|
|
Between Politics and Reason
Chapter 6. Legalization and Decriminalization: An Overview
Erich Goode — State University of New York, Stony Brook
It is against the current punitive policy that all the proposals
for change must be measured. According to what criteria should
a given proposal be measured? How is the success of a given proposal
indicated? In what specific ways would we want a given policy
to succeed? Is our goal the reduction in the number of users of
all the currently illegal drugs? Or a reduction only in addicts
and abusers of the hard drugs? Do we want to see a decline in
the illegal drug trade? What about drug-related murders? Drug
overdoses? Drug-related diseases, such as infection with the AIDS/HIV
virus? Do we seek a reduction in the amount of money the society
pays to deal with the drug problem, especially the cost of incarcerated
drug offenders? What if a given program helps in one way but harms
in another? Is there one overall best drug policy? Would either
legalization or decriminalization produce changes we all would
regard as desirable? Are the legalizers right? Has our punitive
or prohibitionist drug policy failed? Which drug policy is likely
to work better; which will be worse? What do we know that will
tell us something about the feasibility of one or another drug
program?
Beginning in the late 1980s (Kerr, 1988), a taboo, almost unthinkable
proposal—the decriminalization or legalization of the currently
illegal drugs—began to be advanced with remarkable frequency
and urgency. Dozens of books, hundreds of magazine and newspaper
articles, uncountable editorials and op-ed pieces, and scores
of prominent spokespersons have urged the repeal of the drug laws.
Drug legalization has become a major focus of debate in recent
years, joining such controversial subjects as abortion, pornography,
the environment, the economy, gun control, and homosexual rights,
women's rights, minority rights, and affirmative action as yet
another battlefield of controversy.
It must be emphasized that legalization is not a single proposal.
Instead, it is a cluster of proposals that stands toward
one end of a spectrum of degrees of regulation and availability.
As we've seen, very few, if any, legalization advocates argue
that there should be absolutely no controls on drugs whatsoever—for
instance, that minors be allowed to purchase heroin and cocaine
from whoever is willing to sell to them. Instead, all agree that
some sorts of controls will be necessary; the question
is, how far along the spectrum of control to decontrol—and whether
those controls should be legal or of some other type—the currently
illegal drugs should be moved. Consequently, both the similarities
and the differences among the various legalization programs have
to be considered.
GENERALISM VERSUS SPECIFISM: AN INTRODUCTION
Many observers of and commentators on the drug legalization issue
are not very careful about making distinctions among what is in
fact a variety of proposals. In fact, the terms "legalization"
and "decriminalization" refer to a wide range of different
practices. Of the many distinctions between and among the many
different legalization proposals we might make, perhaps the most
crucial would be between generalism and specifism. Both
reject the legalistic definition of drugs I spelled out in Chapter
1 and embrace a definition based on psychoactivity. Where they
part company is on the question of whether legalization applies
to all psychoactive drugs, or only to some of them. The
generalist proposes some form of legalization for all
psychoactive substances, whether currently legal or illegal,
whereas the specifist is more selective, proposing legalization
for some substances and prohibition for others.
GENERALISM
A generalist approach to drug abuse is one that sees all psychoactive
substances, legal or illegal, as more or less equal in harm and
health costs, it approaches drug abuse as a medical matter. This
is an "all drugs are created equal" approach, leading
to a "one size fits all" solution—legalization for
drugs, treatment for drug abusers (Zimring and Hawkins, 1992,
p.10). The generalist sees similarities between and among the
many psychoactive drugs. Hence—seeing all drugs as basically
the same—the generalist is likely to support some form of legalization
for all psychoactive substances. The distinctions we might
make among them are secondary their similarities, all-important.
In a nutshell, the generalist believes that drug use and abuse
should be taken out of the realm of the criminal law; as a consequence,
when the currently illegal drugs are legalized, the problems we
now experience with drug abuse will decline drastically or disappear
altogether. Generalists see moral and empirical absurdity in different
laws for different drugs; they see an injustice here as well as
a policy that can't work. Going beyond the issue of drug use,
generalists do not believe that prohibition is possible at all—for
drugs or anything else. Generalists see the sin not in use itself
but in making drug use a crime. To them, the solution is legalization.
Some generalists believe that, with the exception of sale to minors,
there should be virtually no restriction on the possession and
sale of psychoactive drugs (Szasz, 1992), while others argue that
there should be certain restrictions on them—and, in addition,
that current restrictions on cigarettes and alcohol should be
made more stringent—but all should be dealt with in more
or less the same fashion (Trebach, 1993).
SPECIFISM
In contrast, the specifist believes that all drugs are not
created equal; each drug presents a somewhat different problem
with respect to control and public harm. Whether the law or the
drug causes more harm is an empirical question—one we have to
resolve with evidence, not by resorting to rhetoric or moralizing.
Specifists agree with generalists in that they also base their
definition of drugs on psychoactivity. However, the specifist
believes that each drug, while nonetheless psychoactive, should
be approached somewhat differently with respect to the law. The
specifist is a pragmatist, a utilitarian, and bases drug policy
on the principle of harm reduction. Forget the moral question
of whether certain varieties of drug use constitute an affront
to the established order, the specifist says; forget the ideological
question of whether users of illegal drugs get a "raw deal"
by being regarded as criminals while the users of legal drugs
are seen and treated as respectable citizens. These issues pale
into insignificance when considering the question of what is best
for the society, what policy causes the least harm, what contributes
to the public's well-being. The law should be changed where appropriate
and enforced when that, too, is worth-while. Yes, the specifist
says, some instances of prohibition have worked, and, yes, others
have done more harm than good. Our task is to figure out which
is which for the substances under consideration. The bottom line,
and what should count in the long run and should guide public
drug policy, is a detailed cost-benefit analysis.
Thus, the heart of the specifist's approach is that the harm a
drug causes, and the impact of the drug laws, should be weighed
on a case-by case basis (Zimring and Hawkins, 1992, pp.9-10).
Like the generalist, the specifist includes legal substances in
a definition of drugs; unlike the generalist, the specifist does
not see all drugs as created equal. No sweeping generalizations
can be made about the best policy for all drugs; in fact, there
is no best policy for all drugs. It is possible that the possession
and sale of some drugs should remain a crime and that other drugs
should be legalized. The question can be resolved only by looking
at the facts, by a practical, pragmatic weighing of the consequences
of drug abuse versus the consequences of the law. The moral issue
of whether it is "fair" or "just" to prohibit
access to one drug and permit access to another is irrelevant,
a non sequitur (Kaplan, 1988, p.37); it does not enter
into the specifist's equation at all. The specifist ranks drugs
in terms of degrees of harm, and seriously considers the
question of which drug represents the "lesser of two evils"
(Zimring and Hawkins, 1992, p.l2). Neither the use of illegal
substances per se nor the use of the criminal law to reduce use
and public harm are themselves immoral, according to the specifist.
Rather than being concerned about immorality—to the legalist,
breaking the law by using drugs; to the generalist, attempting
to control drug use by means of the criminal law, and criminalizing
some drug users but not others—the specifist focuses on reducing
harm to drug users and to the society as a whole. Perhaps the
most readily grasped of the specifist's programs is to decriminalize
or legalize marijuana and keep the "hard" drugs illegal
(Kaplan, 1970, 1983, 1988; Kleiman, 1992b).
FOUR LEGALIZATION PROPOSALS: AN INTRODUCTION
Once we've recognized that some legalization proposals wish to
remove criminal penalties from all psychoactive substances while
others are selective and aim to legalize some substances and retain
penalties on others, we need to make a number of additional distinctions.
Legalization is not the same thing as decriminalization, as we'll
see momentarily; and requiring the addicted or drug-dependent
to obtain their supply via prescription is not the same thing
as permitting drugs to be sold to anyone, without benefit of a
prescription. More generally, it must be recognized that legalization
and prohibition do not represent an either-or proposition. In
reality, they form a continuum or a spectrum, from a completely
libertarian or "hands-off" proposal—with no
laws governing the possession or sale of any drug—at
one end all the way over to the most punitive policy imaginable,
let's say Darryl Gates's proposal that even casual marijuana smokers
be "taken out and shot" at the other end, with every
conceivable position in between. In reality, very, very few commentators
advocate a policy of no controls whatsoever on the possession
and sale of any and all psychoactive drugs. At the other end of
the spectrum, very, very few commentators call for the death penalty
for the simple possession of the currently illegal drugs. Hence,
what we are discussing in the drug legalization debate is degrees
of difference along a spectrum somewhere in between these
two extremes. In fact, as Ethan Nadelmann (1992, pp.89-94) has
argued persuasively, the "moderate" legalizers and the
"progressive" or reform-minded prohibitionists share
far more in common than the first does with the extreme, radical,
or "hard-core" legalizers or the second does with the
more-punitive prohibitionists.
Therefore, the issue is not legalization versus prohibition. Rather,
the debate centers on some of the following issues: How much
legalization? Which drugs are to be legalized? Under
what conditions can drugs be dispensed? For instance, are
drugs to be dispensed in approved, licensed clinics? To whom
may drugs be dispensed? To addicts and drug abusers only?
Or to anyone above a certain age? In what quantity may
drugs be dispensed? At what purity? At what price are the
legalized drugs to be sold? (For these and other questions that
legalizers must answer, see Inciardi and McBride, 1991, pp.47-49).
Each legalization proposal will answer these questions in a somewhat
different way. Hence, there are many legalization proposals,
and not just one. It is naive to assume that the broad outlines
of drug policy are the only thing that is important, and that
the details will take care of themselves. (For just such an approach,
see Trebach, 1993.) In my view, this assumption is fallacious.
Zimring and Hawkins (1992, pp.109- 110) refer to this view as
the "trickle-down fallacy"; I call it the "let
the chips fall where they may" approach. On both sides of
the controversy, observers too often "simply ignore the detailed
questions... of priority and strategy" (p.109). A specific
policy—what should be done about each and every particular—"cannot
be deduced" from a general position (p.110). At the same
time, there are some points that are shared in common by
all legalizers and some points that are shared in common
by all prohibitionists.
To simplify the picture a bit, let's distinguish among the four
most commonly proposed drug policy reforms: legalization, decriminalization,
the medical and prescription models, and harm
reduction.
LEGALIZATION
One common legalization proposal refers to placing one or more
of the currently illegal and/or prescription drugs under the controls
that now apply to alcohol and cigarettes. Under this proposal,
psychoactive drugs could be purchased on the open market, off
the shelf, by anyone above a certain age. Since the same controls
will apply as for the currently legal drugs, presumably, a proprietor
would not be able to sell to a minor or an intoxicated individual,
or to an inmate of a jail or prison or a mental institution, and
could not sell within a certain distance from a house of worship,
a school, or an active polling place on election day. Controls
may also apply to the establishments that sell the drugs in question;
with respect to alcohol, certain types of bars, for instance,
must also serve food. Package stores must observe a variety of
rules and regulations; some, for instance, are run by the government.
Even those that are private enterprises are controlled: They cannot
be owned and operated by a convicted felon; they cannot be open
on Sunday; they cannot sell substances above a certain potency;
and so on. Thus, legalization refers to a state licensing
system more or less similar to that which prevails for alcohol
and tobacco for the currently illegal drugs.
One qualification: Under our current policy of legalization, manufacturing
alcohol (beer and wine, for instance), or growing tobacco, for
the purpose of private consumption—not commercial sale—does
not come under state control and yet is perfectly legal;
the state retains the right to step in and play a role only when
selling takes place. In addition, under legalization, use,
at least in public, is controlled under a variety of circumstances—for
instance, driving while intoxicated and public intoxication are
illegal. And lastly, for both alcohol and cigarettes, there are
restrictions on advertising; cigarette ads and ads for hard liquor
are banned from television advertising, current athletes cannot
be depicted endorsing alcoholic beverages, and beer cannot be
drunk on camera. Presumably, the drugs that are to be legalized
will be controlled more or less the same way as alcohol and tobacco
now are.
DECRIMINALIZATION
"Decriminalization" refers to the removal of state control
over a given substance or activity. (Many observers use the term
to refer to what I call "partial decriminalization."
Full decriminalization is the removal of all state
controls over a given product or activity.) It is a legal "hands
off" policy of drug control. Under decriminalization, the
state no longer has a role in setting rules and regulations concerning
the sale, purchase, and possession of a given drug. Here, the
distribution of marijuana, heroin, or cocaine would no more be
the concern of the government than, say, selling tomatoes or undershirts
is. Of course, no one may sell poisonous tomatoes or dangerously
flammable undershirts, but under a policy of full decriminalization,
the rules and regulations that apply to drugs would be even
less restrictive than those which now apply to the currently
legal drugs alcohol and tobacco. Under full decriminalization,
anyone can manufacture or grow any quantity of any drug and sell
it to anyone without any serious restriction at all; the only
factor that should determine the sale of drugs—blatant poisons
aside—should be the operation of a free and open economic market
(Szasz, 1992). Of course, almost anyone proposing this policy
is likely to add one obvious restriction, that sale to a minor
be against the law. It must be pointed out that full decriminalization
for every currently illegal drug, with the possible exception
of marijuana, is not a feasible or realistic policy, and is of
theoretical interest only. To expect that legislatures will permit
the possession, sale, and distribution of substances which have
a powerful effect on the mind and great potential for harm be
subject to government controls no stricter than those which apply
to the possession, sale, and distribution of tomatoes simply beggars
imagination. It is not a proposal that has any hope of implementation
in the foreseeable future.
There is one exception to this rule, however. Some commentators
argue strenuously (and, in some quarters, persuasively) that users
be permitted to grow certain natural psychoactive plants—such
as the opium poppy, the coca bush, the peyote cactus, psychedelic
mushrooms, and, of course, the marijuana or cannabis plant—for
their own private consumption (Karel, 1991). Thus, one aspect
of full decriminalization remains a—marginally—viable subject
of debate, while most of the other particulars are so unrealistic
as to seem disingenuous.
PARTIAL DECRIMINALIZATION
The term "decriminalization" is often used to refer
to what is in fact partial decriminalization. Partial decriminalization
does not remove any and all legal restrictions on the possession,
sale, and/or distribution of a given substance, but it does remove
some of them. Currently, in one way or another, small-quantity
marijuana possession is already partially decriminalized in nine
states of the United States, as we saw, and in parts of Europe.
The Netherlands pursues a far, far bolder and more radical policy
of partial decriminalization for marijuana than that which prevails
even in the most liberal states in the United States—in fact,
in practice, it borders on full legalization.
In the Netherlands, by law, small-quantity marijuana possession
is technically illegal; however, in practice, the drug is sold
openly in "coffee shops" (or "hash bars"),
and these transactions are completely ignored by the police. No
advertising of marijuana products is permitted; sale to minors
under 16—even the presence of minors in an establishment—
and the sale of hard drugs will cause the police to shut a shop
down. Thus, small-quantity marijuana possession and sale there
have been decriminalized de facto, that is, in practice—although,
again, "legalization" might be a more apt term—but
de jure or according to the law, they are still technically
illegal. The "hard" drugs are unaffected by this policy;
sale of heroin and cocaine, especially in high volume, remains
very much illegal. In fact, in the Netherlands, the proportion
of prisoners who are convicted drug offenders is the same as it
is in the United States, roughly one-third (Beers, 1991, p.40).
At the same time, possession by the addict or user of small quantities
of heroin or cocaine (half a gram or less) is typically ignored
by the police. However, the sale of even small quantities of the
hard drugs is not permitted to take place openly in legal commercial
establishments, as it is with marijuana (Jansen, 1991; Leuw and
Marshall, 1994).
PRESCRIPTION AND MAINTENANCE MODELS
The prescription and the maintenance models overlap greatly, although
they are conceptually distinct. Both are usually referred to as
the medical approach to drug abuse, since both see drug
abuse as a disease that can be treated by making certain drugs
available to addicts or the drug-dependent. Currently in the United
States, the prescription model prevails for certain pharmaceuticals
deemed to have "legitimate" medical utility; as we saw,
certain approved psychoactive substances may be prescribed by
physicians for the treatment of their patients' ailments. Under
an expanded prescription or maintenance policy, sometimes referred
to as a type of legalization plan, anyone who believes
himself or herself to be dependent on a given drug would be able
to go to a physician or a clinic and, after a medical examination,
be duly certified or registered. Certification would enable one
to obtain prescriptions at regular intervals which, in turn, would
make it possible to purchase or obtain the drug in question. Or
the drug could be administered directly by a clinic or a physician.
Some current prescription models call for an eventual withdrawal
of the client or patient from the drug, but they insist that this
must be done gradually, since it is both humane and effective.
Under the current prescription policy, drugs have to be tested
by pharmaceutical companies and reports submitted to the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) demonstrating that they are safe
and effective for the ailments for which they would be prescribed.
A drug demonstrated to be either unsafe or ineffective cannot
be approved by the FDA and hence, cannot be prescribed as a medicine.
Presumably, if the currently illegal drugs are to be prescribed
to addicts, they must pass muster as safe and effective medicines.
One version of, or variation on, the prescription or medical model
is referred to as the maintenance model because the addict
or drug-dependent person is "maintained" on doses of
the drug in question. As we saw, currently, in the United States,
some form of maintenance is in effect for roughly 100,000 heroin
addicts, most of whom are administered methadone. However, methadone
maintenance programs are fairly tightly controlled in most jurisdictions,
and most addicts nationwide are not enrolled in them, either because
they do not wish to be—for instance, because the restrictions
are too severe and the quantities administered are too small—or
because the clinics do not have room for all who wish to enroll.
To set up a full walk-in program for any and all heroin addicts
who want to take part in methadone maintenance therapy would require
a quadrupling of the current operating budget of this treatment
modality. In addition, there is no heroin maintenance program
in place in the United States, and none for those dependent on
any drug other than a narcotic, including cocaine. (Such a program
is in effect in Great Britain, in Liverpool, on a provisional
basis.) Presumably, a legalization proposal that relies heavily
on the medical model would aim to expand the number of addicts
currently on methadone; expand the number of possible narcotics
used for maintenance programs, including heroin; and possibly
even expand maintenance programs to include nonnarcotic drugs,
for instance, cocaine. Again, regardless of the particulars, a
drug maintenance program sees drug abuse as a medical, not a criminal,
matter and aims to legalize the administration of psychoactive
substances to addicts or abusers. It is not clear what such a
program proposes to do when drug abusers refuse to participate
in the program, demand to use other drugs in addition to the legal
drugs they are being administered, or demand a significant escalation
in the dose they are administered. Or what should be done when
someone who is not chemically or psychologically dependent demands
quantities of a given drug from the program. This program sees
the primary motivation of drug abusers as maintenance, not recreation.
HARM REDUCTION
Harm reduction represents an eclectic or mixed bag of policy proposals.
It is, as we saw, a specifist legal policy: different programs
for different drugs. Harm reduction is the explicit policy that
prevails in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and certain jurisdictions
in the United Kingdom, such as Liverpool. Its goal is stated in
its title: Rather than attempting to wipe out drug distribution,
addiction, and use—an impossibility, in any case—its goal
is for drug policy to attempt to minimize harm. Legal reform,
likewise, is secondary; the emphasis is on practicality—what
works in concrete practice rather than what seems to look good
on paper or in theory. A needle exchange and distribution program
stands high on the list of particulars of any harm reduction advocate:
Addicts can turn in used needles at distribution centers and receive
clean, fresh ones free of charge. This is designed to keep the
rate of new AIDS/HIV infections in check. Another particular of
the harm reduction advocates relates directly to law enforcement:
Make a sharp distinction between "soft" and "hard"
drugs, and between users and small-time, low-level sellers on
the one hand and high-level, high-volume dealers on the other.
In practice, this means de facto decriminalization of small-quantity
marijuana possession, attempting to route addicts into treatment
programs but not arresting them, but arresting and imprisoning
big-time heroin and cocaine dealers.
In short, harm reduction means: Stress treatment and rehabilitation;
underplay the punitive, penal, or police approach, and explore
nonpenal alternatives to trivial drug offenses. Expand drug maintenance,
especially methadone programs; experiment with or study the feasibility
of heroin maintenance programs; expand drug education programs;
permit heroin and marijuana to be used by prescription for medical
treatment. Consider ways of controlling the legal drugs, alcohol
and tobacco. Be flexible and pragmatic: Think about new programs
that might reduce harm from drug abuse, and if one aspect of the
program fails, scuttle it, and try something else. Remember: Drugs
are not the enemy; harm to the society and its constituent members
is the enemy. Whatever reduces harm by whatever means necessary
is all to the good (Beers, 1991).
No one who supports a harm reduction proposal questions the fact
that there are theoretical and practical difficulties and dilemmas
in implementing such a policy. Some tough and troubling questions
demand an answer. For instance, how do we measure or weigh one
harm against another? What if our policy results in fewer deaths
and more addicts? Less crime and more drug use? If we are truly
worried about harm from drug abuse, why concentrate on legalizing
or decriminalizing the illegal drugs—why not focus on ways of
reducing the use, and therefore the harm, that the legal drugs
cause? What if our policy improves conditions for one group or
category in the population but harms another? And will harm reduction
really result in less state control of the drug addict, abuser,
and user? Government regulations and programs designed to reduce
drug-related harm is likely to result in far more state
intervention into the lives of persons affected by them. (For
a cynical, mechanistic, and ill-conceived critique of harm reduction
programs from a radical or left-wing perspective, see Mugford,
1993.) No advocates of a harm reduction program suggest that it
is a problem-free panacea or cure-all, but all believe that these
and other criticisms are not fatal, and that its problems can
be resolved with the application of reliable information and good
common sense.
WHY CRIMINALIZATION CAN'T WORK
Proposing that the drug laws and their enforcement be changed
implies that the current ones are ineffective and/or harmful.
(In fact, the bulk of the legalizers' writings is devoted to criticizing
the current punitive policy; only a very small proportion of it
deals specifically with the particulars of a viable legalization
program.) Consequently, to fully understand the justifications
for drug legalization, it is necessary to explain, in the view
of the legalizers, how and why the current prohibitionist
program to deal with the drug problem is a failure. Behind the
punitive reasoning of criminalization is the assumption that a
drug war can and should be fought, that it can be won, and that
the principal weapons that must be used in this war are the
law, arrest, and imprisonment; they agree that drug
abuse is primarily a police matter. In stark contrast,
all, or nearly all, legalizers, agree on one point: They oppose
the current punitive system. They insist that drug abuse is
not primarily a police matter. They believe that relying
on the law and its enforcement is ineffective, counterproductive,
and unjust.
Why do the legalizers and decriminalizers believe that
our current, mainly punitive approach to drug control doesn't
work? In their view, what are some major flaws in attempting to
solve the drug problem by criminalizing the sale and possession
of drugs? Why don't drug prohibitions work, according to the legalizers?
Before these questions can be answered, we have to lay down specific
criteria as to what constitutes "working" in the first
place. No specific drug policy is likely to "work" best
in all important ways. It is entirely possible that a given program
may work well in one way and badly in another. What do the legalizers
mean when they say the punitive policy toward drug abuse
doesn't—and can't—work? In criticizing the current
policies and urging drug legalization or decriminalization, they
make 10 points.
First, the legalizers say, criminalization makes the illegal
drugs expensive and, hence, profitable to sell; because of the
profit motive, arresting producers and sellers and taking them
out of business simply results in other producers and sellers
stepping in to supply the shortfall. Therefore, drugs can never
be stamped out through the criminal law: The demand for drugs
is constant and inelastic; the criminalized status of illegal
drugs makes them expensive, and therefore highly profitable to
sell. Therefore, it is inevitable that suppliers will remain
in business; ironically, it is criminalization that guarantees
"business as usual."
Second, they say, the currently illegal drugs are less
harmful than the prohibitionists say and, in fact, less harmful
than the currently legal drugs. Hence, drug criminalization
is both aimed at the wrong target and discriminatory as well.
If anything, controls ought to be applied to cigarettes and alcohol—which
kill many more people—and not to the far safer currently illegal
drugs.
Third, the legalizers insist, prohibition is futile because
criminalization does not deter use. Drug abuse is as high
now, under a punitive policy, as it would be under a policy of
legalization; legalization would not produce an increase in use.
Anyone who wants to use is doing so now. Prohibition is a logistical
impossibility; there are simply too many holes in the net of social
control. Drugs will always leak through the net. Hence, the very
foundation of prohibition is invalid, they insist. Moreover,
since the demand for drugs is inelastic—users will pay
any price, no matter how exorbitant—raising the price through
legal harassment cannot work.
Fourth, the legalizers argue, prohibition encourages the
distribution and therefore the use of harder, stronger, more
dangerous drugs—and discourages the use of softer, weaker,
safer drugs. This is the case because criminalization places a
premium on selling drugs that are less bulky and easier to conceal,
drugs that show a greater profit margin per operation. This has
been referred to as the "Iron Law of Prohibition": The
more intense the law enforcement, the more potent the prohibited
substance becomes (Thornton, 1992, p.70). In contrast, under legalization,
they say, less potent and less harmful drugs (such as cocaine
leaves, cocaine gum, opium, and marijuana) will be substituted
for the more potent, more harmful illicit drugs now in use (crack,
heroin, "ice," and methamphetamine) (Goldstein, 1986).
Fifth, they say, drug dealers sell in a market in which
there are no controls whatsoever on the purity and potency of
their product. Hence, users are always consuming contaminated—and
dangerous—substances. In contrast, legalization would enforce
strict controls on purity and potency; as a consequence, death
by overdose would be virtually eliminated.
Sixth, the legalizers say, by undercutting the profit motive,
organized crime would be forced out of the drug trade. As a result,
the stranglehold that criminal gangs and mobs have on the throat
of the community would be released; residents would be able to
reclaim their neighborhoods, and democracy would triumph.
Seventh, legalizers say, the current level of drug-related
violence is solely a product of the illegality of the drug trade.
Drug-related murders are the result of disputes over dealing territory
or "turf," robberies of drug dealers, assaults to collect
a supposed drug debt, the punishment of a worker, a drug theft,
and a dealer selling bad or bogus drugs (Goldstein et al., 1989).
Eliminate criminalization, and the profit motive will be eliminated,
and so will drug gangs and the violence they inflict. The murder
rate will decline, and neighborhoods and communities will be safer.
Eighth, by placing such a huge priority on the drug war
and encouraging the arrest of dealers, the government has opened
the door to the violation of the civil liberties of citizens on
a massive scale. False or mistaken arrests or rousts, the seizure
of the property of innocent parties, corruption and brutality—these
are the legacies of prohibition. Under legalization, such violations
would not occur. The police would not be pressured to make questionable
arrests, nor be tempted by bribes from dealers; consequently,
they will be better able to serve the community (Ostrowski, 1990;
Wisotsky, 1990a, l99Ob, 1993).
Ninth, consider the enormous cost and the staggering tax
burden of enforcing prohibition; billions of our tax dollars are
being wasted in a futile, harmful endeavor. Under legalization,
not only would this waste not occur, but the sale of drugs could
be taxed, and revenues could be raised to treat drug abusers.
In an era of fiscal austerity, surely the budgetary argument should
weigh heavily. Legalization would represent using the tax dollar
wisely.
And tenth, under legalization, useful therapeutic drugs,
now banned by the government, will be reclassified so that they
will find their rightful place in medicine. Marijuana, a Schedule
I drug, is useful in the treatment of glaucoma and in reducing
the nausea associated with chemotherapy; heroin, also completely
banned by virtue of its Schedule I status, is an effective analgesic
or painkiller. In addition, a current Schedule I classification
is the kiss of death for scientific experimentation. The book
has been prematurely closed on some drugs, such as MDMA ("ecstasy")
and LSD—both Schedule I drugs—which have enormous potential
for unlocking the secrets of drug mechanisms and, possibly, valuable
therapeutic application as well. Our society cannot afford to
remain ignorant about drugs with such complex and potentially
revealing effects as these (Beck and Rosenbaum, 1994, pp.l46ff.;
Grinspoon and Bakalar, 1993).
Taken as a whole and at first blush, these arguments might seem
forceful and persuasive. But are they really valid? We'll examine
a few of them in the next two chapters.
|
