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Table of Contents
CIA Director Stansfield Turner's Testimony
(Continued -- pp. 33-50)
Senator WALLOP. If they are, I would assume that you would still try to
find from either theirs or somebody else's information how to protect our people from that
kind of activity.
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator WALLOP. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafee?
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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Admiral Turner, I appreciate that these tawdry activities were taking place long before
your watch, and I think you have correctly labeled them as abhorrent, but not only were
they abhorrent, it seems to me that they wee rather bungled, amateurish experiments that
don't seem to have been handled in a very scientific way, at least from the scanty
evidence we have.
It seems to me that there were a minimum of reports and the Agency didn't have the ability
to call it quits. It went on for some 12 years, as you mentioned. What I would like to get
to is, are you convinced now in your Agency that those scientific experiments, legitimate
ones that you were conducting with polygraph and so forth, were being conducted in a
scientific manner and that you are handling it in a correct manner to get the best
information that you are seeking in the end?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, I am, and I also have a sense of confidence that we
are limiting ourselves to the areas where we need to be involved as opposed to areas where
we can rely on others.
Senator CHAFEE. I am convinced of that from your report. I just do hope
that you have people who are trained in not only handling this type of experiment, but in
preparing the proper reports and drawing the proper data from the reports. You are
convinced that you have this type of people?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator CHAFEE. The second point I am interested in was the final lines
in your testimony here, which I believe are very important, and that is that the Agency is
doing all it can in cooperation with other branches of the Government to go about tracking
down the identity of those who were in some way adversely affected, and see what can be
done to fulfill the government's responsibilities in that respect. I might add that I
commend you in that, and I hope you will pursue it vigorously.
A hospital in my State was involved in these proceedings, and it is unclear exactly what
did take place, so I have both a parochial interest in this and a national interest as
well, and I do hope you will press on with it. It involves not only you, I appreciate, but
also HEW and perhaps the Attorney General.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir. We will.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.
Admiral Turner, MKULTRA subproject 3 was a project involving the surreptitious
administration of LSD on unwitting persons, was it not?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator INOUYE. In February 1954, and this was in the very early stages
of MKULTRA, the Director of Central Intelligence wrote to the technical services staff
officials criticizing their judgment because they had participated in an experiment
involving the administration of LSD on an unwitting basis to Dr. Frank Olson, who later
committed suicide. Now, the individuals criticized were the same individuals who were
responsible for subproject 3, involving exactly the same practices. Even though these
individuals were clearly aware of the dangers of surreptitious administration and had been
criticized by the Director
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of Central Intelligence, subproject 3 was not terminated immediately after Dr. Olson's
death.
In fact, according to documents, it continued for a number of years. Can you provide this
committee with any explanation of how such testing could have continued under these
circumstances?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I really can't.
Senator INOUYE. Are the individuals in technical services who carried on
subproject 3 still on the CIA payroll?
Admiral TURNER. I am sorry. Are you asking, are they today?
Senator INOUYE. Yes.
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator INOUYE. What would you do if you criticized officials of the
technical services staff and they continued to carry on experimentation for a number of
years?
Admiral TURNER. I would do two things, sir. One is, I would be sure at
the beginning that I was explicit enough that they knew that I didn't want that to be
continued anywhere else, and two, if I found it being continued, I would roll some heads.
Senator INOUYE. Could you provide this committee with information as to
whether the individuals involved had their heads rolled?
Admiral TURNER. I don't believe there is any evidence they did, but I
will double check that.
[See p. 170 for material referred to.]
Senator INOUYE. As you know, Senator Huddleston and his subcommittee are
deeply involved in the drafting of charters and guidelines for the intelligence community.
We will be meeting with the President tomorrow. Our concern is, I think, a basic one. Can
anything like this occur again?
Admiral TURNER. I think it would be very, very unlikely, first, because
we are all much more conscious of these issues than we were back in the fifties, second,
because we have such thorough oversight procedures. I cannot imagine that this kind of
activity could take place today without some member of the CIA itself bypassing me, if I
were authorizing this, and writing to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and blowing the
whistle on this kind of activity.
I am also doing my very best, sir, to encourage an openness with myself and a free
communication in the Agency, so that I am the one who finds these things if they should
happen. The fact is that we must keep you and your committee and now the new committee in
the House informed of our sensitive activities. I think all of these add up to a degree of
scrutiny such that this kind of extensive and flagrant activity could not happen today
without it coming to the attention of the proper authorities to stop it.
Senator INOUYE. A sad aspect of the MKULTRA project was that it naturally
involved the people who unwittingly or wittingly got involved in experimentation. I would
appreciate it if you would report back to this committee in 3 months on what the Agency
has done to notify these individuals and these institutions, and furthermore, to notify us
as to what steps have been taken to identify victims, and if identified, what you have
done to assist them, monetarily or otherwise.
Admiral TURNER. All right, sir. I will be happy to.
Senator GOLDWATER. Will the Senator yield?
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Senator INOUYE. Yes, sir.
Senator GOLDWATER. I wonder if he could include in that report for our
information only a complete listing of the individuals and the experiments done on them,
and whether they were witting or unwitting, volunteer or nonvolunteer, and what has been
the result in each case. I think that would be interesting.
Admiral TURNER. Fine. Yes, sir.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy?
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. It is your intention to notify the
individuals who have been the, subjects of the research, is that right, Admiral Turner? Do
you intend to notify those individuals?
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. If you can identify them, you intend to notify them?
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And you intend to notify the universities or research
centers as well?
Admiral TURNER. Senator, I am torn on that. I understand your opening
statement. I put myself in the position of the president of one of those, universities,
let's say. If he were witting -- if his university had been witting of this activity with
us, lie has access to all that information today. If lie, were not witting, I wonder if
the. process of informing him might put his institution's reputation in more jeopardy than
letting them go on the way they are today, not knowing. I really don't know the equities
here.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, the problem is, all you have to do is pick up the
newspapers and you see these universities mentioned. In many instances, I think you are
putting the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, where there is a complete
change of administration, and they may for one reason or another not have information that
they are, under suspicion. There is innuendo; there is rumor. I cannot help but believe
that it will just get smeared all over the newspapers in spite of all the security steps
that have been taken.
It seems to me that those universities should be entitled to that information, so that the
ones with other administrations can adapt procedures to protect those universities. The
importance of preserving the independence of our research areas and the communities seems
to me to be a very fundamental kind of question about the protection of the integrity of
our universities and our research centers.
Admiral TURNER. You are saying that you feel that if we identify them
privately to themselves, we can benefit them in an adequate way to cover the risk that
this will lead to a more public disclosure? There are lots of the 80 who have not been
identified publicly at this point.
Senator KENNEDY. I think the universities themselves should be notified.
I think then the universities can take whatever steps in terms of their setting up the
procedures to protect. their own kinds of integrity in terms of the future. I would
certainly hope that, they would feel that they could make a public comment or a public
statement on it. I think it is of general public interest, particularly for the people
that are involved in those universities, to have some kind of awareness of whether they
were. used or were not used and how they were used.
I think they are entitled to it, and quite frankly, if there is a public official or an
official of the university that you notify and be wants
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for his own particular reasons not to have it public, I don't see why those in a lesser
echelon or lower echelon who have been effectively used by it should not have the
information as well.
So, I would hope that you would notify the universities and then also indicate to the
public. I can't conceive that this information will not be put out in the newspapers, and
it puts the university people at an extraordinary disadvantage, and of course some of it
is wrong, which is the fact of the matter, and I think some university official saying,
well, it isn't so, is a lot different than if they know it is confirmed or it is not
confirmed in terms of the Agency itself. I think that there is a responsibility there.
Admiral TURNER. I have great sympathy with what you are saying. I have
already notified one institution because the involvement was so extensive that I thought
they really needed to protect themselves, and I am. most anxious to do this in whatever
way will help all of the people who were perhaps unwitting participants in this, and the
difficulty I will have is, I can't quite do, I think, what you suggested, in that I may
not be able to tell an institution of the extent and nature of its participation.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, you can tell them to the best of your information,
and it seems to me that just because the university or an individual is going to be
embarrassed is not a reason for classifying the information. So, I would hope -- I mean, I
obviously speak as an individual Senator, but I feel that that is an incredible disservice
to the innocent individuals and I think, a disservice to the integrity of the,
universities unless they are notified, to be able to develop procedures you are developing
with regards to your own institution and we are trying to in terms of the Congress.
Certainly the universities are entitled to the same.
Admiral TURNER. Yes. Not all of these, of course, were unwitting.
Senator KENNEDY. That's right.
Admiral TURNER. Many of them were witting, and therefore they can take
all those precautionary steps on their own, but I am perfectly open to doing this. I am
only interested in doing it in a way that when identifying a university it will not lead
to the public disclosure of the individuals, whom I am not allowed to disclose, and so on.
Senator KENNEDY. That could be done, it seems to me.
Admiral TURNER. So, we will see if we can devise a way of notifying these
institutions on a private basis so that they can then make their own decision whether
their equities are best served by their announcing it publicly or their attempting to
maintain it--
Senator KENNEDY. Or you. I wonder. What if they were to ask you to
announce, or indicate?
Admiral TURNER. My personal conscience, sir, at this time, is that I
would be doing a disservice to these universities if I notified the public.
Senator KENNEDY. Would you meet with some university officials and ask
what their views are or whether they feel that the preservation of the integrity of the
universities would be better served or not? I think that would be useful to find out from
small, large, private, and public universities' officials how they view the integrity--
Admiral TURNER. Fine. I Will phone several university presidents today
who are my friends and who are not involved in this, and ask them what they think the
equities would be.
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Senator KENNEDY. All right. You let us know, too.
Admiral TURNER. But I am not sure that I see that there is any great
benefit, in my notifying the public as opposed to the university notifying them. Let him
have his choice whether he wants -- each institution wants to have it made public.
Senator KENNEDY. Yes. The fact would remain that the institution's
credibility would be better served if the institution's president were to deny it and the
university indicated that it did not participate in that program than if the university
were to deny it and the Agency says nothing. It seems to me that that would be the
strongest, and the only way that that is going to be credible. I would value it if you
would get some input from universities as to what they believe is the fairest way in terms
of the preservation of the integrity of the universities.
Let me, if I could, ask on the question of the uses of these safe houses, as I understand
from information that was provided to us in the course of our last committee, the testing
of various drugs on individuals happened at all social levels, high and low, it happened
on native Americans and also on foreign nationals. That is what I understand was the
nature of the project itself.
Now, I am just wondering whether those tests were conducted at the two locations on the
east coast and the west coast which were known as safe houses. To your knowledge, is that
correct?
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. In terms of the research in this particular program, it
did not go beyond the safe houses located on the east coast and the west coast? I believe
I am correct on that.
Admiral TURNER. That type of unwitting testing of sort of randomly
selected individuals, yes.
Senator KENNEDY. It was just located in those two places?
Admiral TURNER. To the best of our knowledge, there were only two
locations.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, how do we interpret randomly selected?
Admiral TURNER. Well, as opposed to prisoners in a prison who were
somehow selected.
Senator KENNEDY. All right. Do you know from this information how many
people were recruited during this period?
Admiral TURNER. No idea.
Senator KENNEDY. Do you know approximately?
Admiral TURNER. I asked that question the other day, and we just don't
have -- apparently we are very -- well, either there were no records kept of the actual
numbers and types of people tested or they were destroyed.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, I would like to come back to the experiments which may have been conducted
at the hospital research facilities which the CIA helped to finance. It wasn't clear to me
from your previous answers what kind of work was done there. I gather you are unclear on
that, too, from your remarks, yet I find in the CIA documentation which you have supplied
us, a list describing some of the advantages the Agency hoped to gain. It says:
(a) One-sixth of the total space in the new hospital wing will be
available to the Chemical Division of TSS * * *; (b) Agency sponsorship of sensitive
research
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projects will be completely deniable; (c) Full professional cover will
be provided for up to three biochemical employees of the Chemical Division; (d) Human
patients and volunteers for experimental use will be available under controlled clinical
conditions with the full supervision of
and there is a blank, something has been deleted.
It seems pretty clear to me what they intended to do in that particular wing. Doesn't it
to you? Why would you go to such elaborate preparations, to buy part of the wing, bring
three of your own personnel there, give them a cover, and give them access to patients?
Why would you go to such trouble and expense to arrange, all that, if you weren't planning
to experiment on people in the hospital?
Admiral TURNER. I agree with you 100 percent, sir. Those were clearly the
intentions. I have no evidence that it was carried out in that way. I am not trying to be
defensive, Senator. I am only trying to be absolutely precise here.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, then, as to the nature of what was done there,
the last paragraph on the same page of the document says, "The facilities of the
hospital and the ability to conduct controlled experimentations under safe clinical
conditions using materials with which any agency connection must be completely deniable
will augment and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS, such as," and
then there's another deletion.
Now, the words following "such as" have been deleted. That is still classified,
or at least it was removed when this document was sanitized and released. It seems to be
that whatever was deleted right there would give you a pretty good clue as to what they
were doing, since it says that the activities would "augment and complement other
programs" undertaken by TSS. So, I have trouble understanding why you don't know what
was contemplated. Just the fact that similar programs are referred to in the document,
though what they are is still deleted, should enable you to check it out.
You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned following the "such
as" in the classified version of this document.
Admiral TURNER. Senator, I have not said that we don't know what was
contemplated being done there. We do not know what was done there.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Why did you delete that reference? Why is that still
classified, that particular project of whatever it is?
Admiral TURNER. I don't know this particular case. We will get you the
exact answer to that one and inform you about it, but it is quite probable that that other
case is unrelated to this in the -- well, not unrelated, but that that was a project that
still deserves to be classified.
[The material referred to follows:]
Construction of the Gorman Annex was begun in 1957 and the Annex was
dedicated in March 1959. Of the several MKULTRA projects conducted at Georgetown only one
involving human testing covered a time span subsequent to March 1959. Subproject 45 ran
from 1955 to 1963, thus it is possible that the final four years 1959-1963) of the
subproject could have been spent in the Gorman Annex. However, there is no reference to
the Gorman Annex or a "new Annex" in Subproject 45 papers, neither is there any
mention of the subproject moving to a new location in 1959 or later years.
Authorization to contribute CIA funds toward construction of the Gorman Annex is contained
in Subproject 35 of MKULTRA. Recently discovered material indicated that Dr. Geschickter
continued his research for sleep- and amnesia-producing drugs under Project MKSEARCH
through July 1967 at Georgetown University Hospital. But it is impossible to determine if
the facilities of the Gorman Annex were involved.
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Senator SCHWEIKER. I think that would give us a pretty good clue as to
what was going to be done in the wing the CIA helped to finance.
Was there any indication at all in the records you found that the project ultimately used
cancer patients or terminally ill patients in connection with this facility?
Admiral TURNER. I'm sorry. I missed your question because I was trying to
get the data on the last one. I will read you the blank.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Go ahead.
Admiral TURNER. QKHILLTOP. It doesn't help you, but--
Senator SCHWEIKER. Can you tell us what that is, or is it still
classified?
Admiral TURNER. I don't know, and I assume from the fact that we deleted
it, it is still classified, but I will get you that answer, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you. I'd like to see that information.
[See p. 171 for material referred to.]
Now my next question was: Is there any indication, Admiral, that projects in that
particular center involved experimentation on terminally ill cancer patients?
Admiral TURNER. I missed the first part of your question, sir. I am very
sorry.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you have any indication that some experiment in the
facility used terminally ill cancer patients as subjects? You do acknowledge in your
statement and it is clear from other documents that these kinds of experiments were at
some point being done somewhere. My question is, is there any indication that cancer
patients or terminally ill patients were experimented with in this wing?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, it does appear there is a connection here, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. The other question I had relates to the development of
something which has been called the perfect concussion. A series of experiments toward
that end were described in the CIA documents. I wonder if you would just tell us what your
understanding of perfect concussion is.
Admiral TURNER. Is that in my testimony, sir, or in some other document?
Senator SCHWEIKER. Subproject 54, MKULTRA, which involved examination of
techniques to cause brain concussions and amnesia by using weapons or sound waves to
strike individuals without giving and without leaving any clear physical marks. Someone
dubbed it "perfect concussion" -- maybe that was poetic license on the part of
our staff rather than your poets over there. I wonder if you could just tell us what brain
concussion experiments were about?
Admiral TURNER. This project, No. 54, was canceled, and never carried
out.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I do believe the first year of the project in
1955 was carried out by the Office of Naval Research, according to the information that
you supplied us. The CIA seems to have been participating in some way at that point,
because the records go on to say that the experimenter at ONR found out about CIA's role,
discovered that it was a cover, and then the project was transferred to MKULTRA in 1956.
Again, this is all from the backup material you have given us. So, it was canceled at some
time. I am not disagreeing
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with that, but apparently for at least a year or two, somebody was investigating the
production of brain concussions with special blackjacks, sound waves, and other methods as
detailed in the backup material.
Admiral TURNER. The data available to me is that this project was never funded by the CIA,
but I will double-check that and furnish the information for the record for you as to
whether there was ever any connection here and if so, what the nature of the work was.
[The material referred to follows:]
Mr. Laubinger corrected his testimony regarding Subproject 54 during
the September 21, 1977 hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research
of the Human Resources Committee. The relevant portion is reproduced below:
Mr. LAUBINGER. On project 54, it has got a rather sensational proposal in
there, in terms of the work that they propose to do, and you asked about the proposal and
I said, in fact, it was never funded under MKULTRA. Now, I overlooked -- at least, my
memory did not serve me correctly when I went through that file folder to see one
memorandum dated January 10, 1956, which makes it quite clear, as a matter of fact, that
that proposal was based on prior work that was funded by the Agency.
Senator SCHWEIKER. By what?
Mr. LAUBINGER. By the CIA. So, that information was in their file folder.
It did not happen to be in my head when I testified.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I think I might have read you that, and that is why I
argued at the time with you, because I think I had in front of me, as I recall, some
indication that it was funded there. I did read that to you. So, you did supply it to us;
there is no argument about that information.
Mr. LAUBINGER. Perhaps I am sort of headstrong, myself, and in my own
view, I am reading under the ULTRA project, that if it had been funded under ULTRA, it
would have had a project number and identified as such. The thing that threw me was that
it was funded, apparently, outside of any MKULTRA activity and it was under the normal
contracting process, so that it was not included in MKULTRA as any work done under that
funding umbrella.
The file folder that you have and I have, right here, makes it quite clear, however, that
a year's work was done through navy funding -- a navy funding mechanism -- on which the
proposal was based that ultimately came into the MKULTRA program. That second proposal was
never funded. So, there was conflict and I, personally, I think, introduced a little bit
of confusion in that in my testimony.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, do you agree or not agree with DOD's statement
here that even though the initial funding was navy, it was really I conduit for the CIA?
Mr. LAUBINGER. I think that is correct.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes; I would appreciate that. I would like to know how
it went from ONR to CIA after a year. Somebody made a decision to make that transfer, and
to make this an MKULTRA subject. There had to be some sort of review that led to a
decision to continue that kind of concussion -- total blackout, maximum amnesia, and
whatever else it was you were interested in -- study and testing.
Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, if I may try to say a few words on that, the
files that were available to us for inspection, which are limited, indicated that there
was a project being carried on by the Navy having to do with the, effects of brain
concussion. The CIA developed an interest in that, and considered funding it, but actually
never did, and as the admiral testified, the MKULTRA is merely a funding mechanism, a
place they go for money to do such things, but there is no evidence that I know of that
that project was ever funded.
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Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, I am confused, because here again is another
quote from a document that we have seen, which you have released and supplied to us:
Following is the technical progress made under the current [deleted]
contract: (a) Specializing instrumentation and numerous testing techniques have been
developed to obtain the desired dynamic data; (b) considerable data has now been obtained
supporting the resonance-cavilation theory of brain concussion; and (c) preliminary
acceleration threshold data has been obtained for a fluid-filled glass simulated skull.
It goes on to talk about a blast range and a 2,500-square-foot laboratory. The document
notes that "Three blast test series have been run to date." It describes a
special blackjack device, "a pancake-type blackjack giving a high peak impact force
with a low unit surface pressure."
I agree the records are inconclusive as to the results of this work, but it certainly
seems that some testing was done.
Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, you are putting us in the same position I think
you were stating that you were in earlier referring to documents not before us, but I
believe you are quoting from a proposal that someone sent to the Agency to fund this work,
and he is referring to past work. The past work would have encompassed a lot of things
like that, but CIA was not involved with that.
Senator SCHWEIKER. What do you mean, Admiral, on page 6 of your testimony
when you mention projects using magician's art? How do magicians get into the spook
business?
Admiral TURNER. I have interpreted this as to how to slip the mickey into
the finn, but I would like to ask my advisers here to comment.
Mr. BRODY. I think that is essentially it, Senator. It is surreptitious
administration of material to someone, deceptive practices, how to distract someone's
attention while you are doing something else, as I understand it. It was also some type of
a covert communication project involved with the study of how magicians and their
assistants perhaps communicate information to one another without having other people know
it. This is the type of thing that was involved, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Huddleston?
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, in your checking these newly discovered documents and interviewing members of the
CIA staff, did you find information that would confirm the contention described by the
reporters for the New York Times that this type of experimentation was begun out of a fear
that the Agency that foreign powers might have drugs which would allow them to alter the
behavior of American citizens or agents or members of the Armed Forces who were taken into
custody, and which would have resulted in false confessions and the like? Is my question
clear?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I haven't personally read the documentation on
that. In my discussions with the people who are well informed in this area at the Agency,
I am told that that is the case.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Was there any evidence or any indication that there
were other motives that the Agency might also be looking for drugs that could be applied
for other purposes, such as debilitating an individual or even killing another person? Was
this part of this kind of experimentation?
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Admiral TURNER. Yes; I think there is. I have not seen in this series of
documentation evidence of desire to kill, but I think the project turned its character
from a defensive to an offensive one as it went along, and there certainly was an
intention here to develop drugs that could be of use.
Senator HUDDLESTON. The project continued for some time after it was
learned that, in fact, foreign powers did not have such a drug as was at first feared,
didn't it?
Admiral TURNER. That is my understanding. Yes, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Is there any indication that knowledge gained as a
result of these experiments has been useful or is being applied in any way to present
operations?
Mr. BRODY. Senator, I am not sure if there is any body of knowledge. A
great deal of what there was, I gather, was destroyed in 1973. I would like to defer to
Frank here. Do you know of any?
Mr. LAUBINGER. I know of no drugs or anything like that developed under
this program that ever reached operational use or are in use today.
Senator HUDDLESTON. So apparently any information that was gathered was
apparently useless and not worth continuing, not worth further development on the part of
the Agency.
Mr. LAUBINGER. I am having difficulty hearing your questions.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I can hardly hear myself.
Admiral TURNER. I think the answer to your question is that we have no
evidence of great usefulness on this, and yet I think we should remember--
Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, is it accurate to say that this experimentation
produced few useful results or had little application at all to the operations of the
Agency or anybody else as far as we know?
Admiral TURNER. I think that is basically correct. At the same time, I
would point out that we had two CIA prisoners in China and one in the Soviet Union at this
time, and we were concerned as to what kinds of things might be done to them, but I am not
saying that--
Senator HUDDLESTON. Have you detected any sign that any other nation is
continuing or has in the past conducted experiments similar to this or with a similar
objective?
Admiral TURNER. I am not prepared to answer that one off the top of my
head, sir, but I will get it to you.
[The material referred to follows:]
We maintain no files of up-to-date information on the testing of drugs
in foreign countries. Some years ago we occasionally would review foreign research on
antibiotics and pharmaceuticals in connection with public health and civil defense
assessments. For a few years beginning in 1949 we assessed foreign research on LSD under
Project ARTICHOKE because of concern that such drugs might be employed against Agency and
other U.S. personnel. Information relative to this work has already been provided to
relevant Committees. In this early work we also occasionally looked at foreign human
experimentation; we long ago eliminated our holdings on this subject and no collection
requirements are any longer served. As consumer interest in this area has dropped off and
higher priority areas need attention, we have virtually no present coverage with the
possible exception of an occasional scanning of the literature for a specific program. To
the best of our knowledge no other unit in the Intelligence Community is tracking this
subject now.
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Senator HUDDLESTON. You don't know whether any of your agents anywhere in
the world have been subjected to any kind of procedure like this?
Admiral TURNER. We certainly know of other powers conducting research in
these areas, yes.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know how they go about that research?
Admiral TURNER. It is pretty sketchy, the information we have.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you know of any other organization in this country
or any institution that has conducted extensive research on unwitting individuals and
through unwitting institutions?
Admiral TURNER. Well, I have read something in the newspapers about this,
but I have not familiarized myself with it in specifies.
Senator HUDDLESTON. It is not a normal mode of operation for hitman
research, is it?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Wallop?
Senator WALLOP. Mr. Chairman, I only have one to follow up on Senator
Huddleston's questions and my earlier ones. You are not really saying, are you Admiral
Turner, that there are no mind-altering drugs or behavior modification procedures which
have been used by foreign powers?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I am not.
Senator WALLOP. I drew that inference partly in answer to my question
that you knew of no truth serum. Maybe that is a misnomer, but surely there are relaxants
that make tongues looser than they would otherwise be. Isn't that true?
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator WALLOP. So I think it is fair to say, too, that the experience of
many American prisoners of war in the Korean conflict would indicate that there are
behavior modification procedures in use by foreign powers of a fairly advanced degree of
sophistication.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator WALLOP. Again, I will just go back and say I think this must have
been part of the motivation. I don't think you would have mentioned Cardinal Mindszenty
had you thought his behavior was normal at the time or had anybody else. So, I would just
again say I think it is a little bit scapegoating. I don't think the object of this
hearing is in any way to lay blame on those passed or those dead or otherwise, but I think
it is a little bit scapegoating to say that it stopped with the directors of the CIA or
the DCT's of the time. Also I think it is a little bit scapegoating, to say they didn't
even know it, but that it was some lower echelon acting alone.
I think this was a behavior pattern that was prevalent in those years, and I think the
object lesson is that we have discovered, we think and we hope, through your assurances
and other activities of the Congress, means of avoiding future incidents of that kind. I
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafee?
Senator CHAFEE. No questions.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy, I think you have another question.
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Senator KENNEDY. Just talking about the two safe houses on the east and
west, coast as being the sources for the unwitting trials, now, the importance of this and
the magnitude of it, I think, is of significance, because we have seen from your records
that these we're used over a period of 8 or 9 years, and the numbers could have been
considerable. You are unable to determine, at least, in your own research, what the
numbers would be, and what the drugs were, how many people were involved, but it could
have been considerable during this period of time.
It would certainly appear to me in examining the documents and the flow charts of cash
slips that were expended in these areas that it was considerable, but that is a judgmental
factor on it, but I think it is important to try and find out what the Agency is
attempting to do to get to the bottom of it.
Now, the principal agent that was involved as I understand it is deceased and has been
deceased for 2 years. The overall agent, Mr. Gottlieb, has indicated a fuzzy memory about
this whole area. He has testified before the Intelligence Committee. Yet he was
responsible for the whole program. Then, the Director had indicated the destruction of the
various materials and unfamiliarity with the project.
Now, you have indicated in your testimony today that there are two additional agents on
page 9 of your testimony, you indicated there were two additional agents which you have
uncovered at the bottom of it, and you say the names of CIA officials who approved or
monitored the various projects. You talk about the two additional agents in your
testimony.
Now, I am just wondering if you intend to interview those agents to find out exactly what
is being done. I suppose, first of all, shouldn't the project manager know what was being
done?
Admiral TURNER. Our first problem, Senator, is that we have been unable
to associate an individual with those names at this point. We are still burrowing to find
out who these people are. We haven't identified them as having been CIA employees, and we
don't know whether these were false names.
Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that down, as I understand it?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking that. down, and you have every
intention of interviewing those people to find out whatever you can about the program and
project?
Admiral TURNER. My only hesitation here is whether I will do this or the
Justice Department.
Senator KENNEDY. It will be pursued, though, I understand?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Either through the Agency or through the Justice
Department?
Admiral TURNER. [Nods in the affirmative.]
Senator KENNEDY. Is it plausible that the director of the program would
not understand or know about the details of the program? Is it plausible that Dr. Gottlieb
would not understand the full range of activities in those particular safe houses?
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Admiral TURNER. Let me say it is unlikely. I don't know Mr. Gottlieb.
Senator KENNEDY. Has anybody in the Agency talked with Mr. Gottlieb to
find out about this?
Admiral TURNER. Not since this revelation has come out.
Senator KENNEDY. Not since this revelation? Well, why not?
Admiral TURNER. He has left our employ, Senator.
Senator KENNEDY. Does that mean that anybody who leaves is, you know,
covered for lifetime?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Why wouldn't you talk with him and find out? You have
new information about this program. It has been a matter of considerable interest both to
our committee and to the Intelligence Committee. Why wouldn't you talk to Mr. Gottlieb?
Admiral TURNER. Well, again, I think the issue is whether this should be
done by the Justice Department or ourselves.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, are we wrestling around because you and Attorney
General Bell can't agree--
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY [continuing]. On who ought to do it?
Admiral TURNER. We are proceeding together in complete agreement as to
how to go. I have, in connection with trying to find all of these Americans or others who
were unwittingly tested, I have some considerable concern about the CIA running around
this country interviewing and interrogating people, because I don't want to give any
impression that we are doing domestic intelligence.
Senator KENNEDY. I am just talking about one, in this case. That was the
man who was responsible for the whole program, and to find out whether anyone within the
Agency since you have had this new material has talked to Gottlieb since 1975, and if the
answer is no, I want to know why not.
Admiral TURNER. The reason he was not interviewed in connection with the
1975 hearings was that he had left the employ of the CIA and there was a concern on the
part of the Agency that it would appear to the investigators that the CIA was in some way
trying to influence him and influence his testimony before the committee. If these
committees have, no objection, we would be happy to contact Dr. Gottlieb and see if he can
augment anything here in this new information, though I don't think there is much in this
new information that be can add to as opposed to what was available in 1975.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, you see, Admiral Turner, you come to the two
committees this morning and indicate that now at last we have the information. We don't
have to be concerned about anything in the future on it. Now, I don't know how you can
give those assurances to the members of these committees as well as to the American people
when you haven't since 1975 even talked to the principal person that was in charge of the
program, and the records were destroyed. He is the fellow that was running the program,
and the Agency has not talked to him since the development of this new material.
Admiral TURNER. Our only concern here is the proprieties involved, and we
will dig into this and work with the Justice Department on
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who, if either of us, should get into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb so as not to prejudice
any legal rights that may be involved here, or to appear in any way to be improper.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, do I understand you have not contacted the Justice
Department about this particular case since the development of this new material about
Gottlieb?
Admiral TURNER. Not about Gottlieb specifically. We have contacted him.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is amazing to me. I mean, can you understand
the difficulty that any of us might have in terms of comprehending that when you develop a
whole new series of materials that are on the front page of every newspaper in the country
and are on every television, I mean, that means something, but it does not mean nearly as
much as the interest that we have in the fact about the testing of unwitting Americans,
and every single document that the staff reviews has Mr. Gottlieb's name on it and you
come to tell us that we don't have to worry any more, we have these other final facts, and
Mr. Gottlieb has not been talked to?
Admiral TURNER. Sir, I am not saying that these are in any way the final
facts. I am saying these are all the facts we have available.
Senator KENNEDY. And you have not talked to the person who was in charge
of the program, so what kind of value or what kind of weight can we give it?
Admiral TURNER. We are happy to talk to him. I think the issue here again
is one of propriety and how to go about this. We have not, I believe, enough new
information about Gottlieb's participation here to signal that his interview would be that
much more revealing than what was revealed in 1975.
Senator KENNEDY. The importance of it, I think, from our point of view,
is, he would know the drugs that were administered, the volume of drugs, how it was
administered, and in terms of your ability to follow lip to protect these people and their
health, to the extent that it can be done, that opportunity is being lost.
I want to get on to some others, but will you give us the assurance that you will get
ahold of Gottlieb or that you will talk to Attorney General Bell and talk with Gottlieb?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. And let us know as to the extent of it. I don't see how
we can fulfill our responsibility in this area on the drug testing without our hearing
from Gottlieb as well, but I think it is important that you do so, particularly since all
of the materials have been destroyed.
These other two agents, have they talked to them?
Admiral TURNER. We don't, know who they are, sir. We are trying to track
down and see whether these names can be related to anybody.
Senator KENNEDY. That is under active investigation by the Agency?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. And you have the intention of talking to those people
when you locate them. Is that correct?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, under the same circumstances as Gottlieb.
Senator KENNEDY. And you have people working on it? Admiral
TURNER. Yes, sir.
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Senator KENNEDY. With regards to the activities that took place in these
safe houses, as I understand from the records, two-way mirrors were used. Is that your
understanding?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. We have records that construction was done to
put in two-way mirrors.
Senator KENNEDY. And they were placed in the bedroom, as I understand.
[Pause.]
Senator KENNEDY. Well, we have documents--
Admiral TURNER. I believe that was in the Church record, but I don't have
the details.
Senator KENNEDY. And rather elaborate decorations were added, as I
understand, at, least, to the one in San Francisco, in the bedroom, which are French
can-can dancers, floral pictures, drapery, including installation of bedroom mirrors,
three framed Toulouse Lautrec posters with black silk mats, and a number of other -- red
bedroom curtains and recording equipment, and then a series of documents which were
provided to the committee which indicate a wide proliferation of different cash for $100,
generally in the $100 range over any period of time on the particular checks. Even the
names are blocked out, as to the person who is receiving it. Cash for undercover agents,
operating expenses, drinks, entertainment while administering, and then it is dashed out,
and then the other documents, that would suggest, at least with the signature of your
principal agent out there, that "called to the operation, midnight, and climax."
What can you tell us that it might suggest to you about what techniques were being used by
the Agency in terms of reaching that sort of broad-based group of Americans that were
being evidently enticed for testing in terms of drugs and others? Do you draw ally kind of
conclusion about what might have been going on out there, in these safe houses?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
[General laughter.]
Senator KENNEDY. There is a light side to it, but there is also an
enormously serious side. And that is that, at least the techniques which are used or were
used in terms of testing, and trying to find out exactly the range of drugs used and the
numbers of people involved and exactly what that operation was about, as well as the
constant reiteration of the, use of small sums of cash at irregular intervals. A variety
of different techniques were employed but there is an awful lot of documentation putting
these matters together.
When you look at the fact that, it is a broad range population that has been tested,
tested in these two areas, with the kind of cash slips that were used in this payment
mechanisms and decorations and all of the rest, we are not able to put a bottom line on it
but one thing is for sure, and that is, Gottlieb knows. That is one thing for sure,
because his name appears on just about every one of these documents, and it is, I think,
very important to find out what his understanding is of the nature of that. So, we will
hear more about that.
Admiral TURNER. I believe Gottlieb has been interviewed by the Congress.
Senator KENNEDY. That's right, he has, and in reviewing the record, it is
not very satisfactory, and it just seems with the new information
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and the new documentation and the new memoranda -- and he did not have the checks at that
time -- and with the wide variety of different memoranda with his name on it, his memory
could be stimulated on that.
Thank you.
Senator INOUYE. I would like to thank the admiral and his staff for
participating in this hearing. I believe the record should show that this hearing was held
at the request of the Agency and the admiral. It was not held because we insisted upon it.
It was a volunteer effort on the part of the Agency. I think the record should also
indicate that Admiral Turner has forwarded to this committee a classified file, including
all of the names of the institutions and the persons involved as the experimentors.
I should also indicate that this hearing is just one step involved in the committee's
investigation of drug abuse. Just as you have had much work in going over the 8,000 pages,
the staff of this committee has had equal problems, but I would like the record to show
that you have made these papers and documents available to the committee. I thank you for
that.
As part of the ongoing investigation, we had intended to call upon many dozens of others,
experimentors, or those officials in charge, and one of those will be Dr. Gottlieb.
In thanking you, I would like to say this to the American people, that what we have
experienced this morning in this committee room is not being duplicated in any other
committee room in any other part of the world. I doubt that very much. Our Agency and our
intelligence community has been under much criticism and has been subjected to much abuse,
in many cases justified, but this is the most open society that I can think of. For
example, in Great Britain there are about six people who are aware of the identity of the
man in charge of intelligence. In other countries, similar conditions exist. Here in the
United States we not only know Admiral Turner, we have had open hearings with him, such as
this. The confirmation hearings were all open.
In a few weeks, the Senate of the United States will debate a resolution to decide upon
whether we should disclose the amounts and funds being used for counterintelligence and
national intelligence. I would hope that, in presenting this issue to the public, the
media will take note that the Agency has cooperated and will continue to. The abuse that
we have learned about this morning is one I hope will never happen again, but without
constant oversight on the part of the Executive Office, on the part of the Congress, it
could happen again. It is important, therefore that we continue in this oversight
activity.
So, once, again, Admiral, I thank yon very much for helping us. We will continue to call
upon you for your assistance. We would like to submit to you several questions that the
members and staff have prepared. I hope you will look them over carefully and prepare
responses for the record, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman?
Senator INOUYE. Yes, sir?
Senator KENNEDY. I, too, want to thank Admiral Turner for his
responsiveness. I have had meetings with him in the committees and also conversations,
telephone conversations, and private meetings, and
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I have found him personally to be extremely responsive, and it is a very difficult
challenge which lie has accepted in heading this Agency. I want you to know, personally,
I, too, would like to see this put behind us. I don't think we are quite there yet in
terms of this particular area that we are interested in. I think the Intelligence
Committee has special responsibilities in this area of the testing, so we look forward to
working with you in expediting the time that we can put it behind, but it does seem to me
that we have to dig in and finish the chapter. So, I want to personally express my
appreciation to you, Admiral Turner, and thank you for your cooperation and your help, and
I look forward to working with you.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure you emphasized this
enough, but I think the record ought to show that Admiral Turner informed the Select
Committee on his own initiative when the new documentation was found. The documentation
has been made available to us voluntarily, in a spirit of cooperation.
I think this shows a vast difference from the mode of operation that existed prior to the
formation at least of the Church committee, and a difference that is very helpful.
Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Admiral.
We would now like to call upon Mr. Philip Goldman and Mr. John Gittinger.
Mr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger, will you please rise and take the oath.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. GOLDMAN. I do.
Mr. GITTINGER. I do.
Senator INOUYE. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, and after that, Mr. Gittinger.
Senator KENNEDY. Before we start in, we had a third witness, Mr.
Chairman, Mr. Pasternac, who planned to testify, traveled to Washington -- he, lives in
Washington, and was contacted recently --with the intention of testifying this morning.
And something -- he called us late this morning and indicated that he wanted to get a
counsel before he would wish to testify.
Senator INOUYE. Mr. Goldman.
Mr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, sir.
Next: Testimony of Philip
Goldman and John Gittinger
Previous: "Truth"
Drugs in Interrogation
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