|
Legal References on Drug Policy
Federal Court Decisions on Drugs by Decade
1940
Year |
Title and Summary |
1940
US Supreme Court |
ODOM v. ADERHOLD, WARDEN - October
16, 1940 The constitutional right of accused to be represented by counsel may be
waived, and the burden rests upon the petitioner to establish that he did not competently
and intelligently waive this constitutional right. Whether there has been an intelligent
waiver of the right of counsel depends upon the particular circumstances and surroundings
in each case. . . . The waiver of the right will ordinarily be implied where the accused
appears without counsel and fails to request that counsel be assigned to him.
A careful examination of the record fails to reveal that petitioner was denied any of
his constitutional rights. |
1942
US Supreme Court |
YOUNG v. UNITED STATES - February 2,
1942 1. On review of a conviction in a criminal case, the Government's confession of
error, though entitled to great weight, does not relieve the Court of its duty to examine
independently the errors confessed. P. 258.
2. The second proviso of § 6 of the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, as amended, which
requires "any manufacturer, producer, compounder, or vendor (including dispensing
physicians)" to keep a record of all sales, exchanges, or gifts of certain
preparations and remedies, does not apply to physicians administering to patients whom
they personally attend. P. 259. |
1943
US Supreme Court |
DIRECT SALES CO. v. UNITED STATES -
June 14, 1943 A mail-order wholesale drug corporation made sales of morphine
sulphate to a physician in unusually large quantities, frequently, and over an extended
period. Held, that the evidence, from which it could be inferred that the seller not only
knew the physician was selling the drug illegally but intended to cooperate with him
therein, was sufficient to sustain the seller's conviction of conspiracy to violate the
Harrison Narcotic Act. |
1945
US Court of Appeals |
UNITED STATES v.
BRANDENBURGH - CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND CIRCUIT - January 11, 1945 There is
no merit in the appellant's contention that she did not get a fair trial because the lower
court consolidated the two indictments. |
1946
US Court of Appeals |
UNITED STATES v. BRANDENBURG. -
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD CIRCUIT. - April 12, 1946 . .the rather
elaborately drawn count does not charge a sale of drugs to a known addict. In essence, the
charge is that the drugs were sold to a purchaser for the purpose of satisfying the
cravings of unspecified addicts. Under the principles already enunciated there can be no
doubt that an indictable offense is thus charged.Obviously, a physician who prescribes
drugs in bad faith, not in the course of his professional practice only and for the
purpose of satisfying the cravings of drug addicts is guilty of an indictable offense
under the statute and the decisions cited above, interpreting it.
We conclude, therefore, that the indictment is sufficient. . . . .
The repeated prescribing of the drug in such quantities and at such intervals was
sufficient evidence to raise a serious doubt as to Dr. Brandenburg's good faith.
Consequently, we must conclude that the jury believed the physician-patient relationship
terminated or that the prescriptions were issued in bad faith by the appellant. For this
belief there was sufficient warrant in the proof. . . . .
Asserting an inadvertent and improper presence among the exhibits sent out with the
jury, of certain written matter, appellant seeks a new trial. Among the many prescriptions
offered in evidence by the government were three which were attached to sheets of paper
and pinned together. These bore legends, evidently drafted by government agents, and to
the effect that the prescriptions "were purchased" from Dr. Brandenburg and
"postdated". Neither counsel noticed these legends. Casual inspection by defense
counsel before they went into the evidence did not reveal the typewritten and handwritten
hearsay statements. It was not until several days after the jury returned its verdict that
appellant's counsel first noticed the existence of the legends. He then brought the matter
before the trial judge on motion to set the verdict aside. The court denied the motion. In
this, we think he erred: |
1948
US Supreme Court |
JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
- SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES - No. 329 - Decided: February 2, 1948 1.
Where officers detected the odor of burning opium emanating from a hotel room, entered
without a search warrant and without knowing who was there, arrested the only occupant,
searched the room and found opium and smoking apparatus, the search violated the Fourth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution; and a conviction for a violation of the federal
narcotic laws based on the evidence thus obtained cannot be sustained. Pp. 11-17.
2. As a general rule, the question when the right of privacy must reasonably yield to
the right of search must be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent. Pp. 13-14.
3. There were no exceptional circumstances in this case sufficient to justify the
failure of the officer to obtain a search warrant. Pp. 14-15.
4. It being conceded that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest petitioner
until he entered the room and found her to be the sole occupant, the search cannot be
sustained as being incident to a valid arrest. Pp. 15-16.
5. The Government cannot at the same time justify an arrest by a search and justify the
search by the arrest. Pp. 16-19.
6. An officer gaining access to private living quarters under color of his office and
of the law must then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion. P. 17. |
1948
US Supreme Court |
FRAZIER v. UNITED STATES
- December 20, 1948 1. Petitioner was convicted in a federal court in the District of
Columbia for violating the Harrison Narcotics Act. In the circumstances of this case, he
was not denied the trial "by an impartial jury" guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, although the jury was composed entirely of employees of the Federal Government
and one of them and the wife of another were employees of the Treasury Department, but not
of its Bureau of Narcotics which administers and enforces the federal narcotics statutes.
Pp. 498-514.
2. A motion to strike the entire panel for alleged irregularities in the method of its
selection, which was not made until after an entire morning had been consumed in
uncompleted efforts to select a jury and which was supported solely by counsel's unsworn
statements, without any proof or offer of proof, was without merit. Pp. 503-504.
3. Given 10 arbitrary choices among 22 prospective jurors not disqualified for cause,
of whom 13 were government employees and 9 privately engaged, petitioner knowingly
rejected by peremptory challenges all 9 of the latter and accepted without challenge all
but one of the former. Held : His objection to the resulting jury on the ground that it
consisted entirely of government employees was not justified. Pp. 504-512.
4. In view of the D.C. Code (1940) § 11-1420, which removed (with specified
exceptions) the previously existing disqualification of government employees for jury
service in the District of Columbia in criminal and other cases to which the Government is
a party, the mere fact of government employment is insufficient to disqualify a juror who
is otherwise qualified. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123. Pp. 508-512.
5. Where petitioner knew that the wife of one juror was employed by the Treasury and
knew that another juror was a government employee but failed to inquire as to the exact
nature of the latter's employment and failed to challenge either juror while the jury was
being selected, petitioner's challenge to these two jurors in a motion for a new trial was
rightly overruled. Pp. 512-514. |
|