air Force to
maintain forces at a sufficient level to respond to two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts and that 20 fighter wings would
be necessary to meet that requirement. DOD further stated that force
requirements for the air sovereignty mission were not included in the
level required to meet major regional conflicts. That is, the
analysis supporting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Roles
and Missions report was based on the Air Force maintaining 26-1/2
fighter wings. Force structure reductions would result in a decrease
to 20 fighter wings. Thus, under the most demanding circumstances in
which the Air Force would have to deploy all 20 fighter wings, no
forces would be available to fulfill the air sovereignty mission.
DOD agreed that eliminating all dedicated air defense units would
result in significant net savings but also noted that some
incremental costs would be incurred in dual tasking other units. DOD
also commented that a dedicated force capable of performing air
sovereignty missions could help deter illegal airborne activity.
However, our September 1993 report on drug control efforts noted that
the continental air defense force might be ineffective in detecting,
monitoring, and apprehending drug smugglers because direct
drug-smuggling flights into the United States essentially ended years
ago and jet fighter aircraft cannot effectively track slow,
low-flying, drug-smuggling planes.
The analysis in the Chairman's Roles and Missions report was clearly
based on the threat of a Soviet-style bomber attack on North America.
The decline in that threat led to the Chairman's recommendation that
a dedicated continental air defense force was no longer needed.
However, the Air Force has proposed to maintain essentially the same
framework historically used to defend against a Soviet-style bomber
attack.
We are not recommending that all capability to protect U.S. airspace
be eliminated. We agree with the Chairman's recommendations to
assign the mission to existing Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
general-purpose and training squadrons and eliminate or sharply
reduce the dedicated forces currently associated with continental air
defense.
We recognize that the Bottom-Up Review recommended that the Air Force
maintain 20 fighter wings for responding to two nearly simultaneous
major regional conflicts. However, during peacetime, while most
general-
purpose forces are not deployed, the air sovereignty mission could be
accomplished using general-purpose and training forces. If the most
demanding circumstances were to arise and all 20 fighter wings were
needed overseas, over 500 nondeployable training forces could be
used, as is now planned, to protect U.S. airspace. This is more
than three times the number of aircraft dedicated for that purpose
during peacetime. DOD provided no evidence that implementing the
recommendation concerning dual tasking general-purpose and training
forces would, under the most demanding circumstances, force the
National Command Authority to choose between deploying insufficient
forces or leaving U.S. airspace unprotected.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
We initiated this review as part of our legislative responsibility
and as a result of findings from our ongoing review of the Air
Force's fighter support aircraft. We analyzed the air defense
mission in regard to current military and nonmilitary threats, the
availability and compatibility of other forces to be dual tasked to
perform the mission, and the reductions in defense budgets and force
structure.
We visited the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Headquarters, Air National Guard
Bureau Headquarters, and Defense Intelligence Agency, all in
Washington, D.C. Additionally, we visited the North American
Aerospace Defense Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs,
Colorado; the Air Combat Command Headquarters, Langley Air Force
Base, Virginia; the Commander of Naval Air Forces Atlantic, Norfolk,
Virginia; the Naval Air Reserves Headquarters, Naval Support
Activity, New Orleans, Louisiana; the 1st Air Force Headquarters,
NORAD's Southeast Sector Operations Control Center, and Air Defense
Forces' F-15 training facilities, Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida;
the Air Defense Forces' F-16 training facilities, Kingsley Field,
Klamath Falls, Oregon; and the 159th Fighter Group, Naval Air
Station, New Orleans, Louisiana.
We also visited the following continental air defense units and alert
sites collocated within the units: the 102nd Fighter Interceptor
Wing, Otis, Massachusetts; 144th Fighter Interceptor Wing, Fresno,
California;
119th Fighter Interceptor Group, Fargo, North Dakota; 125th Fighter
Interceptor Group, Jacksonville, Florida; 142nd Fighter Interceptor
Group, Portland, Oregon; 148th Fighter Interceptor Group, Duluth,
Minnesota;
147th Fighter Interceptor Group, Ellington, Texas; 158th Fighter
Interceptor Group, Burlington, Vermont; 177th Fighter Interceptor
Group, Atlantic City, New Jersey; and 120th Fighter Interceptor
Group, Great Falls, Montana.
While NORAD is a joint U.S.-Canadian command, we limited our review
to U.S. air defense forces only.
We conducted our review from June 1992 to July 1993 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense
and the Air Force, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, and other appropriate congressional committees. We will also
make copies available to other interested parties on request.
Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report
are listed in appendix IV.
Richard Davis
Director, National Security
Analysis
THE CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE
MISSION'S TRANSITION TO THE
POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT
=========================================================== Appendix I
The protection of continental skies is the responsibility of the
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which is comprised
of U.S. and Canadian air forces. NORAD's mission of continental
protection involves controlling sovereign airspace, assessing and
warning of enemy air or missile attack, and intercepting or engaging
such threats. This mission is supported by an extensive network of
ground-, air-, and space-based radars, sensors, and satellites, as
well as up-to-date threat intelligence. NORAD maintains a core force
of air defense fighter squadrons to provide protection in the event
of an attack. A number of these interceptors are on 24-hour alert at
locations along the U.S. border to identify and intercept unknown
aircraft or objects. In addition, two alert sites are located in
Alaska. The aircraft at these sites are provided by the 3rd Fighter
Wing, a dual-tasked active air force F-15 unit stationed at Elmendorf
Air Force Base, Alaska.
The continental air defense mission, with its dedicated force,
evolved as a direct result of the growth of the Soviet long-range
bomber fleet in the post-World War II environment and the detonation
of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949. NORAD was established in 1957 by
Canada and the United States to intercept any Soviet long-range
bombers attacking over the North Pole. Canada and the United States
also built three radar networks across the continent to give 2 to 3
hours warning of bomber attacks. The operation of these extensive
networks required daily coordination on tactical matters and
considerable merging of plans, so an integrated command was
established at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado,
to centralize operational control of air defense. By 1960, NORAD
maintained approximately 1,200 interceptors dedicated to countering
Soviet bombers.
During the 1960s, the character of the military threat changed as the
Soviets focused on intercontinental and sea-launched ballistic
missiles and developed an anti-satellite capability. In response,
the United States built a space-based surveillance and
missile-warning system to detect and track airborne threats
worldwide. NORAD was given responsibility for this system, thereby
adding to its mission the tactical assessment and warning of a
possible air, missile, or space attack on North America.
The effectiveness of NORAD's air defense system was first questioned
in the early 1960s, when the Soviets shifted reliance from manned
bombers to ballistic missiles. The Secretary of Defense at that time
believed that current air defenses would limit damage only marginally
in a nuclear attack by long-range ballistic and submarine-launched
missiles. In his opinion, the existing interceptor force was
excessive in relation to the diminished bomber threat. On the basis
of this change in threat and on budget considerations, the Department
of Defense (DOD) reduced the number of NORAD interceptors to
approximately 300 aircraft by the mid-1970s.
With the breakup of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact in 1991, the military threat upon which NORAD had based
its core structure had again changed significantly. Likewise, the
Cuban threat was declining, and other military threats did not
approach that of the Soviets during the Cold War.
NORAD recognized this drastic reduction in the military threat and
determined that sufficient warning time existed to reconstitute
forces needed to meet a re-emerging threat of the magnitude of the
former Soviet Union. Consequently, NORAD revised the justification
for its core forces, emphasizing peacetime air sovereignty.
According to a recent NORAD strategy review,
"The dramatically changed threat and . . . development of
post-Cold War defense policies suggest real possibilities for
shifting NORAD's focus from deterring massive nuclear attack to
defending both nations [Canada and the United States] by maintaining
air sovereignty . . . . The size of the core force would equate
to that required to perform the peacetime Air Sovereignty mission."
NORAD defines air sovereignty as providing surveillance and control
of the territorial airspace, which includes:
intercepting and destroying uncontrollable air objects;
tracking hijacked aircraft;
assisting aircraft in distress;
escorting Communist civil aircraft; and
intercepting suspect aircraft, including counterdrug operations and
peacetime military intercepts.
Of these tasks, NORAD considers intercepting drug smugglers the most
serious. Under 10 U.S.C. 124, DOD is designated the single lead
agency for detecting and monitoring air and maritime shipments of
illegal drugs to the United States.\1
DOD gave NORAD the responsibility for intercepting suspected airborne
drug smugglers. However, only 7 percent of NORAD fighter intercepts
from 1989-92 were drug related (see table I.1).
NORAD plans to reduce the number of alert sites in the continental
United States to 14 and provide 28 aircraft for the day-to-day
peacetime air sovereignty mission. Each alert site will have two
fighters, and their crews will be on 24-hour duty and ready to
scramble within 5 minutes.
Table I.1
Scramble Activity by Air Defense Units
and Alert Sites, 1989-92
Air defense unit/alert Total Number drug Percent drug
site Status\a number related related
-------------------------- ---------- ---------- ------------- -------------
Atlantic City, N.J. 1 82 14 17.1
Burlington, Vt./ 1 6 2 33.3
Langley Air Force Base, 3 52 0 0
Va.
Duluth, Minn. 5 0 0 0
Tyndall Air Force Base, 3 57 6 10.5
Fla.
Ellington, Tex./ 1 158 10 6.3
Holloman Air Force Base, 3 41 5 12.2
N. Mex.
Fargo, N. Dak./ 5 0 0 0
Kingsley Air Force Base, 3 49 0 0
Oreg.
Fresno, Calif./ 1 88 1 1.1
Castle Air Force Base, 4 3 0 0
Calif.
George Air Force Base, 4 76 1 1.3
Calif.
March Air Force Base, 3 15 0 0
Calif.
Great Falls, Mont./ 4 4 4 1 00.0
Davis-Monthan Air Force 3 62 8 12.9
Base, Ariz.
Jacksonville, Fla./ 1,4 64 4 6.3
Homestead Air Force Base, 4 270 24 8.9
Fla.
Key West, Fla. 3 15 2 13.3
Niagara Falls, N.Y./ 5,6 0 0 0
Charleston, S.C. 4 40 1 2.5
Otis, Mass./ 1 70 7 10.0
Bangor, Maine 3 32 1 3.1
Loring Air Force Base, 4 22 5 22.7
Maine
New Orleans, La. 2 84 7 8.3
Portland, Oreg./ 1 33 2 6.1
McChord Air Force Base, 4 32 0 0
Wash.
Selfridge, Mich./ 5,6 0 0 0
Seymour Johnson Air Force 3 52 2 3.9
Base, N.C.
Elmendorf Air Force Base, 2 111 0 0
Alaska
================================================================================
Total 1,518 106 7.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Percents have been rounded.
\a 1, Dedicated air defense unit with home station alert site; 2,
dual-tasked unit; 3, detached alert site; 4, alert site closed or
planned to close; 5, no home alert; 6, changing missions.
--------------------
\1 Drug Control: Impact of DOD's Detection and Monitoring on Cocaine
Flow (GAO/NSIAD-91-297,
Sept. 19, 1991).
LOCATIONS OF AIR DEFENSE,
GENERAL-PURPOSE, AND TRAINING
FORCES
========================================================== Appendix II
General-
Dedicated air purpose or
State defense unit Alert site training unit
--------------- ------------- ------------- -------------
Alabama X
Alaska X X
Arizona X X
Arkansas X
California X X X
Colorado X
Florida X X X
Georgia X
Hawaii X
Idaho X
Illinois X
Indiana X
Iowa X
Kansas X
Louisiana X X
Maine X
Maryland X
Massachusetts X X
Michigan X
Minnesota X
Missouri X
Montana X
Nevada X
New Jersey X
New Mexico X X
New York X
North Carolina X X
North Dakota X
Ohio X
Oklahoma X
Oregon X X
South Carolina X
South Dakota X
Texas X X X
Utah X
Vermont X
Virginia X X
Washington X
Wisconsin X
------------------------------------------------------------
Note: California and Oregon each have two alert sites.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix II
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 1-2 and 7-8.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 3-4.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 4-5.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on p. 7.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on pp. 7-8.
(See figure in printed edition.)
Now on p. 8.
Now on p. 8.
Now on p. 8.
(See figure in printed edition.)
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Jerry Herley, Assistant Director
NORFOLK REGIONAL OFFICE
Richard G. Payne, Regional Management Representative
Frank R. Marsh, Evaluator-in-Charge
Carolyn L. McClary, Evaluator
Jeffrey C. McDowell, Evaluator
_
|
