¹  AS 17.12.010 provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, it is unlawful for a person to manufacture, compound, counterfeit, possess, have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense, give, barter, supply or distribute in any manner, a depressant, hallucinogenic or stimulant drug.

AS 17.12.150 defines "depressant, hallucinogenic, or stimulant drug" to include all parts of the plant Cannabis Sativa L.

²  In his briefs before this court, Ravin also attempts to raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment in the application of AS 17.12.010 to possession of marijuana for personal use.  Because this issue was not raised below or in the petition for review to this court, we decline to consider the issue in this proceeding.  See Appellate Rule 24(c).  Cf. Moran v. Holman, 501 P.2d 769, 770 n. 1 (Alaska 1972).

³  501 P.2d at 171.  See State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973); State v. Van Dort, 502 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1972); Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 527 (Alaska 1974); Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Alaska 1974); State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974).

⁴  Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S.Ct. 412, 417, 4 L.Ed.2d 480, 486 (1960).  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 178 (1973).

⁵  McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196, 85 S.Ct. 283, 290, 13 L.Ed.2d 222, 231 (1964), quoted in the concurrence of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 523 (1965).

⁶  See Concerned Citizens v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary Comm'n, 518 P.2d 92, 101 (Alaska 1974); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923).

⁷  516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973).

⁸  Id. at n. 16.

⁹  The right to privacy was recently made explicit in Alaska by an amendment to the state constitution.  Alaska Const. Art. I, § 22.

¹⁰  381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965).

¹¹  381 U.S. at 484, 85 S.Ct. at 1681, 14 L.Ed.2d at 514.

¹²  394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969).

¹³  See Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957).

¹⁴  394 U.S. at 564, 89 S.Ct. at 1247, 22 L.Ed.2d at 549.

¹⁵  413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973).   See also United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 93 S.Ct. 2674, 37 L.Ed.2d 513 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973).

¹⁶  In a companion case, United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 93 S.Ct. 2674, 37 L.Ed.2d 513 (1973), the Supreme Court observed that the Stanley right to possess obscene material in the home is limited to the home and does not create a right to transport, receive, or distribute the matter.  The Supreme Court further said that it is not true that a zone of constitutionally protected privacy follows such materials when they are moved outside the home.  See United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973).

¹⁷  410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).

¹⁸  Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) where the Supreme Court said in part:

          If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.

¹⁹  501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972).

²⁰  Alaska Const. Art. I, § 1.

²¹  501 P.2d at 168.

²²  501 P.2d at 170, quoting Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1971).

²³  For a discussion of the origins and scope of a similar constitutional guarantee of privacy, in the Hawaii Constitution, Art. I, § 5, see State v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 327, 493 P.2d 306 (1972), particularly n. 4 in the dissent of Justice Levinson at p. 314.  This court has, in the area of searches and seizures, attempted to define the right of privacy.  See, e.g., Erickson v. State, 507 P.2d 508 (Alaska 1973); Mattern v. State, 500 P.2d 228 (Alaska 1972); Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1972); Ellison v. State, 383 P.2d 716 (Alaska 1963); Rubey v. City of Fairbanks, 456 P.2d 470 (Alaska 1969); Sleziak v. State, 454 P.2d 252 (Alaska 1969).

²⁴  Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 528 (Alaska 1974).   In Gray we said:

There is no available recorded history of this amendment, but clearly it shields the ingestion of food, beverages or other substances.  But the right of privacy is not absolute.  Where a compelling state interest is shown, the right may be held to be subordinate to express constitutional powers such as the authorization of the legislature to promote and protect public health and provide for the general welfare.

²⁵  Id.  If the State were required, for instance, to carry the extremely heavy burden of showing a compelling state interest before it could regulate the purity of foodstuffs and medicines, the result would be a practical inability to protect the public from health threats which consumers could neither know about nor protect themselves against.

²⁶  Hawaii Const. Art. I, § 5.

²⁷  53 Haw. 327, 493 P.2d 306 (1972).

²⁸  493 P.2d at 315.

²⁹  387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972).

³⁰  194 N.W.2d at 896.

³¹  Id.

³²  243 N.E.2d 898 (Mass. 1969).

³³  The privacy argument has been rejected in several other cases.  Miller v. State, 458 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970); In re Klor, 64 Cal.2d 816, 51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791 (1966); People v. Aguiar, 257 Cal.App.2d 597, 65 Cal.Rptr. 171 (1968); United States v. Drotar, 416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 402 U.S. 939, 91 S.Ct. 1628, 29 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971); Borras v. State, 229 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1969); Raines v. State, 225 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1969).  See Scott v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 396, 395 F.2d 619 (1968).

³⁴  Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 345 F.Supp 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd, 413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973).

³⁵  Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746, 751 (1886).

³⁶  381 U.S. at 486, 85 S.Ct. at 1682, 14 L.Ed.2d at 516.

₃₇  394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969).

³⁸  394 U.S. at 564, 89 S.Ct. at 1247, 22 L.Ed.2d at 549.

³⁹  Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2640, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, 462 (1973).

⁴⁰  U.S. v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142, 93 S.Ct. 2674, 2677, 37 L.Ed.2d 513, 517 (1973).  See U.S. v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973).

⁴¹  U.S. v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142-143, 93 S.Ct. 2674, 37 L.Ed.2d 513, 518 (1973).

⁴²  State v. Spietz, 531 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1975); Ferguson v. State, 488 P.2d 1032 (Alaska 1971).  See cases cited supra at n. 21.   The home receives special attention in other areas of Alaska's laws, e.g., the homestead exemption in relation to execution sales, AS 09.35.090; the justifiable homicide defense pertaining to the prevention of a felony in the home, AS 11.15.100; and the distinction between burglary in a dwelling house and burglary in other structures, AS 11.20.080-.100.

⁴³  Among the works we have examined in addition to the testimony below are the following: Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, The First Report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse (March 1972); Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective, the Second Report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse (March 1973); Drug Use in Anchorage, Alaska, 223 J.Am.Med.Ass'n 657 (1971); G. Nahas, Marihuana: Deceptive Weed (1973); Nahas et al, Inhibition of Cellular Mediated Immunity in Marihuana Smokers, 183 Science 419 (1974); L. Grinspoon, Marihuana Reconsidered (1971); Hearings before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, May 1974; Nahas & Greenwood, The First Report of the National Commission on Marihuana (1972); Signal of Misunderstanding or Exercise in Ambiguity, draft of article to be published in Bulletin of N.Y. Academy of Medicine; Marihuana and Health: Fourth Annual Report to the U.S. Congress from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (1974); Silverstein & Tessin, Normal Skin Test Responses in Chronic Marihuana Users, 186 Science 740 (1974); Marihuana: The Grass May No Longer Be Greener, 185 Science 683 (1974); Marihuana (II): Does it Damage the Brain?, 185 Science 775 (1974); Depression of Plasma Testosterone Levels After Chronic Intensive Marihuana Use, 290 N.Engl.J.Med. 872 (1974); Plasma Testosterone Levels Before, During and After Chronic Marihuana Smoking, 291 N.Engl.J.Med. 1051 (1974); Marijuana Survey-State of Oregon, Drug Abuse Council (1974).

⁴⁴  It is not the function of this court to reassess the scientific evidence in the manner of a legislature.  See U.S. v. Thorne, 325 A.2d 764 (D.C.App. 1974), where an attack on the constitutionality of the District of Columbia marijuana statutes was made.  There the court said:

    In our opinion the court below misconceived its function in its approach to the constitutionality of the statutory proscription of the possession and use of marijuana.  In deciding that this drug has virtually no harmful effects upon the human system, the court had occasion to consider the testimony of four expert witnesses and a voluminous mass of documentary studies.  The court weighed this evidence and resolved the conflict to its own satisfaction.  If this were a hearing or a trial turning upon the determination of facts upon which there was conflicting testimony, such procedure was, or course, correct.

    But a holding that a legislative enactment is invalid cannot rest upon a judicial determination of a debatable medical issue.  Any party assailing the constitutionality of a statute has the heavy burden of demonstrating that it has no rational basis.

    .    .    .    .     .

    . . . It is apparent from the record in this case that the question decided by the court below after the hearing on the pretrial motions was "at least debatable."  Hence, under the tests set forth in Carolene Products, the court should have deferred to congressional judgment.

Similarly the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898, 901-02 (1969), said:

    We know of nothing that compels the Legislature to thoroughly investigate the available scientific and medical evidence when enacting a law.   The test of whether an act of the Legislature is rational and reasonable is not whether the records of the Legislature contain a sufficient basis of fact to sustain that act.  The Legislature is presumed to have acted rationally and reasonably.  See Commonwealth v. Finnigan, 326 Mass. 378, 379, 96 N.E.2d 715; Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 348 Mass. 414, 422, 204 N.E.2d 281.  "Unless the act of the Legislature cannot be supported upon any rational basis of fact that reasonably can be conceived to sustain it, the court has no power to strike it down as violative of the Constitution."  Sperry & Hutchison Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of Life of Commonwealth, 307 Mass. 408, 418, 30 N.E.2d 269, 274, 131 A.L.R. 1254.  See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234.

Justice Kirk, in his concurring opinion in Leis, also explains the question of legislative judgment and the range of judicial cognizance.

⁴⁵  Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective, the Second Report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse (March 1973) at 64.

⁴⁶  Drug Use in Anchorage, Alaska, 223 J.Am.Med.Ass'n 657 (1971).

⁴⁷  Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, First Report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse (March 1972), p. 61.

⁴⁸  See Nahas, et al.  Inhibition of Cellular Mediated Immunity in Marihuana Smokers, 183 Science 419 (1974).  But cf. Normal Skin Test Responses in Chronic Marijuana Users, 186 Science 740 (1974).

⁴⁹  See Stenchever, Statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, May 16, 1974.  The National Institute on Drug Abuse, in Marihuana and Health, Fourth Report to the United States Congress from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, states in part:

    The preclinical findings of greatest interest and potential significance during the past two years have been a series of studies indicating that delta-9-THC (and possibly other marihuana constituents) have an effect upon certain basic cellular mechanisms which involve the uptake of amino acids and the nucleotides into primary nuclear components such as DNA.  Since this may interfere with basic biological processes, the preliminary data raises the possibility that the effects of marihuana, under some circumstances, may be more widespread on the organism than has been previously thought.

Id. at 6.

⁵⁰  Depression of Plasma Testosterone Levels After Chronic Intensive Marihuana Use, 290 N.Engl.J.Med. 872 (1974).  But cf. Plasma Testosterone Levels Before, During and After Chronic Marihuana Smoking, 291 N.Engl.J.Med. 1051 (1974).

⁵¹  Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, the First Report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse (March 1972), 63.  See also Marihuana and Health, Fourth Report to the United States Congress from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (1974), which reads at 12:

    While chronic users in the United States have used for appreciably shorter periods of time than users overseas, studies of American chronic users are potentially of great importance in assessing possible implications of marihuana use for the American population.  In one large scale study of undergraduate student use comparisons were made between nonusers (including those who had done a limited amount of experimentation), occasional users and chronic users (those who had used three or more times a week for three years or more or for two years if use was almost daily).  No statistical differences in academic performance were found nor was there any evidence of reduced motivation.  . . . Another study of moderately using medical students who had used regularly for three or more years and who were matched with nonusing medical students for intelligence, found no difference on an extensive battery of neuropsychological tests.

⁵²  Id. at 70-71.

⁵³  Marihuana and Health, Fourth Report to the United States Congress from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (1974) at 6.

⁵⁴  "While tolerance to the effects of marihuana has not been generally observed among American users, there is increasingly convincing evidence that tolerance (i.e., larger dosages required to produce the same effects found with lower dosages) does develop under conditions of heavy, regular use.  Given the relatively low doses and infrequent use typical of present patterns of use in the United States it is not surprising that tolerance has not usually been observed.  . . . While the amounts involved were usually large and atypical of current use patterns, the probability of a withdrawal syndrome in at least some American heavy users must be considered."  Marihuana and Health, Fourth Report to the United State Congress from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (1974) at 10, 75-81.

⁵⁵  Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, Appendix II, at 622.

⁵⁶  Petitioner's witnesses, Doctors Fort and Ungerleider, both testified that marijuana was not harmless.

⁵⁷  E.g., Raines v. State, 225 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1969).

⁵⁸  E.g., Kingery v. Chappel, 504 P.2d 831 (Alaska 1972); People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc.2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1967); State v. Mele, 103 N.J.Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176 (1968).

⁵⁹  E.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich.App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968); People v. Fries, 42 Ill.2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969).  See Everhardt v. New Orleans, 208 So.2d 423 (La.App. 1968), rev'd, 217 So.2d 400 (1969); People v. Carmichael, 53 Misc.2d 584, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1967), rev'd, 56 Misc.2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1968).

⁶⁰  51 Haw. 516, 465 P.2d 573 (1970).

⁶¹  Similarly, in State v. Kastner, 53 Haw. 327, 493 P.2d 306 (1972), which involved the constitutionality of Hawaii's marijuana statue, Justice Abe noted his belief that the statute went beyond the police power of the state because of the lack of evidence that use of marijuana harms anyone other than the user.  There is, he wrote, under the Hawaii Constitution a fundamental right of liberty to make a fool of oneself so long as one's act does not endanger others.

⁶²  Cf. Liggett Co. v Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12, 49 S.Ct. 57, 59, 73 L.Ed. 204, 208 (1928):

The police power may be exerted in the form of state legislation where otherwise the effect may be to invade rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment only when such legislation bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general welfare.

⁶³  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 177 (1974); Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 528 (Alaska 1974); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 170 (Alaska 1972).

⁶⁴  We recognize that more potent forms of cannabis than marijuana are commonly used in other countries and are available on a limited scale here.  However, studies of use patterns here do not indicate any great likelihood of a significant shift in use here to the more potent substances.  If such a shift were to occur, then marijuana use could be characterized as a serious health problem.

⁶⁵  3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 71.02 (4th ed. 1974) and the cases cited in note 42 supra.

⁶⁶  See Marihuana and Health, Fourth Report to the United States Congress from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 105 (1974).  This report contains citations to the most recent studies.

⁶⁷  Evidence that marijuana has a detrimental effect on driving performance, especially as the dose increases, continues to mount.  It has been found to increase both braking and starting times, to adversely affect attention and concentration abilities, and to detract from performance on a divided attention task, all of which are presumable involved in driving.  A recent Canadian study of driving ability while marijuana-intoxicated examined drivers' performance under both driving course and actual traffic conditions.  A significant decline in performance as measured by several criteria was found in most drivers tested.  Based on the accumulated evidence, it seems clear that driving while under the influence of marijuana is ill-advised.  Marihuana and Health, Fourth Report to the U.S. Congress from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 10-11 (1974).
    Petitioner's own experts do not disagree with the Secretary's conclusions.  Dr. Grinspoon testified that ". . . it stands to reason that anybody who is intoxicated or has a psychoactive drug in him should not drive, because there is no question . . . his wherewithall is not with him, and I think that would be the case with marijuana."  Dr. Fineglass stated that ". . . moderate or heavy use of marijuana can definitely interfere with some of the local skills that would be necessary for the operation of a motor vehicle, and therefore, in their recommendations did take note of driving while intoxicated as a potential danger to the public safety."  Dr. Ungerleider testified that although the immediate effects of marijuana intoxication on the organs and bodily functions are transient and have little or no permanent effect, "there is a definite loss of some psychomotor control, temporary impairment of time space perception. . . ."  Later in the course of his testimony, Dr. Ungerleider concluded that recent studies had proven that driving under the influence of marijuana presents a serious risk resulting from impaired driving ability.

⁶⁸  Current Alaska law enacted since the trial of this case prohibits driving under the influence of an hallucinogenic drug.  AS 28.35.030.   Alaska law also specifically prohibits operation of a boat while under the influence of marijuana.  AS 05.25.060.
    There does not now exist a means for detecting the presence of cannabis in the body which is available for practical use by law enforcement agencies.  Such means are in use in laboratories, however, and research is progressing toward a device which could be used by police in the way that breathalyzer tests for alcohol are used now.

⁶⁹  We do not intent to imply that the right of privacy in the home does not apply to children.  See Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 167 (Alaska 1972).  We note that distinct government interests with reference to children may justify legislation that could not properly be applied to adults.

⁷⁰  Statistics indicate that few arrests for simple possession occur in the home except when other crimes are simultaneously being investigated.  The trend in general law enforcement seems to be toward minimal effort against simple users of marijuana, and concentration of efforts against dealers and users of more dangerous substances.  Moreover, statistics indicate that most arrests for possession of marijuana in Alaska result in dismissals before trial.

⁷¹  See U.S. v. Maiden, 355 F.Supp. 743 (D.Conn. 1973); U.S. v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349 (2nd Cir. 1973).  In attacking a complex problem, the state need not choose between attacking every aspect of that problem or not attacking that problem at all.  Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 80 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969).

⁷²  E.g., People v. McCabe, 49 Ill.2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971); Attwood v. State, 509 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974); see People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 194 N.W.2d 878 (1972); cf. State v. Zornes, 475 P.2d 109 (Wash. 1970).

⁷³  E.g., Bettis v. United States, 408 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898 (Mass. 1969); Miller v. Texas, 458 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Crim.App. 1970); Raines v. State, 225 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1969); People v. McKenzie, 169 Colo. 521, 458 P.2d 232 (1969); People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965).  See State v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 327, 493 P.2d 306 (1972).

⁷⁴  See AS 17.10.010 et seq.  (The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act).

⁷⁵  O.R.S. 167.207.  The Alaska legislature have also recently passed a bill which would decriminalize possession of marijuana in certain contexts.

¹  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965).

²  The court writes that art. I, § 22 of the Alaska Constitution ". . . was intended to give recognition and protection to the home".

³  Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970) (footnotes omitted).

⁴  381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965).

⁵  405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972).

⁶  Id.  405 U.S. at 453, 92 S.Ct. at 1038, 31 L.Ed.2d at 362.

⁷  410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).

⁸  Id.  410 U.S. at 153, 93 S.Ct. at 727, 35 L.Ed.2d at 177.

⁹  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 93 S.Ct. 2674, 37 L.Ed.2d 513 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973).

¹⁰  On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 670, 703 (1973).

¹¹  Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524 (Alaska 1974).

¹²  See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).

¹³  Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972).

¹⁴  Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 706 (Alaska 1975).

¹⁵  Where a fundamental right has required use of the compelling state interest test, only one law has been found valid by the Supreme Court, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944), but no state law has passed muster.  Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274, 296-97 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  See 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 670 at 702.  See also Gilbert v. State, 526 P.2d 1131 (Alaska 1974).

¹⁶  Of course, in any event where Federal Constitutional rights are involved, we must at least apply the minimum standards prescribed by the United States Supreme Court.  Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970).

¹⁷  48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 670 at 705.

¹  The right to privacy which received protection in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), has nothing to do with the locus of the home and, for the most part, is concerned with matters occurring outside the home.