I’ve now seen enough pieces of the
big picture to understand that what I’ve doing for the past four years
has been defining, one interview at a time, the huge illegal
‘marijuana’ market which has been growing out of public view, one
high school graduating class at a time, for thirty-seven years. That’s
a study which became possible only because a window was opened in
1996 by California’s Proposition 215 just widely enough to encourage
a fraction of those pot users often dismissed as ‘heads’ or
‘stoners’ to apply for ‘medical’ status; and even then, only because
my own age made me just naive and curious enough to wonder how they had
all become chronic users of an agent which had been so completely
invisible to me during my own high school years ((‘45-’49) and then
remained unknown to nearly everyone over thirty until the world
somewhat blatedly discovered how much ‘hippies’ liked ‘pot’ during
1967’s ‘summer of love.’
It further turns out that because the same differences in generational
perspective which inspired my question are nearly
incomprehhensible to 96% of the pot market participants born since
1946, I’ve had a particularly difficult time getting ‘experts’ with a vested
interest in the ‘debate’ to even notice.
Also, because the great majority of buyers in what would only gradually
become a huge illegal market weren’t born until well after 1945,
the market’s illegal status was enough to keep both them and those
arresting them from an accurate understanding what was really
happening. As more time has passed and new pot users have been born—
and later become users tehmselves— the truth has been even more
distorted by simultaneously evolving ignorant beliefs and dishonest
'research.' An especilly ironic result of that ignorance and fraud is
that each side in the modern ‘pot debate’ is wedded to its own fairy
tale; a situation which— even more ironically— makes the truth seem the
least plausible explanation— and thus readily dismissed.
But it gets worse...
The 10 year evolution of Proposition 215 within California has also
been a good example of blind men trying to describe an elephant to each
other; so prolonged, so complicated, so rapidly changing, and so
ineptly reported that even those dealing intimately with one or more of
its many aspects on a daily basis can remain unaware of developments in
other areas— and their significance— for long intervals. It doesn’t
seem to matter whether one's primary interest is political, legal,
medical, or just shaping of public opinion.
Sadly; my take on current trends is that although the reform position
is much closer to the truth and retains considerable uninformed popular
support, it’s losing political ground because the feds’
simplistic message is being skillfully and aggressively sold to various
City Councils and other entities making the key decisions that will
directly affect the long term future of medical cannabis: namely,
which— if any— of several petitioners hoping to open ‘dispensaries’ in their
communities will receive business licenses and how stringently
they will be regulated?
One needs only to grasp that delay is a form of denial and
over-regulation by a hostile bureaucracy a good way to prevent something that can’t be banned
outright from ever happening to intuit the federal
strategy. Also its ultimate purpose: forcing as much
‘medical’ pot distribution back onto the street as possible. The feds
clearly hope that market participants can then be arrested as before
with the same minimal outcry now heard in states with far more
restrictive laws.
That scenario also assumes something else which remains to be seen: will
all those Californians who have had recommendations for years and been
(somewhat) educated by the experience become as docile as they they
once were when the old order is re-established?
In another installment, I’ll report how a recent experience with the
Richmond City Council provided me with the evidence that confirms this
analysis; but first, I want to point out when and how present federal
tactics were first revealed. It started with the infamous— and never
rebutted— charges arising from the 2004 ‘Oaksterdam’ flap when ‘able
bodied young men’ were filmed leavng a local club with large bags (of
clones). They were portrayed as irresponsible ‘scammers’ of (what might
be) a worthwhile program. The unanswered allegation that they
‘obviously’ weren’t ‘legitimate’ patients and the subsequent propaganda
campaign have been cleverly coordinated with local police and is
helping convince many City Councils to either ban pot clubs
outright of declare a ‘moratorium’ on licenses pending further
study. Things got a lot worse after Raich when the feds began
arresting certain activists already out on bail on state charges. All
but one remains buried as deeply in the federal gulag as if in
Guantanamo. in fact, the public seems more aware of Guantanamo than of
the Californians now mired in cruel double jeopardy within their home
state.
Viewed from the proper perspective, a recent
drug warrior claim can be seen as revealing the same weakness as
the FDA
4/20 announcement: their increasingly desperate need to
'prove' that pot is 'bad.'
Unfortunately, because the subtleties and implications of both
messages seem also to have eluded many drug policy reformers, they
aren't yet taking full advantage of the wonderful political
possibilities offered by their opponents’ desperation.
The FDA's 4/20 'announcement' was actually a restatement of Barry
McCaffreys' almost
illogical response to the (weakly stated, yet decisive) finding of
the 1999 IOM report that pot is medicine.My real time
analysis of McCzar's statement was written 2 days after his
spin first appeared (click on 'feature article).
Parenthetically, his 1999 'support' of 'deep lung delivery (via)
aerosol' could be devastatingly compared to contemporary
hypocrisy if
only the involved reformers were aware of what McCzar had said back in
1999. The hypocrisy I refer to is the DEA’s fight to
uphold NIDA's denial of an application to grow the pot which would
allow its aerosolized delivery to be studied in more detail. I’ve read
a lot about that case, have yet to see one reference to McCzar's
damning statement.
You can bet neither NIDA nor the DEA will ever mention it.
Several main stream columnists were far quicker than ‘reform’ icons to
point out the out the intellectual absurdity of FDA’s position-- and
its telling violations of the canons of science... yet, clinical data
supplied by applicants in California casting doubt on many
never-confirmed drug war assumptions has been stubbornly ignored by
many ‘reformers’ for three years.
With respect to the 'new' claims linking pot to mental illness,an
interesting paper by Morral, et al in 2002, offered elaborate
mathematical 'proof' that positing some 'common factor' other than a
gateway' effect actually provides a better explanation of MTF data
collected since 1975.
Interestingly; after some initial furor, that paper has been
largely ignored. The most obvious explanation of my own data
(pointed out in 2004) that the 'common factor' hs been the large
scale
self-medication by juveniles with pot; a phenomenon which can now be
precisely traced to its historical origins in the late Sixties...
The drug warriors can't be hoisted on their own petards if their
political opponents are unwilling to light the appropriate fuses; to do
that, one must first know that such fuses exist— and where to find them.
The feature article in the current (June) of Atlantic magazine
concerns what its author (Jeffrey Rosen) thinks is likely to be an
imminent development: the overturning of Roe V. Wade by a newly
configured SCOTUS. Although Rosen's careful parsing of the various
possibilities doesn't mention the drug war-–– even tangentially–– the
situation is laden with significance for the intermediate future of
drug policy to a degree that suggests reformers would very quickly be
presented with a variety of important political opportunities by any
significant resurgence of the abortion issue at the Supreme Court level.
For one thing, the national policies now controlling both
contentious issues were created by–– and to a degree, remain dependent
on–– medical decisions made by medically ignorant Supreme
Court Justices. That fact alone would allow drug policy activists to
capitalize on any debate prompted by a move against Roe from the far
Right; especially if were tp involve 'partial birth' abortion.
Unfortunately, it would also require reform leadership to
demonstrate considerably more knowledge of drug policy history than
they have to date.
A very interesting variation with respect to the abortion controversy
is that even if Roe were to be struck down by the Court, abortion
would not automatically become illegal; rather the policy would be up
for grabs. Given how national attitudes toward abortion are now being
expressed, it's very unlikely that a national top-down, rigorously
enforced general ban would ever gather the support needed to
pass. What is far more likely is that abortion would be decided
by the individual states and probably remain legal for a
numerical majority of American women. A similar outcome with in the
case of drug use would represent a huge victory for drug policy reform and such
an argument might be made very effectively as the dust from Roe was starting
to settle. Of course, a more enlightened attitude toward the medical
use of cannabis (especially by 'reformers') would be a big plus in any
event.
The more one reads Rosen's analysis, the more uncannily it echoes
dilemmas similar to those which confound the drug policy stand-off, including
the political risk each side runs by rejecting all compromise on
doctrinal grounds. Although there are obvious differences, the
article deserves careful attention from people with a serious interest
in 'medical marijuana.'
Why the 'Serious Illness' Notion has been a Serious Mistake
In the last entry I promised to discuss why I think the notion that
permission to use cannabis on medical grounds should be granted only to
those with ‘serious’ diseases is 'unrealistic.'
Actually; I think it's both silly and self defeating
Although several good reasons for thinking that way might become apparent
to an experienced clinician after a bit of critical analysis,
most working doctors have already been so intimidated by the drug war
they have long since excused themselves from thinking seriously about
cannabis. Thus, even the most cogent clinical arguments I might make
(and there are several) wouldn’t help much-- and would be Greek to
non-clinicians.
No problem; a perfectly good case can be made from basic human nature
if we simply consider the almost universal bans on two other human
behaviors widely regarded as ‘sinful:’ gambling and prostitution. Those
proscriptions have also tended to survive in secular democracies
despite their perennial failure. Although cloaked in the garb of Public
Health from the time of the Harrison Act, our drug war had its roots
in the same quasi-religious logic that led to bans on commercial sex
and wagering; they simply had much longer histories in Western society.
One key to understanding the underlying connection between the three bans
is that, from the outset, they all relied heavily on the state’s powers of
arrest and prosecution. The biggest difference was that, in the case of
drugs, the first clamor for a ban came from the top down. However, that
difference is also readily understood: our drug policy, like many
others, had complex origins. Early in the Twentieth Century there was a
desire to curry favor with China; along with an increasing public
awareness of ‘addiction’ as an exotic problem. Combining them under the
circumstances that existed at the time was both logical and effective.
The next point to be made is that historically, policies
criminalizing specific behaviors which were not regarded as directly threatening
by a significant fraction of the affected population have tended to
fail. Beyond that, increasing attempts at top-down enforcement in the
face of such failure has usually tended to corrupt both law enforcement
agencies and the affected society. One would think that such a history—
especaiiy if repeated several times— might have triggered some
recognition among politcal analysts that moral prohibitions do not make
good policy; but such critiques are noteworthy for their absence. All
one has to do is search for academic treatises either analyzing or
condemning moral prohibitions as failures to be struck by their
relative absence–– either in the past, or in the modern glut of books
dealing in detail with every imaginable subject.
The only possible conclusion also applies directly to the drug
war itself: morality-based policies, no matter how irrational they prove to be,
tend to be treated with undue deference at every level of society. Once
understood as an intrinsic part of human nature, that scruple goes a long
way in explaining both the persuasive nature of ‘politically
correct’ ideas, and the undue deference accorded certain notions in the
absence of evidence that they are at all realistic. Examples are the
‘will of the people,’ the 'essential' nobility of humanity, and
the idea that we humans were intended to 'rule' over other species.
It thus appears that the ‘seriously ill' scruple is simply the logical
default for (typically human) critics of the drug war; the down side of
such thinking is that it has prevented them from understanding— and
promulgating— solid clinical evidence that our drug policy has actually
had far worse consequences than most people imagined.
It also explains why I must rely on this blog to communicate with the
demonstrably small nucleus of drug war resisters that 'gets it.' I am
still forced by history (and basic human optimism) to believe that
truth and logic are ultimately contagious; however, the process is
usually erratic and was always been unpredictable. Whether modern IT will
accelerate full recognition of the drug war's social consequences is
still an unsettled question.
Whether cannabis (marijuana) has any medical value key has become a key
social and political issue now dividing America. Those with either a
vested interest in the drug war or a fundamentalist religious point of
view usually agree with the federal government’s emphatically stated
opinion that it doesn’t. Although constituting only about 35% of the
nation’s population, their extreme views have dominated how all the
‘medical marijuana’ laws and initiatives passed over the last decade
have been both written and implemented in every state where they exist.
That’s especially true of California, where the first such law was
passed in 1996 and everyone agrees its provisions are the most
‘liberal.’
Just why the most conservative possible structure and implementation of
pot laws should have been the rule isn’t that difficult to understand;
it’s because those who voted for them originally were also deeply
divided in their opinions over what should qualify someone for the
privilege of using cannabis and how to deal with those who don’t pass
muster. ‘ One extreme was apparently that pot should be allowed only
for certain ‘serious’ or terminal diseases; thus people ith that view
continue to have have no problem with arresting and prosecuting
people
seen as having ‘trivial’ complaints. At the other extreme was what may
now be a slowly increasing fraction— perhaps thirty to
forty percent—
of the general population who think pot should be ‘legalized’ for all
adults and regulated like alcohol and tobacco.
Since most professional law enforcement officers and prosecutors
continue to be numbered among the hard core minority supporting the
most punitive federal position, it’s not difficult to understand why
implementation of medical marijuana laws has been so one sided; nor is
it difficult to understand why California has emerged as the
battleground in what has really been a ten-year, to-and-fro guerrilla
war between patients and law enforcement.
Unfortunately, for a variety of complex reasons, most practicing
physicians, including those who think of themselves as ‘pot docs,’ and
a majority of cannabis activists have not played a very constructive
role; that’s because they have either activley or passively supported the
most conservative (and unrealistic) definition of medical use:
that it
shoud be restricted to the ‘seriously ill.’
In my next entry I’ll explain exactly why I regard their position
‘unrealistic’ and how it must change if we are to take full political
advantage of the brilliant master stroke the first medical marijuana
initiatives actually represented.
On April 20, the FDA released what was clearly intended as an
authoritative 'advisory'
explaining
that ‘marijuana’ shouldn’t be taken seriously as medicine because it
must be smoked! That statement has since been parsed more exensively—
and critically— than any comparable official statement of drug war
dogma I can remember. While I still haven’t read all the critical
comments, I’m disturbed that I have yet to see one clearly stating what
seems to me its most shocking (albeit unintentional) disclosure: the
degree to which ’science’ has been distorted to defend a destructive
policy of failiure.
An inescabable collateral realization is that many of our
‘leading
scientific institutions’ have been bullied into grossly compromising
their supposedly hallowed scientific principles— without a peep of
protest.
For those still in denial, the drug war’s remote origins were a series
of judicial decisions made nearly 100 years ago when the US Supreme
Court was sufficiently persuaded by superficial and misleading analysis of
what— even then— was incomplete and biased evidence, to embrace
three
key fallacies. The first was that ‘addicition’ is the most important
risk of using ‘narcotics’ (that term then applying only to
opiates and
cocaine) the second, was that abstinence is the only acceptable goal of
addiction treatment. The third was that physicians can’t be trusted to
prevent addiction in their patients or to treat it properly when it
occurs; thus police and criminal sanctions are essential elements of
the nation’s Public Health.
The subsequent history of our drug policy is that its inflexible
nature— and the prerogatives conferred by the Court on its enforcement
bureaucracy — were protected by a single bureaucrat for over three
decades after he took over the FBN in 1930. Other than skillfully
protecting the Bureau’s intellectual turf, Harry Anslinger’s most
important contribution was the 1937 MTA, which added cannabis as a
third proscribed agent on scientifically absurd grounds.
Otherwise,
his tenure can now be seen as most noteworthy for what never happened:
any significant expansion of the three illegal markets created by the
policy.
However, his departure in 1962 was followed by three events which would
soon dramatically reshape and enlarge all illegal drug markets within a
single tumultuous decade: the introduction 'psychedelics' and several
other new psychotropic agents, the discovery of cannabis by a
significant fraction of American youth, and the 1968 election of
Richard Nixon.
Even before Nixon’s ‘drug war’ was empowered by the CSA
(1970),
reinforcd by the DEA (1973), and another agency (NIDA) created to
defend its ‘scientific’ purity in 1975, it had been on an upward
trajectory. Some momentum was lost following the Watergate disgrace;
but it was quickly recovered— and then some— after Reagan’s election in
1980. Since then, the policy has becme so dominant in Washington that
its major political risk may be that unwitting revelations like the
clueless 4/20 FDA proclamation could trigger enough public recognition
of its foolishness to bring about insight and repudiation
In that context, one wonders just when— and if— the leadership of the
drug policy reform movemment will ever ‘get it.’
