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Legal References on Drug Policy
Federal Court Decisions on Drugs by Decade
1950
Year |
Title and Summary |
1950
US Court of Appeals
Eighth Circuit |
ARMSTRONG v. STEELE, WARDEN. - April
26, 1950. . . . Armstrong entered a plea of guilty to an indictment charging him in the
first count with smuggling marihuana into the United States with intent to defraud the
United States, and in the second count with knowingly receiving, concealing, and
transporting the marihuana after importation into the United States, each count charging a
violation of section 545, Title 18 United States Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 545, and in the
third count with having unlawfully received the marihuana without paying the transfer tax
required . . .. He received a sentence of 18 months imprisonment on each of the three
counts of the indictment, the sentences on the first and second counts to run
consecutively. . .
. . . Armstrong . . . (claimed) that the sentences imposed upon him are void because
not within the jurisdiction of the court. Petitioner did not allege or prove that he had
complied with section 2255, Title 28 United States Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, and for that
reason his petition for was dismissed.
Section 2255, Title 28 United States Code, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255, provides that a
prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of the United States, claiming the right to
be released on the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of law or that the
sentencing court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, may move the sentencing
court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence, and further: "An application for
a writ of in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant
to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to
apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has
denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention." . . .
The judgment of the District Court was right and must be affirmed. |
1950
US Supreme Court |
UNITED STATES v. SANCHEZ ET AL. -
November 13, 1950 1. The tax of $100 per ounce imposed . . . on transferors of marihuana
who make transfers to unregistered transferees without the order form . . and
without payment by the transferees of the tax imposed . . . is a valid exercise of the
taxing power of Congress, notwithstanding its collateral regulatory purpose and effect.
(a) A tax is not invalid merely because it regulates, discourages or deters the
activities taxed; nor because the revenue obtained is negligible or the revenue purpose is
secondary.
(b) A tax is not invalid merely because it affects activities which Congress might not
otherwise regulate.
2. The tax levied . . . is not conditioned on the commission of a crime, and it may
properly be treated as a civil rather than a criminal sanction. Pp. 45-46.
(a) That Congress provided civil procedure for collection indicates its intention that
the levy be treated as civil in character. P. 45.
(b) The civil character of the tax of $100 per ounce imposed by § 2590 (a) (2) is not
altered by its severity in relation to the tax of $1 per ounce levied by § 2590 (a) (1).
Pp. 45-46.
(c) The imposition by § 2590 (b) of liability on transferors is reasonably adapted to
secure payment of the tax by transferees or stop transfers to unregistered persons, as
well as to provide an additional source from which the expense of unearthing clandestine
transfers can be recovered. Pp. 45-46. |
1951
US Court of Appeals |
BUTLER v. UNITED STATES.
- Sept. 15, 1951 This case considered a number of points including:
The defendant urges that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the
United States Attorney in his opening statement and closing argument to mention
intoxicating liquors, the harmful effects of improper use of narcotics, other narcotic
cases, conspiracies and how the case developed, since such statements were
"inflammatory and highly prejudicial." Defendant also argues that prejudicial
references were made to defense counsel. Defendant's contentions are wholly lacking in
merit. The very purpose of an opening statement is to inform the jury how the case
developed, its background and what will be attempted to be proved. |
1951
US Court of Appeals |
UNITED STATES v. MARKHAM - October 15,
1951 Defendant appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty
of all the charges contained in three indictments, consolidated for trial, charging him
with the acquisition and transfer of marihuana without having paid the tax thereon. . .
Defendant alleges the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction to the jury
with respect to the defense of entrapment. . . . .
Since the defendant neither took the stand nor offered any direct testimony on the
subject of entrapment, and called as his only witnesses the U.S. Commissioner and a deputy
U.S. Marshal merely to establish the date when he was released on bond, the only possible
manner in which he could have produced testimony to go to the jury on the question of
entrapment would be on cross-examination. We have carefully read the record and are unable
to find any such evidence presented which would have required the trial court to submit
this issue to the jury. |
1951
US Supreme Court |
UNITED STATES v. JEFFERS - November
13, 1951 1. Without a warrant for search or arrest, but with reason to believe that
respondent had narcotics unlawfully concealed there, officers entered the hotel room of
respondent's aunts, in their absence and in the absence of respondent, searched it, and
seized narcotics claimed by respondent. The search and seizure were not incident to a
valid arrest; and there were no exceptional circumstances to justify their being made
without a warrant. Held : The seizure violated the Fourth Amendment; and, on respondent's
motion, the narcotics so seized should have been excluded as evidence in his trial for
violation of the narcotics laws. Pp. 49-54.
(a) That the evidence seized in these circumstances was not on respondent's premises,
did not deprive him of standing to suppress it. Pp. 51-52.
(b) Nor is a different result required by the provision of 26 U. S. C. § 3116 that
"no property rights shall exist" in such contraband goods. Pp. 52-54.
2. Since the evidence illegally seized was contraband, the respondent was not entitled
to have it returned to him. P. 54.
In the District Court, respondent's motion to suppress evidence seized without a
warrant was denied and he was convicted of violating the narcotics laws, 26 U. S. C. §
2553 (a) and 21 U. S. C. § 174. The Court of Appeals reversed. 88 U. S. App. D.C. 58, 187
F.2d 498. This Court granted certiorari. 340 U.S. 951. Affirmed, p. 54. |
1951
US Court of Appeals |
UNITED STATES v. STALLSWORTH. -
December 19, 1951 The principal contention of the defendant is that the government
failed to prove venue in the Northern District of Illinois. We are of the opinion that
under the facts of this case the presumption of guilt from the defendant's failure to
produce the order also covered the question of venue. The marihuana was in the defendant's
possession in this District. It was found in his automobile which he parked in front of
343 East 47th Street, Chicago, Illinois. The defendant had driven the automobile to this
location. His finger print was on the package. The fact as to where the defendant acquired
the marihuana was a fact peculiarly within his knowledge. Counsel for the defendant agrees
that the presumption of guilt provision of the Narcotics Act, 26 U.S.C.A. § 2553(a), is
similar to the provision of the Marihuana Tax Act which we are here considering and that
the two provisions should be similarly interpreted and applied. The provision in the
Narcotics Act states in part: "* * * the absence of appropriate tax-paid stamps from
any of the aforesaid drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this subsection
by the person in whose possession same may be found". |
1952
US Supreme Court |
ON LEE v. UNITED STATES - June 2,
1952 While petitioner was at large on bail pending his trial in a federal court on
federal narcotics charges, an old acquaintance and former employee, who, unknown to
petitioner, was a federal "undercover agent" and had a radio transmitter
concealed on his person, entered the customer's room of petitioner's laundry and engaged
petitioner in a conversation. Self-incriminating statements, made by petitioner during
this conversation and a later conversation on a sidewalk with the same "undercover
agent," were listened to on a radio receiver outside the laundry by another federal
agent, who testified concerning them, over petitioner's objection, at the trial in which
petitioner was convicted. Held :
1. The conduct of the federal agents did not amount to such a search and seizure as is
proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 750-753.
(a) The undercover agent committed no trespass when he entered petitioner's place of
business, and his subsequent conduct did not render the entry a trespass ab initio.
(b) The doctrine of trespass ab initio is applicable only as a rule of liability in
civil actions, not where the right of the Government to make use of evidence in a criminal
prosecution is involved.
(c) The contentions that the undercover man's entrance was a trespass because consent
was obtained by fraud, and that the other agent was a trespasser because by means of the
radio receiver outside the laundry he overheard what went on inside, must be rejected.
(d) Decisions relating to problems raised where tangible property is unlawfully seized
are inapposite in the field of mechanical or electronic devices designed to overhear or
intercept conversation, at least where access to the listening post was not obtained by
illegal methods.
(e) Even if the Court were to overturn its ruling that wiretapping is outside the ban
of the Fourth Amendment, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, petitioner would not be
aided, since his case cannot be treated as one involving wiretapping.
2. The facts do not show a violation of § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, since
there was no interference with any communications facility that petitioner possessed or
was entitled to use, nor was petitioner sending messages to anyone or using a system of
communications within the Act. .
3. The evidence should not have been excluded as a means of disciplining law
enforcement officers. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, distinguished. |
1954
US Court of Appeals |
JACKSON v. UNITED STATES. - April 8, 1954
Appellant's main contention is that in instructing the jury that, under the applicable
statutes, the unexplained possession of narcotic drugs is sufficient evidence to authorize
conviction, the trial court erred in instructing that actual, physical possession is not
essential and that constructive possession is sufficient.
These instructions, however, were given only in connection with the charges of selling not
in or from the original stamped package and facilitating concealment and sale. They were
not given in connection with the charges in counts 11 and 14 of selling narcotics without
a written purchase order. We find no error in the presentation of the case to the jury on
these two counts, and in view of the concurrence of the sentences, it is unnecessary for
us to resolve the questions presented as to the validity of the convictions on the
remaining six counts. |
1954
US Supreme Court |
WALDER v. UNITED STATES
1954.SCT.123 , 347 U.S. 62, 74 S. Ct. 354, 98 L. Ed. 503
February 1, 1954
|
1954
US Court of Appeals |
UNITED STATES v. KAPSALIS ET AL. -
July 8, 1954. In 1951 the traffic in narcotics had reached such alarming
proportions in the United States that Congress passed a concurrent resolution, H.R. 3490,
"to make more stringent and uniform the penalties to be imposed upon persons
violating" these laws. . . .
In October of 1952 the defendant Andrew Kapsalis was charged in three indictments,
containing two, nine and four counts, respectively, with violations of the Harrison
Narcotics Act, . . .. The court, after first determining by questioning the defendant and
his attorney that the defendant's attorney had advised the defendant as to his rights, as
to the nature of the offenses and as to the possible penalties, accepted the pleas of
guilty, adjudged the defendant guilty and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment on each
indictment, the sentences to run concurrently for a total of ten years.
The defendant Kapsalis now contends that the District Court was influenced to sentence
him for a longer term on each indictment because of the mandatory minimum penalties
"purportedly" established by the 1951 amendments . . . under which the defendant
was sentenced was invalid; that it never became a law because the resolution after being
passed by the Congress was neither "presented to the President nor approved by the
President as required by Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the Constitution."
Kapsalis therefore contends that the District Court erred in dismissing the motion to
vacate his sentence. . . .
We think the motions and the files and the record in each of these cases conclusively
show that the prisoners Kapsalis and Robinson were entitled to no relief and their motions
were, therefore, properly dismissed without a hearing. |
1954
US Court of Appeals |
J. D. CHARLES, APPELLANT, v. UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE - September 24, 1954. This case considered
whether a witness being present in the courtroom, and the judge's instructions to the
jury, were grounds for reversal. |
1954
US Court of Appeals |
LEONARD HARRIS, APPELLANT,
v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE. - October 12, 1954 On February 8, 1952, an
indictment was returned against the appellant charging him with wilfully, knowingly and
feloniously obtaining and possessing 1081/2 grains of bulk marihuana without having paid
the tax thereon as required by law. 26 U.S.C.A. § 2593(a). Appellant appeared before the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas, together with court-appointed
counsel, and entered a plea of guilty to the indictment. On that plea appellant was
sentenced to imprisonment for five years.
On April 30, 1954, appellant filed a motion under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 to set aside the
sentence on the ground that the section which he allegedly violated was derived from the
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 which was repealed February 10, 1939, and that the court lacked
jurisdiction to impose the judgment and sentence because the law under which he was
sentenced had been repealed.
Judgment affirmed. |
1954
US Court of Appeals |
JOSEPH PETTWAY, JR., APPELLANT, v. THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE - October 21, 1954 Appellant's contention that
the statute hereinabove referred to as the Boggs Act is ex post facto litigation and
unconstitutional is without merit. The statute was in effect prior to May 29, 1952, the
date of the offenses charged in the indictment. The information, setting out the two prior
convictions, did not charge appellant with any crime. It merely alleged facts, which, if
established, went solely to the question of punishment.
Appellant contends that the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, violation of which was
specifically charged in the indictment, was not in effect on May 29, 1952, having been
superseded by the Marihuana Tax Act of 1939, and that the indictment in charging violation
of a law no longer in existence was invalid. It is conceded that the acts alleged in the
indictment were violations of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1939. It is well settled that if
the indictment charges acts illegal under an existing federal statute it is not
invalidated for failure to refer to the statute or for specifying the wrong statute. |
1955
US Supreme Court |
MARCELLO v. BONDS, OFFICER IN
CHARGE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE - May 31, 1955 After a hearing pursuant
to § 242 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, petitioner, an alien who had
been convicted in 1938 of violation of the Marihuana Tax Act, was ordered deported. . . .
The validity of the deportation order was challenged by petitioner in a proceeding. Held :
1. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 expressly supersedes the hearing
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. Pp. 305-310.
2. The fact that the special inquiry officer was subject to the supervision and control
of officials in the Immigration Service charged with investigative and prosecuting
functions did not so strip the hearing of fairness and impartiality as to make the
procedure violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. P. 311.
3. Petitioner failed to support his claim that, within the meaning of this Court's
decisions in the Accardi cases, his case was prejudged by the Board of Immigration Appeals
and by the special inquiry officer. Pp. 311-314.
4. The prohibition of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution does not apply to
deportation of aliens. |
1955
US Court of Appeals
Sixth Circuit |
ILEY WILLIAMS, APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, APPELLEE. - June 9, 1955. . . appellant was convicted for violating
section 2593(a), Title 26, U.S.C.A., making it a crime for a transferee of marihuana to
possess that narcotic drug without having complied with the lawful requirements as to
payment of tax and production of the required order forms, there is no force in the
argument of appellant that the codifying Act of February 10, 1939, repealed all laws or
parts of laws embodied in the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act;
And it appearing after full consideration of the facts of the case that there was no
arrest and seizure of appellant in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, the judgment of the district court is affirmed upon the authority of
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. |
1956
US Supreme Court |
REA v. UNITED STATES - January 16, 1956 On
the basis of evidence seized under an invalid federal search warrant, petitioner was
indicted in a federal court for unlawful acquisition of marihuana. On his motion under
Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this evidence was suppressed.
Thereafter he was charged in a state court with possession of marihuana in violation of
state law. Alleging that the evidence suppressed in the federal court was the basis of the
state charge, petitioner moved in a federal court for an order enjoining the federal agent
who had seized the evidence from transferring it to state authorities or testifying with
respect thereto in the state courts. Held: The motion should have been granted. Pp.
214-218. |
1956
US Court of Appeals |
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL. ANGELO FRANK
BRUNO, APPELLANT, v. JAMES M. SWEET, ACTING OFFICER IN CHARGE, IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, APPELLEE. - July 17, 1956. We are
convinced that it has been established beyond controversy that, under section 241(a)(11)
of the Act, petitioner's conviction of a narcotics offense was in itself sufficient basis
for the deportation order. |
1957
US Supreme Court |
ROVIARO v. UNITED STATES -
March 25, 1957 Petitioner was convicted (of) possessing and transporting
heroin imported unlawfully. In the face of repeated demands by petitioner for disclosure,
the trial court sustained the Government's refusal to disclose the identity of an
undercover informer who had taken a material part in bringing about petitioner's
possession of the drugs, had been present with petitioner at the occurrence of the alleged
crime, and might have been a material witness as to whether petitioner knowingly
transported the drugs as charged. Held : In the circumstances of this case, failure of the
court to require disclosure of the identity of the informer was reversible error. |
1957
US Supreme Court |
RABANG v. BOYD,
DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE - May 27, 1957 Petitioner,
born in 1910 in the Philippine Islands, has resided in the continental United States since
1930 when he was admitted for permanent residence. He was convicted in February 1951 of
violating the federal narcotics laws. After administrative proceedings, he was ordered
deported under the Act of February 18, 1931, as amended, which provides for the
deportation of "any alien" convicted of violating a federal narcotics law.
Petitioner's application for was denied by the Federal District Court and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. Held : Petitioner was deportable under the 1931 Act, and the judgement
is affirmed. Pp. 428-433. |
1957
US Supreme Court |
MULCAHEY, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, v. CATALANOTTE - June 3, 1957 An alien who entered
the United States in 1920 for permanent residence was convicted in 1925 of a federal
offense relating to illicit traffic in narcotics. At that time, there was no statute
making that offense a ground for deportation. After enactment of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, he was ordered deported under §§ 241 (a)(11) and (d) thereof,
which provide for the deportation of any alien who "at any time" has been
convicted of violating any law relating to illicit traffic in narcotics. He challenged the
validity of this order in a proceeding. Held : the order of deportation is sustained.
Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, ante, p. 685. Pp. 692-694. |
1957
US Court of Appeals
Ninth Circuit |
CHARLES E. TOLIVER, APPELLANT, v. UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE - November 26, 1957 Appellant contends that the
maximum sentence which the trial court had jurisdiction to impose upon him was four years
since count four is identical with count three and count one is identical with count five.
He further contends that the sentences constitute double jeopardy. |
1958
US Court of Appeals |
FRED BRIDGES, APPELLANT, v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE - April 21, 1958 Appellant asserts that imposition of
the second (consecutive) sentence has caused him to suffer double punishment because of an
inference that the heroin referred to in the first count was also involved in the second
count. .
The above noted argument advanced by appellant is utterly void of merit. |
1958
US Court of Appeals |
MIGUEL A. MORENO RIOS,
DEFENDANT, APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE. May 19, 1958 Miguel A.
Moreno Rios, after having pleaded guilty to an information charging a violation of the
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, . . .
Two grounds are urged by appellant to support his proposition that the judgment of
conviction is void: (1) Because the federal criminal statute in question is inapplicable
to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and (2) because Chief Justice Snyder was not lawfully
designated to serve as acting judge in the federal district court. Neither point amounts
to anything. In this determination we are in accord with the conclusions reached by the
Commonwealth Government in its brief amicus curiae. |
1958
US Court of Appeals
First Circuit |
RUBEN DARIO SANCHEZ, DEFENDANT,
APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE. - May 19, 1958. The Court held
that the Marihuana Tax Act also applies in Puerto Rico. |
1958
US Supreme Court |
GORE v. UNITED STATES
- - June 30, 1958 Convicted in a federal court on six counts for violating three
different sections of federal law by a single sale of narcotics on each of two different
days, petitioner was sentenced to three consecutive terms for each day's sale, the terms
for each day's sale to run concurrently with those for the other day's sale. He moved
under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 to vacate the sentences as unlawful. Held : The sentences were
not unlawful.
(a) The Court adheres to the decision in Blockburger
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299.
(b) Though the three sections here involved grew out of a single purpose to outlaw
non-medicinal sales of narcotics, they grew out of three different laws enacted at
different times, for each of which Congress has provided a separate punishment, and
Congress did not intend that violations of all three should be treated as a single offense
when committed through a single sale.
(c) Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, distinguished.
(d) The result here reached does not offend the constitutional prohibition of double
jeopardy.
(e) The question of policy involved is for Congress to decide, and this Court has no
power to increase or reduce sentences for such offenses. |
1958
US Court of Appeals |
JOE ANTHONY EMMETT,
APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE. - November 25,
1958 During the trial, counsel for the United States called as a Government witness the
lieutenant in charge of the Bureau of Identification of the Police Department of the City
and County of Denver and asked him if he had certain records. When the lieutenant
responded that he had such records, he was asked to produce them. When the records were
produced, Government counsel handed them to the reporter to be marked for identification.
At that point counsel for Emmett and the other defendants approached the bench and
requested the court to declare a mistrial. The court recessed and heard the matter fully
in the absence of the jury. The court concluded that the jury had neither seen the
exhibits nor observed them to the extent that they learned the contents thereof; held that
the exhibits were not admissible in evidence; directed that they be not returned to the
courtroom and denied the motion for a mistrial. The denial of such motion is the ground
set up in the motion to vacate the sentence. (decision affirmed) |
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